A Festschrift for Kjell Johan Sæbø : in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the celebration of his 50th birthday by Grønn, Atle et al.
A Festschrift for Kjell Johan Sæbø 
- in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the celebration of his 50th birthday 
Edited by
Torgrim Solstad 
Atle Grønn 
Dag Haug 
Oslo 2006 
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
TABULA GRATULATORIA i
Atle Grønn, Dag Haug & Torgrim Solstad 
Introduction v
Bergljot Behrens
What the Structure of Criterion Predicates Told Me 1
Reinhard Blutner
Embedded Implicatures and Optimality Theoretic Pragmatics 11
Pål Kristian Eriksen
The Pragmatic Nature of Grammatical Categories 31
Cathrine Fabricius-Hansen
We Congratulate – by ... 45
Jens Erik Fenstad 
Grammar, Geometry and Brain 59
Atle Grønn 
Norwegian Bare Singulars: A Note on Types and Sorts 75
Janne Bondi Johannessen
Just Any Pronoun Anywhere? Pronouns and "New" Demonstratives in Norwegian 91
Jan Tore Lønning
Language Technology and the Science of Linguistics 107
Wiebke Ramm
Dispensing with Subordination in Translation – Consequences on Discourse Structure 121
Torgrim Solstad:
Unification and Word-Internal Pragmatics 137
Arnim von Stechow, Sveta Krasikova & Doris Penka:
Anankastic Conditionals Again 151
Ingebjørg Tonne
Elucidating Progressives in Norwegian 173
Eirik Welo
Pragmatics of the Complex DP in Ancient Greek 187
Henk Zeevat
Strategies for Specifying Relations 199
Thomas Ede Zimmermann
Knowledge and Desire, from a German Perspective 211
TABULA GRATULATORIA
Jens Allwood (Göteborg) 
Silje Susanne Alvestad (Oslo) 
Ingrid Kristine Andersen (Oslo) 
John Ole Askedal (Oslo) 
Tore Bentzen (Oslo) 
Truls Berggren (Oslo) 
Kaja Borthen (Trondheim)
Asbjørn Brændeland (Oslo) 
Karin Buvig (Oslo) 
Signe Bøhn (Oslo) 
Helge J. Jakhelln Dyvik (Bergen) 
Regine Eckardt (Göttingen)
Elisabet Engdahl (Göteborg) 
Stefan Engelberg (Mannheim) 
Ingrid Lossius Falkum (Oslo) 
Caroline Féry (Potsdam) 
Kai von Fintel (Cambridge, Massachusetts) 
Ruth Vatvedt Fjeld (Oslo) 
Kari Fonnes (Oslo) 
Thorstein Fretheim (Trondheim)
Jan Terje Faarlund (Oslo) 
Karen Gammelgaard (Oslo) 
Marianne Hobæk Haff (Oslo) 
Kristin Hagen (Oslo) 
Victor Hansen (Oslo) 
Helgi Haraldsson (Oslo) 
Hilde Hasselgård (Oslo) 
Hans Petter Helland (Oslo) 
Jorunn Hetland (Trondheim)
Helen de Hoop (Nijmegen) 
Gunnar Hrafn Hrafnbjargarson (Oslo/Tromsø)
Janneke Huitink (Nijmegen) 
Åsne Haaland (Oslo) 
Joachim Jacobs (Wuppertal) 
Stig Johansson (Oslo) 
Dalina Kallulli (Vienna) 
 i
Hans Kamp (Stuttgart) 
Elena Karagjosova (Oslo) 
Geir Kirkebøen (Oslo) 
Maria Filiouchkina Krave (Oslo) 
Manfred Krifka (Berlin) 
Tore Langholm (Oslo) 
Arne Martinus Lindstad (Oslo) 
Frode Lundemo (Halden) 
Benjamin Lyngfelt (Göteborg) 
Helge Lødrup (Oslo) 
Claudia Maienborn (Tübingen) 
Uwe Mönnich (Tübingen)
Joakim Nivre (Växjö) 
Steinar Nybøle (Halden) 
Åshild Næss (Oslo) 
Anders Nøklestad (Oslo) 
Stephan Oepen (Oslo/Stanford) 
Wencke Ophaug (Oslo) 
Kjartan Ottósson (Oslo) 
Barbara H. Partee (Amherst, Massachusetts) 
Anneliese Pitz (Oslo) 
Monika Rathert (Saarbrücken) 
Thomas Reppesgård (Oslo) 
Anders Ribu (Oslo) 
Kirsten Ropeid (Oslo) 
Antin Fougner Rydning (Oslo) 
Rob van der Sandt (Nijmegen)
Ingeborg Sanner (Oslo) 
Helle Frisak Sem (Oslo) 
Hanne Gram Simonsen (Oslo) 
Kåre Solfjeld (Halden) 
Jennifer Spenader (Groningen) 
Kjetil Strand (Oslo) 
Andreas Sveen (Oslo) 
Andreas Ropeid Sæbø (Oslo) 
Signe Ropeid Sæbø (Oslo) 
Rolf Theil (Oslo) 
Martha Thunes (Bergen) 
 ii
Janne von Koss Torkildsen (Oslo)
Johan Tønnesson (Oslo) 
Carla Umbach (Osnabrück) 
Espen Vestre (Oslo) 
Sten Vikner (Aarhus) 
Arnfinn Muruvik Vonen (Oslo) 
Else Bjerke Westre (Oslo) 
Olaf Westvik (Tromsø) 
Åse Wetås (Oslo) 
Torstein Winger (Oslo) 
Per Winther (Oslo) 
Tor A. Åfarli (Trondheim)
Dep. of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages, University of Oslo
 iii
INTRODUCTION
Upon realizing that Kjell Johan Sæbø was to turn 50 in May 2006, we 
immediately saw an opportunity to give something back to our dear friend,
colleague and mentor. Of course, we could have waited another ten or twenty 
years, but we wanted to demonstrate through this Festschrift that there is an 
active community of formal linguistics at the University of Oslo today, and that 
Kjell Johan is the leading figure of this community. Kjell Johan has done a lot to 
promote our shared conception of linguistics, and this Festschrift accords him 
the recognition he deserves – now, in 2006, and not in 2026. 
Since Kjell Johan is only halfway through his biography and bibliography,
we keep the introduction short and let the Festschrift speak for itself. We believe 
the articles collected here reflect both a sampling of the interests of Kjell Johan 
and the great respect he enjoys at the University of Oslo and among his fellow 
world-class semanticists. But above all, the Festschrift is an act of deep
friendship.
Necessity
The present volume contains several stories of close personal relations and 
shared research interests. More than 20 years ago, as a young research assistant 
of Arnim von Stechow in Konstanz, Kjell Johan worked on his doctoral
dissertation on necessity and modality. 15 years after the completion of his 
thesis, Kjell Johan reopened the topic in the 2001 Festschrift for Arnim von 
Stechow by celebrating his former supervisor with the article Necessary
Conditions in a Natural Language. And now, following a growing interest in 
“what you have to do if you want to go to Harlem”, von Stechow – in 
collaboration with his two current research assistants Sveta Krasikova and Doris 
Penka – makes his reply to Kjell Johan in Anankastic Conditionals Again.
A somewhat shorter story of shared interests in modality is told by another 
good friend and outstanding semanticist, Ede Zimmermann. Inspired by a 2005-
paper by Kjell Johan and a personal email exchange, Zimmermann presents his 
ideas on Knowledge and Desire, from a German Perspective.
Optimality
Kjell Johan has an amazing ability to always explore new fields of research.
Several of the contributors are inspired by Kjell Johan’s most recent work from 
a very productive last couple of years. His neighbour at the department of 
German and closest colleague for 25 years, Cathrine Fabricius-Hansen, 
congratulates Kjell Johan (We Congratulate - by ...) with a comment on his 
forthcoming paper “The Structure of Criterion Predicates”, in which he 
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introduces a new approach to by-locutions in event semantics. They wrote their 
first article together in 1983 and are still collaborating on various topics. 
In the last decade, Kjell Johan has broadened his fields of interest to include 
formal pragmatics, most recently within the fast-growing framework of 
Optimality Theory. The founders of the new OT-based approach to formal
pragmatics – Reinhard Blutner (Embedded Implicatures and Optimality 
Theoretic Pragmatics) and Henk Zeevat (Strategies for Specifying Relations)
both contribute new material at the heart of Kjell Johan’s current research
interests.
Seminal
This brings us to Kjell Johan’s role in creating an active community for formal
linguistics at the University of Oslo. Together with Jan Tore Lønning (Language
Technology and the Science of Linguistics), Kjell Johan was the organizer of the
circle Semantikkseminaret for many years. This informal meeting place for
formal semantics was founded by Jan Erik Fenstad (Grammar, Geometry and 
Brain), the former dean of the Faculty of Mathematics. Fenstad played an 
important role in creating an interest in these issues at our university at the time
when Kjell Johan was a young student of languages and mathematics.
Last year, Kjell Johan created a new circle for formal linguistics, Seminar i
teoretisk lingvistikk, where he is certainly the most active participant, regularly 
presenting new ideas at the cutting edge of current research. The profile of 
Seminar i teoretisk lingvistikk is somewhat broader than Semantikkseminaret
and comprises both semantics and syntax. One of the more syntactically oriented 
participants, Janne Bondi Johannessen (Just Any Pronoun Anywhere? Pronouns 
and "New" Demonstratives in Norwegian), represents this milieu in the present 
volume.
Kjell Johan has also played an important role in the more empirically
oriented SPRIK project (Languages in contrast), a project which brings together 
qualitative and quantitative methods, as in Wiebke Ramm’s contribution
(Dispensing with Subordination in Translation - Consequences on Discourse 
Structure).
Supervision
Besides his own research, Kjell Johan is greatly respected for his investment in 
doctoral education at the University of Oslo. For several years Kjell Johan was 
the coordinator of the PhD program in linguistics, a responsibility for which he 
was ideally suited, with his broad knowledge of linguistics and supportive
attitude towards students. 
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Kjell Johan is truly an interdisciplinary scholar – being a professor of 
German, he has supervised four completed doctoral dissertations on various 
languages, and none of them was conducted at his own department! This volume 
contains contributions from three of his former doctoral students – Bergljot 
Behrens (What the Structure of Criterion Predicates Told Me), Ingebjørg Tonne 
(Elucidating Progressives in Norwegian) and Atle Grønn (Norwegian Bare 
Singulars: A Note on Types and Sorts).
Currently, Kjell Johan is the supervisor of Eirik Welo (Pragmatics of the
Complex DP in Ancient Greek). Other young researchers who are inspired by
Kjell Johan and benefit from his insights through discussions, occasional
supervision and PhD seminars are Pål Eriksen (The Pragmatic Nature of 
Grammatical Categories) and Torgrim Solstad (Unification and Word-Internal 
Pragmatics).
Silence
When he’s not doing linguistics or spending his time with his dear family, Kjell 
Johan prefers the silence of Norwegian mountains or the silent movies of Buster 
Keaton – no words to analyze, just Kjell Johan alone with his thoughts. 
Oslo,
April 12, 2006. 
Atle Grønn, Dag Haug and Torgrim Solstad (editors). 
The editors wish to express their gratitude toward the Department of Literature, 
Area Studies and European Languages and its direction represented by Per 
Winther and Karen Gammelgaard, for financially and morally supporting this 
volume.
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WHAT THE STRUCTURE OF CRITERION 
PREDICATES TOLD ME 
BERGLJOT BEHRENS 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
bergljot.behrens@iln.uio.no
Abstract
The notion of criteriality in predicate descriptions introduced in an article 
by Kearns in 2003 is taken up in a recent article by Sæbø and formalized 
to explain the semantic processing of English by-clauses. In the present 
paper I relate this notion to another notion of criteriality introduced in the 
linguistic literature a decade earlier, and apply the recent work to ing-
participial adjuncts. 
1 The background 
One central goal of my work in linguistics about a decade ago was to get closer 
to an understanding of the discourse relations that are inferred to hold between 
ING-participial adjuncts and their matrix clauses, and to be able to explicate the 
procedures by which the individual discourse relations obtain. In this work event 
structure proved invaluable. The long established Vendlerian event 
classifications were used (Vendler 1967), and the causative event complex as 
modelled in Higginbotham (1994) and Kamp and Roßdeutscher (1994) allowed 
sub-events in the semantic representation. A causative discourse relation was 
seen to emerge if the adjunct expressed a causative event whose properties were 
such that the Causing sub-event was relatively void of content. This causing 
sub-event referent would thus look for its content in the matrix predicate, and 
the causative relation between matrix and adjunct would result from the 
causative relation in the complex adjunct event. 
(1)
(2)
(3)
Thomas ripped the screen door, breaking the latch. 
The branch fell over the beautifully laid table, breaking the glasses. 
Fortunately, he (Bernard the ´pisciniste´ who bites dentists) had 
found a dentist who fought back with anaesthetics, knocking 
Bernard out completely while the repair work was done. 
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Knock out, like break, is analyzed as a causative predicate whose causing event 
is underspecified. If Thomas breaks the latch we don’t know what activity he
enters into which causes the breaking, neither do we know what a dentist does to 
achieve the result of knocking you out. The information about these activities is 
expressed in the matrix clauses. 
The reverse relation was also seen to obtain in these structures: The 
underspecified causative predicate appears in the matrix, and the adjunct event 
properties saturate it, as in (4): 
(4)
(5)
(6)
They defaced the two poster girls, spray-painting a down-turned 
mouth on one, and adding a wrinkled brow to the other. 
The spray-painting and the adding of a wrinkled brow are events that fill in the 
underspecified conditions in the causative matrix defacing-event description.
The result is a relation of Specification or Elaboration between the clauses. 
In order to explain how a discourse relation between an ing-participial
adjunct and its matrix clause emerges, then, predicates must be seen as 
structured sets of entities, and there must be an element of under-specification in 
the complex structure to allow merging. The structure we define will also 
determine the relation that obtains with the merge.
The merge itself was at the time analyzed as a presupposition satisfaction, in 
that the non-finite structure introduced a floating event referent in the 
representation and the referent would consequently look for an event referent in 
the discourse universe to merge with. Merging, a prerequisite for the discourse 
relations Result and Elaboration, would only occur if an underspecified event 
referent was motivated in the representation.
While the analysis is successful in so far as it helps define certain
constraints on different discourse relations, a growing uneasiness was felt during 
this time over the lack of more finely grained event structure descriptions. The 
causative complex seemed to be the only predicate structure which allowed a 
compositional treatment of the inference leading to the emergence of a discourse 
relation of the kind exemplified above. Yet the relation of Elaboration is also 
inferred in discourses without causatives, such as in (5) and (6): 
He kept a low profile, driving an unobtrusive car. 
The (German) campers had treated his (the peasant’s) elaborate 
defence system with contempt, rolling back boulders to make a gap 
in the barricade and stealing the notices that warned them of the 
presence of vipers. 
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The problem here was that there seemed to be no sound analysis of a temporary
state/activity like “keep a low profile” or an activity of contemptuous treatment 
that would allow us to introduce an underspecified referent which we could then 
see filled with content by being supplied with the adjunct event properties in a 
merging operation. Intuitively there is something unspecified, rather abstract, 
even subjective in describing an activity as that of a contemptuous treatment or 
keeping a low profile, and the activities rendered in the ing-participial adjuncts 
do explicate, or specify, the criteria by which such descriptions are claimed to
hold. So a merge must take place in the interpretation and we need a basis for 
structuring the matrix predicate to allow this to happen in the semantic 
processing of the utterance. 
The Vendlerian classification of events has received a lot of attention, and 
has formed the basis for most of the linguistic literature on event structure. The
classification has proved insightful with respect to the understanding of temporal
relations and verbal aspect, but as (5) and (6) above demonstrate, the classifi-
cations do not help us structure eventualities to allow a compositional analysis 
of event merging in all its manifestations even within the limited syntactic 
configuration we are faced with here.
A major breakthrough in the direction of extending the compositional
analysis to cover cases of intuitively similar event relations comes from Ryle’s 
discussion of predicate types (1949), revived and brought further by Kate 
Kearns in her article on durative achievements (2003). The major difference 
between Ryle’s discussions and Vendler’s classification, according to Kearns, is 
the focus on the temporal dimension of the predicates, and as becomes evident 
from Kearns’ article, the temporal dimension has in many ways been an obstacle 
to further refining the structure of the predicate types observed by Ryle. In our 
cases, there is reference to just one event, but there are two descriptions of it. 
The temporal relation is not the central factor in the representation of the 
structure, as there is no temporal relation to be identified. How can we account
for such examples? 
Kjell Johan Sæbø, my intellectually inspiring supervisor at the time, has
recently taken Kearns’ article as an opportunity to further mining out the logical 
structure of criterion predicates and has come up with a most convincing and 
thorough solution to the problem (Sæbø, to appear). His work is impressive,
presenting structured solutions to vague, yet explicated conceptualizations of the 
semantic processing involved.
2 The notion of criteriality has changed 
In an article from 1995, I argue that a notion of criteriality is relevant for the 
understanding of how the relation of Elaboration emerges as the result of a 
merge between two event representations (Brynildsen 1995). Criteriality was 
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first introduced in an unpublished paper by Lars Hellan in 1994. The notion is 
understood as an argument role feature applying to the agents of certain events. 
One example is the notion of breaking, as in for example Thomas broke the 
latch. Although it must be possible to identify Thomas as responsible for the
breaking, it was observed that “there is no particular pattern of behaviour which 
has to be displayed by him in order to qualify for this role in the description.” 
(Hellan 1994: 11). The subject argument is non-criterial. The latch, on the other 
hand, is criterial in this event – as there would be no breaking unless there was 
some entity that broke, i.e. some entity that was affected. Criterial participants in 
Hellan’s sense can be exemplified in John ate the apple, in which the apple as
well as John are integrally involved in every bit of the eating. The exact 
behaviour of John is specified, and the apple is involved in every bit of it. 
This intuitive notion of non/criteriality was applied to transition verbs 
generally in my 1995 paper, and a distinction was made on the basis of whether 
or not the verbs are lexically categorized for criterial properties on their subject
arguments. The factor of criteriality was seen to distinguish between two types 
of achievements, such as in the criterial the capsule split and the non-criterial he
won. A minimal pair would be for example open and unzip, the first non-
criterial, the second specifying the behaviour of the subject participant. The 
distinction was formally represented by postulating an underspecified event 
referent causatively related to the result event in non-criterial achievements and 
accomplishments.
In my thesis of 1998 I dropped the notion of criteriality, but kept the 
analysis of causatives to include an underspecified Causing event. The notion of 
a non-criterial agent did not seem to be independently needed to introduce the 
sub-events I needed for the analysis. I did not at the time realize that a notion of 
criteriality could be spelled out to include examples like (5) and (6). 
The notion of criteriality is differently stated in Kearns, and with Kjell 
Johan’s seminal analysis of the structure of such predicates, I can now see that 
criteriality is after all an important feature in the analysis of the relations that
obtain between ing-participial adjuncts and their matrix clauses. Criteriality is a 
decisive feature for the distinction between Elaboration on the one hand, which 
does involve identifying two descriptions of one event, and a similar relation of 
Accompanying Circumstance which involves two events understood to form a 
unit, but not requiring full unification (see below). In the following I will present 
a simplified description of these predicates, based on Sæbø (forthcoming) and 
apply them to my cases. 
Kearns defines criteriality as a property of predicates, as opposed to Hellan's
definition of it as a property of the argument. A criterion predicate, according to
Kearns, expresses an individual-level, characterizing property of the event, in 
Ryle’s description stated as “a state-of-affairs which obtains over and above that
4
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which consists in the performance of the sub-servient task activity” (Ryle 1949:
143). The key notion of criteriality is that there is some conventional criterion an 
action must meet in order to qualify as being an event of the criterion-matching 
kind (Kearns 2004: 599). Thus the property Hellan attributed to the argument
role is shifted to a property of the predicate. The predicates taking non-criterial 
arguments in Hellan’s description, would, according to Kearns, be defined as 
criterion predicates. Applied to example (3) above, criteriality is a property of 
the matrix event: a defacing event is criterial in the sense that for a proposition 
with such a predicate to be true, there must be an action out there that meets 
some conventional criteria that qualify as being of the defacing kind. The action 
of spray-painting a down-turned mouth on one of the poster girls would match 
such a criterion, and so would the action of adding a wrinkled brow on the other 
poster girl. The criterion-matching suggests that the criterial predicate is 
parasitic upon a host (Kearns 2004: 596), i.e. it qualifies as of a particular type 
only in virtue of the nature of its host event. 
Criterion predicates in Kearns’ discussion are limited to achievements. As 
long as the predicates are of a nature that allows us to define them as complex
causatives, my analysis of ing-participial adjuncts in terms of a saturation of 
underspecified event referents does not need much refinement. However, if we 
look at the examples in (5) and (6), we are faced with predicates which also 
seem to be of the criterion matching kind, even though they are not complex
causatives. Kearns’ “cure the patient” is a causative with an implicit
underspecified causing event, but “treat the patient” is an activity, and so is 
“treat the peasant’s defence system with contempt”, cf. (6), yet both are criterial 
in the sense that the activities described are indefinite and must match some
conventional criterion for being adequately interpreted as a treatment. “Keep a
low profile”, cf. (5) would also match Ryle’s description of a predicate denoting 
a state of affairs which obtains over-and-above the “sub-servient” performance
of driving an unobtrusive car (in a manor setting). 
Put in plain language, the description of criterial predicates is simple
enough, and the identification of them is intuitively very satisfying for any 
analysis of the discourse relation Elaboration, which requires a merging of 
discourse referents. However, the minute we go one step further and try to 
model the procedure by which the two event descriptions merge into a complex
description of one event, we run into problems, as Sæbø (forthcoming)
convincingly argues. Events, according to him, cannot be ascribed individual 
level properties. Rather, it is the event type that can have such properties. What 
the German campers did to the French peasant’s defence system was of a 
contemptuous treatment kind. The outcome of this observation is that criterial 
predicates can be used to predicate over predicates, which means, in fact, that
they must be analysed as second order entities. By this analysis the first order 
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predication over an underspecified agentive event is included in the criterial 
predicate. This is spelled out in detail in Kjell Johan’s article. The predicate keep
a low profile would thus receive the following semantic representation: 
(7)
¢e, O²
¢P, indefinite²
f  Q
P(e)
P d Q
Low Profile(Q(pro))(Agent(e))(f)
,
There are details in this representation that are of little relevance for my
presentation here. The point is to demonstrate the second order predication: Q
predicates over the predicate P, which predicates over an underspecified 
agentive event e.
The semantic difference between a causative and a criterial predicate 
becomes particularly clear in the representation. While the causatives (not 
represented semantically here) have a Cause-operator, resulting in a 
counterfactual analysis, the criterial predicates on the other hand, have an 
Inclusion operator (<), by which the first order predication is included in or 
identical with the criterial predicate. This distinction is intuitively and logically 
very satisfying, as it explains how Elaboration can be inferred even though the
“host” does not cause the proposition with the criterial predicate to be true, as 
exemplified in (5) and (6). This structured decomposition of criterial predicates 
yields a representation with an unsaturated agentive event which invites a 
merging operation given that an appropriate “host” is introduced in the adjunct 
phrase. The matrix proposition will then be true in virtue of its host being true. 
While either predicate type in the matrix – causative or criterial – allows the 
predicate in the ing-clause to merge with an underspecified element, and thus 
gives rise to the Elaboration interpretation, the reverse case is different. A
criterial predicate in the ing-adjunct can give rise to the relation of Abstraction, 
as in (8), while a causative predicate in this position yields the relation of Result
or Consequence, as in (9): 
(8)
(9)
The siren sounded, indicating that the air raid was over.
[The ability of DNA to replicate itself is a consequence of its 
unique structure. It is shaped like two intertwined helices.] During 
cell division these unzip, splitting the molecule along its length into 
two separate helices. (from D.Attenborough: Life on Earth)
How wonderful that there are minds in our linguistic community that can cope 
with such problems and help us disentangle the complexity of these phenomena!
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3 What happened to Hellan’s notion of criteriality? 
Surprisingly, although criteriality in the sense of an argument role feature is 
spelled out in Hellan and Dimitrova-Vulchanova in a published paper from 
2000, there is no reference to it in either Kearns’ or Sæbø’s work. 
However, it seems that Sæbø’s analysis implicitly answers why the Agents 
in the criterial examples are understood to be what Hellan called “non-criterial”.
In Sæbø’s analysis of criterial predicates it is the implicit “host” event 
(explicated in the by-phrase, or in my examples in the ing-participial phrase) that
is assigned an Agent, not the “parasite”, cf. the Agent role on the event referent 
predicated over in the representation in (7) above. The formalization yields an 
interpretation in which the criterial event may in fact not be intended.
While the host predicate is normally concrete (cf. drive a car in (5) or sound
in (8) above), relating an event that an agent is the source of and responsible for, 
(and when communicated, observable and testable by the interlocutor), the 
criterial predicate relates the speaker’s perspective on that event, in the sense
that the speaker uses such predicates to classify the “host” event as an event of a 
certain type. Kearns appeals to “conventional criteria”, but they can clearly be
relatively subjective. Although the agent of the “concrete” event appears as the 
subject of the criterial event description, it is “non-citerial” in Hellan’s sense
with respect to the “parasite” predication. This makes sense if the Agent role is 
assigned to the host event in the semantic representation.
The identification and precise description of criterion predicates, then, also 
contributes to the task of recognizing subjectivity in text, and their successful
formalization in DRT is an important contribution to implementing not only 
abstraction, but also subjectivity and author’s voice in this framework. What is 
still somewhat unclear to me is whether the formalization as stated in (7) 
actually entails a subjective stance on the parasite predication. This question 
requires further consideration that I will not enter into at this point. 
4 A compositional analysis or a purely pragmatic inference?
The compositional analysis of the merge between the main clause predicate and 
the predicate in the modifying by-phrase is central in Sæbø’s article taken up 
here. The availability of an under-specified referent is secured by the structure
of the main predicate, the merging operation is secured by the preposition by.
ING-participial adjuncts of the kind I exemplify here, have no preposition to
guide or trigger a merging operation, yet the non-finiteness of the structure
creates a syntactic dependency which at least requires that its predicate hook on 
to the predicate in the matrix in some way. As opposed to by-phrase predicates,
however, ing-participial adjuncts may be fully acceptable in cases where a full 
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merging operation would fail. The result is that a discourse relation other than 
Cause, Elaboration or Abstraction (as mentioned in Sæbø forthcoming: 19) 
emerges. This is the case in for example (10) below, where two “concrete”
activity predicates appear in the matrix and adjunct respectively, and the relation
of “Accompanying Circumstance” emerges.
(10) ”I see,” she would say, nodding at some lengthy explanation of his. 
The non-finite properties of the ing-participial adjunct invite a compositional
analysis of the semantic updating procedures, but since the structure is 
acceptable for the implicit expression of a variety of relations, the ing-adjunct
must have other binding conditions than the by-locution. Among other things, an 
updating procedure must be worked out for ing-participial adjuncts which allows
for, but does not require a complete merge. The occasion of Kjell Johan’s 
anniversary cannot be an occasion for setting out to fully exploit the nature of 
these conditions, but the precise analysis of the by-locution within a new version 
of DRT, which includes binding conditions on referents, certainly sharpens 
questions related to it. I shall not go into these questions here, but mention that 
one of the things that lies ahead, is to define the relevant binding condition(s) on 
the adjuncts discussed here, in view of their not having an explicit marker of the
sort of quantifier involved. Furthermore, the compositional analysis rests on the
by-locution. This triggers questions related to the precise definition of other 
connecting expressions which link criterial, indefinite predicates to predications 
over their “sub-servient”, definite activities. English differs from for example
German and Norwegian in allowing these ing-participial modifiers – whether 
preceded by a preposition or not. Parallels to the by-locution exist in Norwegian,
and I presume the preposition ved + infinitives will receive the same analysis as
the English by + V-ing. But when the predicate relation is reversed, as in for 
example (8) and (9) above, Norwegian parallels appear with connectives like
dermed, which may introduce a sentence with a criterial predicate, as well as the 
complex conjunction slik at, which seems restricted to causatives (Behrens 
1998, 2005). Further work on the precise nature of such parallels will certainly 
be inspired by what the structure of criterion predicates told me. 
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Abstract
In a recent paper, Chierchia (2004) distinguishes global and local 
approaches to conversational implicatures and claims that several puzzles 
concerning implicatures in complex sentences can best be explained by a 
local approach. This conflicts with the Neo-Gricean view which is global 
in nature. I will argue that both approaches can coexist in optimality 
theoretic pragmatics where the proper place is assigned to the two 
approaches: a global theory describes the principal forces that direct 
communication – it has a diachronic dimension and allows a rational 
foundation of conversational implicatures; a local theory describes the 
actual, synchronic dimension – it explains how online, incremental 
interpretation of complex sentences is possible. The connection between 
the two views results from assuming that the results of global 
optimization fossilize into a local mechanism of utterance processing. 
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Chierchia (2004) distinguishes between global and local 
approaches to conversational implicatures. According to the global (Neo-
Gricean) view one first computes the (plain) meaning of the sentences; then, 
taking into account the relevant alternatives, one strengthens that meaning by 
adding in the implicature (Chierchia 2004: 42). This contrasts with the local 
view (also called post-Gricean) which first introduces pragmatic assumptions 
locally and then projects them upwards in a strictly compositional way where 
certain filter conditions apply. Representatives of the global view are Gazdar 
(1979), Krifka (1995), Soames (1982), Blutner (1998), Sauerland (2004), Sæbø 
(2004; 2005), and Russell (2004); the local view is taken by Chierchia (2004), 
van Rooy (to appear), Levinson (2000), and Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002).
Whereas many globalists argue against the local view and many localists 
against the global view, I think that proper variants of both views are justified if 
a different status is assigned to the two views: global theories provide the 
standards of rational discourse and correspond to a diachronic, evolutionary 
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scenario; local theories account for the shape of actual, online processing 
including the peculiarities of incremental interpretation. This way of 
distinguishing the two theories makes it possible to look for a systematic linking 
of the two perspectives. My suggestion is to take the idea of fossilization (or 
freezing/conventionalization/routinization) as a mediator between the two views. 
Though this suggestion is not much more than a speculative idea at the moment,
I will argue that optimality theoretic (OT) pragmatics has the potential for 
contributing the linking theory.
The next section gives a concise introduction into OT pragmatics. It is 
explained how OT can account for both the diachronic and the synchronic
perspective. Further, the idea of fossilization is explained with examples from 
Lexical Pragmatics. In Section 3 I explain how a global (Neo-Gricean) theory of 
conversational implicature can deal with several examples of embedded
implicatures. Section 4 gives some arguments why a local account is required in 
order to describe the actual construction of implicatures, and it speculates about 
the role of fossilization. Section 5, finally, draws some general conclusions. 
2 Optimality Theoretic Pragmatics 
OT can be seen as a general framework that systematizes the use of optimization
methods in linguistics.1 One component of OT is a list of tendencies that hold 
for observable properties of a language. These tendencies take the form of 
violable constraints. Because the constraints usually express very general 
statements, they can be in conflict. Conflicts among constraints are resolved 
because the constraints differ in strength. Minimal violations of the constraints 
(taking their strength into account) define optimal conflict resolutions. OT 
specifies the relation between an input and an output. This relation is mediated 
by two formal mechanisms, GEN and EVAL. GEN (for Generator) creates 
possible output candidates on the basis of a given input. EVAL (for Evaluator) 
uses the particular constraint ranking of the universal set of constraints CON to
select the best candidate for a given input from among the candidate set
produced by GEN. In phonology and syntax, the input to this process of
optimization is an underlying linguistic representation. The output is the
(surface) form as it is expressed. Hence, what is normally used in phonology and 
syntax is unidirectional optimization. Obviously, the point of view of the 
speaker is taken. This contrasts with OT semantics where the view of the hearer
is taken (Hendriks & de Hoop, 2001; de Hoop & de Swart, 2000). 
Bidirectional optimization (Blutner, 1998, 2000) integrates the speaker and 
the hearer perspective into a simultaneous optimization procedure. In 
1 A recent overview is given in Smolensky & Legendre (2005). For OT pragmatics the reader 
is referred to Blutner & Zeevat (2004) and Blutner, de Hoop & Hendriks (2005). 
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pragmatics, this bidirectional view is motivated by a reduction of Grice’s 
maxims of conversation to two principles: the I/R-principle, which can be seen 
as the force of unification minimizing the Speaker's effort, and the Q-principle, 
which can be seen as the force of diversification minimizing the Auditor’s 
effort. The Q-principle corresponds to the first part of Grice's quantity maxim
(make your contribution as informative as required), while it can be argued that 
the countervailing I/R-principle corresponds to the second part of the quantity 
maxim (do not make your contribution more informative than is required), the 
maxim of relation and possibly all the manner maxims. In a slightly different
formulation, the I/R-principle seeks to select the most coherent interpretation 
and the Q-principle acts as a blocking mechanism which blocks all the outputs 
which can be grasped more economically by an alternative linguistic input. This
formulation makes it quite clear that the Gricean framework can be conceived of 
as a bidirectional optimality framework which integrates the speaker and the 
hearer perspective. Whereas the I/R-principle compares different possible
interpretations for the same syntactic expression, the Q-principle compares
different possible syntactic expressions that the speaker could have used to
communicate the same meaning. 
I will give a very schematic example in order to illustrate some 
characteristics of the bidirectional OT. Assume that we have two forms f1 and f2
which are semantically equivalent. This means that GEN associates the same 
interpretations with them, say m1 and m2. We stipulate that the form f1 is less 
complex (marked) than the form f2 and that the interpretation m1 is less complex
(marked) than the interpretation m2 . This is expressed by two markedness 
constraints F and M for forms and interpretations, respectively – F prefers f1
over f2 and M prefers m1 over m2. This is indicated by the two leftmost
constraints in table (1). 
Table 1: Markedness and bias constraints in a 2-forms u 2-interpretations design
F M FoM *Fo*M Fo*M F*oM
<f1, m1> *
<f1, m2> * *
<f2, m1> * *
<f2, m2> * * *
Besides the markedness constraints so-called linking constraints can be 
formulated. There are precisely four independent linking constraints in the 
present example. The linking constraint FoM says that simple (unmarked) 
forms express simple interpretations (Levinson’s (2000) I-constraint), the 
constraint *Fo*M says that complex forms express complex interpretations 
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(Levinson’s M-constraint2), and the two remaining bias constraints express the
opposite restrictions. In the present case linking constraints can be seen as 
lexical stipulations that fix a form-interpretation relation in a memory (instance) 
based way. 
In the so-called strong version of bidirectional OT, a form-interpretation 
pair <f, m> is considered to be (strongly) optimal iff (I) no other pair <f, m’> can 
be generated that satisfies the constraints better than <f, m> and (Q) no other
pair <f ’, m> can be generated that satisfies the constraints better than <f, m>.
From the differences of markedness given by the constraints F and M the 
ordering relation between form-meaning pairs can be derived as shown in Figure 
1. The preferences are indicated by arrows in a two-dimensional diagram. Such 
diagrams give an intuitive visualization for the optimal pairs of (strong) 
bidirectional OT: they are simply the meeting points of horizontal and vertical 
arrows.3 The optimal pairs are marked with the symbol $ in the diagram. 
f1 $ q
 f2 q q
m1 m2
Figure 1: Diagram to illustrate strong bidirection 
The scenario just mentioned describes the case of total blocking where some 
forms (e.g., *furiosity, *fallacity) do not exist because others do (fury, fallacy). 
However, blocking is not always total but may be partial. This means that not all 
the interpretations of a form must be blocked if another form exists. McCawley 
(1978) collects a number of examples demonstrating the phenomenon of partial
blocking. For example, he observes that the distribution of productive causatives 
(in English, Japanese, German, and other languages) is restricted by the
existence of a corresponding lexical causative. Whereas lexical causatives (e.g. 
(1a)) tend to be restricted in their distribution to the stereotypical causative
situation (direct, unmediated causation through physical action), productive 
(periphrastic) causatives tend to pick up more marked situations of mediated,
2 Levinson’s M-principle should not be confused with the markedness constraint M 
introduced in Table 1. 
3 Dekker & van Rooy (2000), who introduced these diagrams, gave bidirectional OT a game
theoretic interpretation where the optimal pairs can be characterized as so-called Nash
Equilibria.
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indirect causation. For example, (1b) could have been used appropriately when 
Black Bart caused the sheriff's gun to backfire by stuffing it with cotton.
(1) a. Black Bart killed the sheriff. 
b. Black Bart caused the sheriff to die. 
To make things concrete we can take f1 to be the lexical causative form (1a), f2
the periphrastic form (1b), m1 direct (stereotypic) causation and m2 indirect 
causation.
Typical cases of partial blocking are found in morphology, syntax and 
semantics. The general tendency of partial blocking seems to be that "unmarked 
forms tend to be used for unmarked situations and marked forms for marked 
situations" (Horn 1984: 26) – a tendency that Horn (1984: 22) terms "the
division of pragmatic labour".
There are two ways of avoiding total blocking within the bidirectional OT 
framework and to describe Horn’s division of pragmatic labour. The first
possibility makes use of linking constraints and fits the intended form-
interpretation relation by stipulating the appropriate ranking of the constraints 
such that partial blocking comes out. Let’s assume that the two bias-constraints 
FoM and *Fo*M are higher ranked than the rest of the constraints. This can
be depictured as in Figure 2a. Hence, strong bidirection can be taken as 
describing Horn’s division of pragmatic labour when the appropriate linking 
constraints are dominating.
f1 $ q
           [M] 
           [F] 
  f2 q ($)
       m1          m2
f1 $ q
  f2 q $
      m1        m2
[*Fo*M]
[FoM]
   (a) (b)
Figure 2: Two ways of describing Horn’s division of pragmatic labour: (a) by 
assuming two dominant bias constraints; (b) by assuming markedness constraints and 
weak bidirection
The second possibility is to weaken the notion of (strong) optimality in a way 
that allows us to derive Horn’s division of pragmatic labour by means of the
evaluation procedure and without stipulating particular bias constraints. Blutner 
(2000) develops a weak version of two-dimensional OT, according to which the 
two dimensions of optimization are mutually related: a form-interpretation pair 
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<f, m> is called super-optimal iff (I) no other super-optimal pair <f, m’> can be 
generated that satisfies the constraints better than <f, m> and (Q) no other super-
optimal pair <f ’, m> can be generated that satisfies the constraints better than 
<f, m>. This formulation looks like a circular definition, but Jäger (2002) has 
shown that this is a sound recursive definition under very general conditions
(well-foundedness of the ordering relation). The important difference between 
the weak and strong notions of optimality is that the weak one accepts super-
optimal form-meaning pairs that would not be optimal according to the strong 
version. It typically allows marked expressions to have an optimal interpretation,
although both the expression and the situations they describe have a more
efficient counterpart.
Figure 2b shows that the weak version of bidirection can explain the effects 
of partial blocking without the stipulation of extra bias constraints; especially it
can explain why the marked form f2 gets the marked interpretation m2. This is a
consequence of the recursion implemented in weak bidirection: the pairs <f1,
m2> and <f2, m1> are not super-optimal. Hence, they cannot block the pair <f2,
m2> and it comes out as a new super-optimal pair. In this way, the weak version
accounts for Horn’s pattern of the division of pragmatic labour.
The two parts of Figure 2 describe the same set of solution pairs but the 
calculation of the solutions is completely different in the two cases. In the first 
case unidirectional optimization (either hearer or speaker perspective) is
sufficient to calculate the solution pairs. It is plausible to assume that this kind 
of OT systems can be used to construct cognitively realistic models of online, 
incremental interpretation (cf. Blutner 2006). The second case – involving the 
recursion of weak bidirection (super-optimality) – has a completely different 
status. Because of its strictly non-local nature the proposed algorithms that 
calculate the super-optimal solutions do not even fit the simplest requirements of 
a psychologically realistic model of online, incremental interpretation (Beaver &
Lee, 2004; Zeevat, 2000). The proper understanding of weak bidirection relates 
to an off-line mechanism that is based on bidirectional learning (Benz, 2003;
Blutner, Borra, Lentz, Uijlings, & Zevenhuijzen, 2002; Van Rooy, 2004). In 
these approaches the solution concept of weak bidirection is considered as a
principle describing the direction of language change: super-optimal pairs are 
tentatively realized in language change. This relates to the view of Horn (1984) 
who considers the Q and the I principle as diametrically opposed forces in 
language change. This conforms to the good old idea that synchronic structure is 
significantly informed by diachronic forces. 
For the sake of illustration let’s go back to our example in (1). Let’s assume 
a population of agents who realize speaker- and hearer strategies based 
exclusively on the markedness constraints F and M. In this population each 
content is expressed in the simplest way (f1) and each expression is understood 
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in the simplest way (m1). Let’s assume further that these agents communicate
with each other. When agent x is in the speaker role and intends to express m1,
then expressive optimization yields f1. Agent y is a hearer who receives f1 and, 
according to interpretive optimization, he gets the interpretation m1 – hence the 
hearer understands what the speaker intends: successful communication. Now
assume the speaker wants to express m2. With the same logic of optimization he
will produce f1 and the agent y interprets it as m1. In this case, obviously, the 
communication is not successful. Now assume some kind of adaptation either 
by iterated learning or by some mutations of the ranked constraint system
(including the bias constraints). According to this adaptation mechanism the 
expected ‘utility’ (how well they understand each other in the statistical mean) is 
improving in time. In that way a system that is evolving in time can be described 
including its special attractor dynamics. In each case there is a stabilizing final 
state that corresponds to the system of Figure 2a where the two Levinsonian 
(2000) constraints I (= [FoM]) and M (= [*Fo*M]) outrank the rest of the 
constraints. It is precisely this system that reflects Horn’s division of pragmatic 
labour. The only condition we have to assume is that the marked contents are 
less frequent to express in the population than the unmarked contents.4
Hence, the important insight is that a system that is exclusively based on 
markedness constraints such as in Figure 2b is evolutionary related to a system
based on highly ranked bias constraints such as in Figure 2a. We will use the 
term fossilization for describing the relevant transfer.5
3 A global theory of embedded implicatures 
In OT pragmatics, a global theory of conversational implicatures is realized by
using weak bidirection and systems of markedness constraints for forms and 
interpretations. In this section I will argue that the basic findings of 
conversational implicatures in complex sentences can be explained by this 
rational approach to communication.
4 For more discussion of the role of frequencies in an evolutionary setting see Stalnaker
(2006).
5 Mattausch (2004) has implemented the idea of fossilization using stochastic OT. In that way
he could explain the evolution of reflexive marking strategies in English and he was able to 
show how an optional and infrequent marking strategy like that of Old English could evolve 
into a pattern of obligatory structural marking like that attested in modern English. 
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3.1 Reciprocals, strength and relevance 
A good candidate for a markedness constraint in the interpretive domain relates 
to the strongest meaning hypothesis (SMH). In its original formulation the 
constraint is used as a formal tool for analyzing the remarkable variation in the
meaning of reciprocal expressions like each other or one another (e.g. 
Dalrymple, Kanazawa, Kim, Mchombo, & Peters, 1998). Consider for instance
the following example:
(2)
(3)
a. The girls saw each other.
b. The girls are standing on each other. 
Sentence (2a) entails that every girl saw every other girl. This contrasts with 
sentence (2b) which obviously does not entail that each of the girls is standing 
on each of the others. The interpretation that is strongly preferred in these and 
similar cases is best described by the SMH given below: 
SMH: A reciprocal sentence is interpreted as expressing the logically 
strongest candidate truth conditions which are not contradicted by 
known properties of the relation expressed by the reciprocal scope 
when restricted to the group argument.
Subsequent work has suggested to extend the application of the SMH for 
treating other phenomena with plurals (Winter, 2001), prepositions (Zwarts, 
2003) and quantification (Blutner, Hendriks, & de Hoop, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the SMH makes the wrong predictions in complex sentences 
such as
I doubt that the girls saw each other. 
What is doubted in sentence (3) is the proposition that every girl saw every other 
girl. Of course, this doubt conforms to the strongest interpretation of the 
embedded sentence. Consequently, the complex proposition that is expressed by 
(3) relates to the weakest interpretation that is possible because of the negation 
element in the matrix sentence. It is justified already when some girl did not see 
any other girl. Hence, the global application of the SMH doesn’t give the right
result (we had to replace it by a weakest meaning hypothesis in downward 
entailing contexts!) 
Advocates of the SMH have taken these arguments as showing that the 
principle is based on logical properties of lexical items and directly affects truth 
conditions. Because of its truth-conditional, nondefeasible nature, the SMH 
should be applied locally first. In a second step the projection of the generated 
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truth conditions to the complex sentence structure appears (using the means of
compositional semantics). As a consequence, we have to give up the Gricean 
idea of conversational implicature in the context of reciprocals (and the other 
examples mentioned).
In Blutner (2006) I have argued, however, that a global, Gricean solution is 
possible if we replace the SMH by a principle of optimal relevance. Of course, it 
is essential to have a proper measure of relevance. Van Rooy (to appear) listed
some candidate definitions he found in the linguistic, philosophical and 
statistical literature. For goal-oriented theories of relevance, but also for the
entropy-based version it is essential that the value of relevance can be positive
and negative. The maxim of optimal relevance then means maximizing the 
absolute amount of relevance.
Merin (1997) identified two crucial conditions for a proper theory of 
relevance, i.e. a theory of relevance that conforms to a compositional, linear 
mode of calculating the value of relevance for complex sentences:
(4) a. Rel(A&B) = Rel(A)+Rel(B) if propositions A and B are 
 independent 
b. Rel(A) = -Rel(A)
Using a theory of relevance that satisfies these conditions (among them standard 
statistical relevance and Carnap’s measure of relevance; cf. van Rooy, to 
appear), the Neo-Gricean approach can provide an explanation of the given
examples. Of course we have to skip then the idea of cancellability as a general
criterion for conversational implicatures.
An early example that justifies the idea that conversational implicatures are
NOT necessarily cancellable is due to a classic paper by Sadock (1978): 
Grice states explicitly that generalized conversational implicatures,
those that have little to do with context, are cancellable. But is it not 
possible that some conversational implicatures are so little dependent 
on context that cancellation of them will result in something 
approaching invariable infelicity? In a paper in preparation, I argue 
that sentences of the form almost P only conversationally entail not P,
contrary to the claim made by Karttunen and Peters (1979). The 
implicature is straightforwardly calculable and highly nondetachable 
but, unfortunately for my thesis, just about uncancellable. The
sentence Gertrude not only almost swam the English Channel, in fact
she swam it is, I admit, pretty strange. (Sadock 1978: 293) 
In Section 3.3 I will come back to the cancellability issue. 
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3.2 Explicatures
In the relevance theoretic literature (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002,
2003, 2004) the term explicature is used for pragmatic inferences that directly
affect truth-conditions.
A key feature in the derivation of an explicature is that it may involve
‘free’ enrichment, that is, the incorporation of conceptual material 
that is wholly pragmatically inferred, on the basis of considerations of 
rational communicative behaviour, as these are conceived of on the 
relevance-theoretic account of human cognitive functioning (Carston, 
2003: 819). 
This is one of the standard examples:
a. John had a drink ළ John had an alcoholic drink 
b. I doubt that John had a drink ළ I doubt that John had an 
 alcoholic drink
(5)
(6)
(7)
Other examples of free enrichment relate to domain restrictions in the case of 
quantification. In the following example the explicature depends on the context 
– assume the sentence is uttered in a typical party situation: 
a. Everyone left early (ළ everyone at the party left early)
b. Either everyone left early or the ones who stayed on are in 
 the garden
Also mereonomic restrictions can be seen as not fully specified by the
underlying semantics and thus constituting a task for free enrichment: 
a. This apple is red (ළ the outside of the apple is red)
b. I doubt that the apple is red 
A straightforward observation is that all these examples are based on I/R-
implicatures according to the Neo-Gricean classification. Hence, in order to give
an explanation of the projection properties it is essential to have a proper 
measure of relevance as suggested above – a measure which hopefully can be 
extended to other complex forms than those constructed by negation and
conjunction.
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3.3 Scalar implicatures 
Blutner (1998) proposed an approach to "scalar implicatures" that has some
advantages over the traditional approach based on Horn-scales (see Gazdar, 
1979). For example it solves a famous puzzle given by James D. McCawley. In 
the exercise part of his logic book McCawley (1993: 324) points out that the
derivation of the exclusive interpretation by means of Horn-scales breaks down 
as soon as we consider disjunctions having more than two arguments. For 
example, from a disjunctive sentence of the form John or Paul or Ede is sick we 
can conclude that only one of the three is sick. However, the traditional 
approach predicts that not all the disjuncts can be true, which is too weak. The
solution was to admit a whole lattice of alternative expressions constructed by 
the AND operator in order to block all interpretations with more than one 
individual sick. 
As discussed in Blutner (2006), the global solution also works in cases like 
(8a) where the implicatures are (8b-c): 
(8)
(9)
a. Someone is sick
b. The speaker does not know who is sick
c. The speaker knows (exactly) one individual is sick (in a 
given set of individuals)
The analysis is based on three general assumptions: (i) a Neo-Gricean theory of 
scalar implicatures based on a global blocking mechanism; (ii) Soames’ (1982) 
reconsideration of the epistemic status of scalar implicatures paired with a 
default mechanism of neg-raising (Horn, 1989); (iii) a linear theory of relevance 
as suggested before. Related proposals are due to recent suggestions by 
Sauerland (2004) and Russell (2004). 
It is not difficult to see how to analyse the projection behaviour of scalar 
implicatures via our global theory of implicature projection. I start with one of 
Carston’s (2002) examples:
a. Mary lives somewhere in the south of France 
b. Speaker does not know where in the south of France Mary 
 resides 
c. If Mary lives somewhere in the south of France, then I do not 
know where
Obviously, uttering (9a) implicates the proposition (9b). The derivation of this 
implicature is analogous to the derivation of (8b). However, the implicature does 
not locally arise in the antecedent of a conditional such as in (9c). If it would 
arise, then the whole sentence (9c) would be a tautology, but it is not. The 
21
Reinhard Blutner 
explanation in the present Neo-Gricean framework is obvious: the expression 
alternatives to (9c) have to be logically stronger than (9c) itself. Because the 
weak quantifier somewhere in the south of France occurs in the antecedent of a 
conditional, replacing it by concrete locations results in a weaker expression that 
does not count as an expression alternative. Hence, the implicature does not
arise.
Chierchia (2004) discussed many other examples with scalar implicatures
and concluded that only a local theory can account for the observed phenomena.
However, Sauerland (2004) and Russell (2004) have shown that a global 
Gricean theory is appropriate to account for each of the implicatures Chierchia
identified. In agreement with these authors we can conclude that a global 
account is possible for the treatment of scalar implicatures.
Scalar implicatures are normally considered to be cancellable. However, it 
has often been remarked that cancellability is difficult to distinguish from 
clarification (cf. Burton-Roberts, 2005) and also from contextual change. With 
regard to the latter point, van Kuppevelt (1996) has carefully argued that scalar 
implicatures are topic-dependent, i.e. they are dependent on the question being 
asked in a particular conversational setting. Consider the following example as 
discussed by van Rooy (to appear): 
(10)
(11)
a. Question: Who has 2 children? 
b. Answer: John has 2 children 
c. John doesn’t have more than 2 children 
In this case, the implicature (10c) does not even arise. This is different from the 
following situation where the question is focussing on the number of children: 
a. Question: How many children does John have? 
b. Answer: John has 2 children 
c. John doesn’t have more than 2 children 
In this case the implicature (c) arises; however, it cannot be cancelled. Van 
Kuppevelt (1996) argues that the ‘phenomenon of cancellation’ is in fact an 
effect of contextual change. In this sense scalar implicatures are particularized
conversational implicatures. Obviously, the topic-dependency of scalar 
implicatures is not restricted to numerals but also holds in connection with the 
Q-implicature triggered by ‘or’ (cf. Van Rooy, to appear). The consequence of 
this finding is that cancellability cannot longer count as a criterion for 
identifying conversational implicatures.
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3.4 Free choice interpretation 
In a recent paper, Kjell Johan Sæbø (Sæbø, 2004) has developed a natural 
pragmatic solution to the long-standing problem of Free Choice Permission. In 
his theory the free choice assumption (12b) that is communicated by uttering 
sentences like (12a) comes out as a conversational implicature.
(12)
(13)
(14)
a. You may take an apple or a pear.
b. You may take an apple and you may take a pear. 
Using the framework of Bidirectional OT his solution conforms to the global
approach to conversational implicature. However, examples like (13) proposed 
by Kamp (1973) argue against seeing this inference as a purely conversational
implicature.
Usually you may only take an apple. So, if you may take an apple 
or a pear, you should bloody well be pleased. 
In cases like (13) the free choice inference projects like an explicature. The 
disjunctive permission is the antecedent of a conditional, and the strong 
interpretation of it rather serves to weaken the assertion than to strengthen it.
Sæbø (2004) has interpreted this behaviour by considering the implicated
assumption as constituted by an utterance report which is used in the embedded
sentence (‘they tell you that you may take an apple or a pear’). He points out
that the strong interpretation is not always available in embedded positions and 
gives the following examples.
a. I hope you may take an apple or a pear; then, you won't feel 
 so hungry.
b. If you may take an apple or a pear, you must take a pear. 
c. If they tell you that you may take an apple or a pear, take a 
 pear. 
In example (14a), the free choice is not readily available, but in (14b) it is, at 
least if a paraphrase like (14c) is possible. Sæbø's treatment relates to Carston’s 
(2004) analysis that also refers to different uses of the embedded material 
(Carston 2004; especially chapter 4). Carston distinguishes between material
that is used descriptively or meta-representationally. In case of the meta-
representational use the implicated assumption becomes part of the proposition 
expressed and projects like explicatures.
Generally, it can be concluded that the strategy of treating embedded
material meta-representationally can be useful, but it still leaves us with the
problem of explaining the exact projection behaviour of (ordinary) implicatures,
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a task that cannot be solved by simply stipulating two modes of use (as RT 
does). Instead, implicatures in complex sentences can be explained best by the 
global, rationalist approach to communication where the introduction of meta-
representational elements is modelled.
4 Fossilization and a local theory of embedded implicatures 
In the previous section I outlined a global approach to implicatures in complex
sentences based on a Neo-Gricean framework of OT pragmatics. The approach 
rests on several assumptions that I will list here once more:
(i) Merin’s (1997) local theory of relevance. 
(ii) A Neo-Gricean theory of scalar implicatures based on a global blocking 
mechanism.
(iii) Soames’ reconsideration of the epistemic status of scalar implicatures 
paired with a default mechanism of neg-raising. 
None of these assumptions has a stipulative character; rather each of them is
motivated by independent evidence that has nothing to do with the projection 
behaviour of implicatures. While claiming that a global theory can explain 
complex implicatures, it is essential to state that a global theory cannot count as 
an actual mechanism of language performance, since it doesn’t conform to the 
principles of online, incremental interpretation. Rather, a global account
describes the general forces that direct communication. It has a diachronic
dimension. In order to get a synchronic system which describes the actual
pragmatic inferences, the idea of fossilization has been proposed (Blutner, 
2006). A theory of fossilization describes how pragmatic inferences become
automatized and form part of an efficient cognitive system that makes fast 
online processing possible. The theory conforms to a memory/instance theory of 
automatization (cf. Logan, 1988). 
The presumption of fossilization can be seen as a theory that realizes
Dawkins’ (1983) idea of memic selection. This idea conforms to the “universal
Darwinist” claim (Dennett, 1995) that the methodology of evolutionary theory is 
applicable whenever any dynamical system exhibits (random) variation,
selection among variants, and thus differential inheritance. Related proposals are 
Steels’ recruitment theory of cultural evolution (e.g., Steels, 1998) and Kirby’s 
paradigm of iterated learning (e.g., Kirby, 2000). 
OT is a system of knowledge representation that invites for the development
of the evolutionary perspective because the manipulation of the different 
rankings of a given system of constraints is a powerful but computationally
simple task. It has been applied to the area of lexical pragmatics, especially in 
order to explain the phenomenon of broadening and strengthening in connection 
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with the prepositions om and rond in Dutch (Zwarts, 2005). In a related paper 
(Blutner, 2006) I proposed to apply the theory to phenomena outside the realm
of lexical pragmatics.
Though real simulation results are missing at the moment there are some 
psychological implications of the new perspective of fossilization. Recent data 
of Noveck’s experimental pragmatics group (cf. Noveck, 2005) suggests that 
children are sometimes more logical than adults. In one of their experiments
they presented children and adults with sentences such as (15a) where a 
relatively weak term is used in scenarios where a stronger term is justified. From
a logical point of view (15a) is obviously true. We know that elephants in 
general have trunks, from which it logically follows that (at least) some of them
do. Things are changing if we take pragmatics into account. Understood as 
carrying a scalar implicature, a sentence like (15a) is not true but false. In order
to make the situation even more perplex for the subjects the experimental items
like (15a) were presented along with control items that are patently true or 
patently false, like in (15b) and (15c) respectively:
(15) a. Some elephants have trunks.
b. Some houses have bricks. 
c. Some crows have radios.
Surprisingly, younger children are typically more likely than adults to find the
experimental utterance acceptable. One possibility to interpret this data is to 
assume that children are pragmatically delayed at young ages. From the 
fossilization perspective, it can be claimed that scalar inferences become
automatic with age and that the experimental results are simply revealing how 
such inference-making matures.
This way of explaining the basic empirical finding contrasts with the view 
of Relevance Theory that ‘would suggest that children and adults use the same 
comprehension mechanisms but that greater cognitive resources are available for 
adults, which in turn encourages them to draw out more pragmatic inferences’
(Noveck, 2005). Noveck’s data seem to confirm Relevance Theory, especially 
the data that show a link between scalar-inference production and task 
complexity. However, the present view of fossilization does not necessarily 
conflict with these findings since memory-based automatization does not mean 
that the task complexity cannot have any influence. 
5 Conclusions
As with global and local accounts of lexical pragmatics, the present
investigation sees global and local accounts of embedded implicatures as 
complementary: the global account has a diachronic dimension and allows a 
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rational foundation of conversational implicatures; the local account describes 
the actual, synchronic dimension – it explains how online, incremental 
interpretation of complex sentences is possible. The connection between the two 
views results from assuming that the results of global optimization fossilize into 
a local mechanism of utterance processing. A theory of fossilization has 
important consequences for overcoming the predominant, synchronic view of 
language, for assimilating language competence and language performance, and 
for getting a better understanding of the division of labour between semantics 
and pragmatics. At present, we do not have a real theory of fossilization, but it
appears that OT pragmatics has the appropriate tools in order to formulate such
a theory. 
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Abstract
This paper promotes the hypothesis that central grammatical categories 
must be analysed as pragmatic rather than semantic entities, in order to 
explain their seemingly redundant typological distribution. A case is 
made of the relatively complex English past tense system versus the 
single Russian past tense, and it is shown how the distinctions within the 
former system can be analysed in terms of pragmatic features like topic 
and focus, and how it thus can be explained how Russian may do with 
just a single past tense, without this leading to a communicative 
asymmetry between Russian and English. 
1 The pragmatic nature of grammatical categories 
The topic of this paper is a seemingly trivial linguistic fact, but it has strong 
implications for linguistic description: It is the fact that a grammatical category 
may be compulsory in one language, but absent in another. Compare, for 
instance, the distinction between the past tense system in English and that of 
Russian. Whereas English has several tense forms in the past – e.g. the perfect, 
the preterit and the pluperfect – Russian has only one. This means that the 
Russian past tense sentence in (1) has three possible English translations:1
(1) Ja  kupi-l  nov-uju kurtk-u. 
I    buy.PEF-PST.M.S new-ACC.F  jacket-ACC2
'I have bought a new jacket.' / 'I bought a new jacket.' / 'I had 
bought a new jacket.'
This seems trivial, because is not the English past tense system just another case 
of language redundancy? Most marking of grammatical categories seems to be 
1 The fact that Russian makes a distinction between perfective and imperfective aspect, is 
irrelevant to the asymmetry between the English and the Russian tense systems. A past tense 
imperfective verb in Russian would have the same threefold translational possibility in 
English.
2 The abbreviations found in the glosses are explained at the end of the paper. 
Pål Kr. Eriksen 
redundant, because the interpretations of the different categories would in any 
case be recoverable from the context. For instance, if a language does not 
express any tense distinctions at all, the narrative context will nevertheless show
whether the sentence you utter should be interpreted as present, past or future
tense. Most reasonably, the same must be the case with the asymmetry between 
the English and the Russian past tense systems. Russian may do with only one
past tense form in (1), because the three different interpretations are dependent 
on three different contexts.
The asymmetry between languages as far as the number of grammatical 
categories is concerned, is thus mainly dealt with by letting either semantics or 
pragmatics handle the interpretations in question. If a category C is expressed 
formally in language X, the interpretation of C becomes a semantic/lexical issue. 
If the same category C is not expressed in language Y, the context will show us 
whether an utterance U from language Y would correspond to C or another 
category C' in language X – thus, an interpretation of U in language Y, entailing 
the concept in C, must be explained in pragmatic/contextual terms.
This is a very reasonable idea, not at least since the alternative would be to 
resort to the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis: The presence of a grammatical category in 
language X, and its absence in language Y, would mean that the concept of this
grammatical category would be unthinkable to the users of language Y. For 
instance, it would follow that the absence of tense in Hopi means that speakers 
of Hopi do not have any concept of time. Since the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, at 
least in its strong form, has been completely rejected by modern linguistics, we 
would want to avoid such a conclusion, and the alternative is to rely on 
contextual interpretations. 
The pragmatic solution in itself is therefore not a problem. The problem is 
how linguists have implemented it in practice in semantics and in linguistic
typology. First of all, the pragmatic interpretations themselves are rarely 
described. More work is needed on how the sense of different grammatical 
categories can be obtained from the context. Secondly, the pragmatic solution 
has been treated merely as a default option for unexpressed categories, without
considering that it also has consequences for the analysis of the overtly 
expressed categories. If the typology of grammatical categories is such that in 
any language a given grammatical category may be realised either as an overtly 
expressed category or as a contextual interpretation, it follows that the semantics 
of the overtly expressed category must be described in such a way that it can be
shown how the same sense could just as well have been retrieved from the 
context. In short terms, grammatical categories must be analysed as pragmatic 
rather than semantic entities. 
In order to appreciate this point, let us consider the analysis of the past 
tense. In the traditional Reichenbachian model tenses are described in terms of 
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the three features E (=Event point), R (=Reference point) and S (=Speech point),
and the difference between the perfect and the preterit is a question of whether R 
coincides with E or with S: 
Perfect: E_R,S (E precedes R, which coincides with S) 
Preterit: E,R_S (E coincides with R, and they precede S) 
Pluperfect: E_R_S (E precedes R, which precedes S)
How do we describe the semantics of the single Russian past tense within this 
model? We could either give it a very simple semantic representation, by only 
using the features E and S: 
Russian past tense: E_S (E precedes S) 
This correctly covers the semantics of the Russian past tense, but it fails to
describe how the different past tense interpretations like perfect, preterit, etc…, 
are retrieved from the context. Another possibility would be to take the different 
contextual interpretations as the starting point, and give them the same 
descriptions as the English tenses, but this solution fails to explain how the 
contextual interpretations are related to the lexical semantics of the 
morphological category itself, which necessarily must be the same in all three 
contexts. The Reichenbachian “reference point” is at the heart of the problem,
but although the term may be understood as some kind of pragmatic concept, 
this term alone may not necessarily be the ideal solution.
What we need is a model where a simple semantic description is given to the
Russian past tense category, but where it is shown how different pragmatic
structures overlaying that semantic description will lead to the wanted
interpretations. But it follows that in order to do so, it will first be necessary to 
show how the differences between the English past tenses are mainly of a 
pragmatic nature. This analysis will serve to exemplify the said main target of 
the paper: To show how redundant grammatical categories may, and, whenever 
possible, should be analysed as mainly pragmatic in nature, in order to explain
how they may be compulsory in some languages, but absent in others. 
2 A pragmatic analysis of a complex past tense system 
English has three main tense distinctions in the past: The perfect, the preterit and 
the pluperfect.3 There has been some discussion about whether the perfect forms
should be considered real tenses or subtypes of aspect (cf. Comrie 1976: 5-6, 52-
65). For the present discussion the question is irrelevant. The perfect forms do 
3 I will ignore such subtypes as the past conditional in this paper. 
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not interfere with the Russian aspect, as any Russian aspect can be given both 
perfect and preterit interpretations in English. The same holds for the perfect 
tenses in English, which can take both progressive and non-progressive event
descriptions as their input (“have been doing” vs. “have done”). Furthermore,
the purpose of this discussion is to show how a single Russian form may 
correspond to both the preterit and the perfect in English, regardless of whether 
these forms are tenses or aspects.
Comrie furthermore argues that there is an essential distinction between the 
(present) perfect and the other perfect tenses (cf. Comrie 1985: 77-82). His 
typology distinguishes between absolute tenses (the present, the past and the
future), which by their very nature specify the temporal confines they assign an 
event to, and relative tenses, which do not specify any temporal confines of their 
own, but which are defined relatively to some other temporal entity. The 
pluperfect and the future perfect are absolute-relative tenses, as they are defined 
relatively to an absolute tense (the past and the future respectively). The 
problem is to classify the perfect into this typology. At first sight it might seem 
parallel to the other absolute-relative tenses. Where the pluperfect assigns an 
event to a point in time preceding the absolute past tense, the perfect assigns an 
event to a point in time preceding the absolute present tense. The problem is that 
this makes the perfect indistinguishable from the preterit/simple past, which has 
the exact same definition. Comrie points out several other semantic and
typologic features which set the perfect apart from the other perfect tenses, and 
concludes that the perfect does not take part in his typology of tenses, but is a 
totally different kind of entity. On this basis Comrie also refrains from defining 
the perfect in his work on tense (Comrie 1985: 32-35).
Comrie’s observation shows that the preterit and the perfect are in some 
way in conflict. When examining the context-dependency of different past tense 
forms, a distinction turns up in situations where there is no preceding context,
e.g. at the outset of a conversation or narration. Here the perfect is licit (2a) but
the preterit is not (2b)4:
(2) a. I have lived in Russia. 
b. #I lived in Russia. 
(2b) forces the addressee to search for a given context in which a past situation 
is under discussion, so that my living in Russia can be interpreted as coinciding 
with that point of time. (2a) sounds much better on its own, and even though it
might be argued that (2a) also needs a context, it does not have to be a past time
context. It follows that the preterit functions like an unbound variable, which 
4 The notation “#” indicates that although the example is grammatically correct, it is
contextually illicit. 
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must be bound sentence-externally or internally (by a temporal adverbial). These
types of binding, exemplified in (3a) and (3b) respectively, are able to save the 
interpretation of a preterit form of the verb “to live”: 
(3)
(4)
(5)
a. I have met Putin. It happened in my youth. I lived in Russia, 
 and… 
b. Last year I lived in Russia. 
The perfect, on the other hand, can by itself render an interpretation for its past
time event. Its interpretation, however, will always be indefinite. Even when a 
past time reference is available in the preceding context, the perfect will remain 
indefinite:
# One day I went to visit the Kremlin, and there I have met Putin. 
(4) fails to provide the intended reading that my meeting with Putin happened
during the given visit to the Kremlin, or is at least decidedly strange with such a 
reading. Instead, it simply states that my meeting with Putin could have
happened at any time. The reason why this “any time” is hard to connect to the
contextually given point in time, may be traced back to Gricean pragmatics. The 
grammar already contains a form which is restricted to definite readings, the 
preterit. Avoidance of its use might signal that the point in time provided by the
perfect itself cannot possibly coincide with a contextually given time. In either
case the perfect’s ability to operate even outside past time contexts, and its 
indefinite sense in such uses, suggests that the perfect in itself contains an 
existential operator which binds the interpretation of the point in time. Unlike 
the preterit, which may be paraphrased as “at the given point X in the past, the 
event Y occurred”, the perfect may be paraphrased as “at some point X in the 
past, the event Y occurred”. 
While the perfect seemingly always conveys an existential/indefinite
reading, a sentence with the preterit does not always have a definite reading. 
Compare the sentences in example (5): 
a. I have slept well today. 
b. *I have slept well yesterday. 
c. I slept well yesterday. 
The perfect tense can be combined with a temporal adverbial and render an 
existential reading within the adverbial’s time frame, provided that the adverbial 
also includes the point of speech, as it does in (5a). If it does not, as in (5b), the
sentence is ungrammatical. However, the intended reading is saved by 
employing the preterit tense, as in (5c). But this means that (5c) has an 
existential reading, viz. that for some time yesterday it was true that I slept well. 
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I will return to this problem, but for now it can be concluded that the perfect 
tense renders an existential reading, while the preterit has a referential reading, 
unless it is bound by a temporal adverbial.5
The point of the current discussion has been to reveal the opposition perfect-
preterit as an opposition between what I will call existential and referential
tense. While the former, like the perfect, predicates the existence of a point in 
time of its own, the latter, like the preterit, only predicates events holding of a 
presupposed point in time, to which it refers. In the latter case the given point in 
time may already be provided through other events, without this interfering with 
the use of the preterit, cf. (3a), where my living in Russia is a further addition to
the point in time for which it happened that I met Putin. In other words, in the 
existential tense the existence of a point in time is a focus, while in the
referential tense it is a topic. This fact can also be disclosed by examining the 
scope of negation in the two types of tenses: 
(6) a. I haven’t been inside the Kremlin.
b. I went to visit Putin in the Kremlin, but he wasn’t there. 
It is an established truth in semantics and pragmatics that the scope of negation 
coincides with the scope of focus (e.g. Jackendoff 1972: 254-255). Observe the 
consequences this leads to for the sentences in (6). (6a) conveys the idea that
there has never been a point in time for which I have been inside the Kremlin. In
(6b), on the other hand, the negation only states that at the point in time when I 
went to visit Putin, he was not in the Kremlin. Consequently, in the perfect the
negation has scope over the existence of a point in time (“there does not exist 
any point in time in the past at which the event X has occurred”), but in the
preterit the negation only has scope over the event, which in turn is assigned to a
presupposed point in time (“at the given point in time in the past, the event X 
did not occur”).
This is not to say that the perfect always has a strict “never”-reading. Take 
the sentence “Putin hasn’t been in the Kremlin”, for instance. Our knowledge of 
the world leads to the conclusion that Putin must at some point in time have 
been to the Kremlin, consequently the “never”-reading is ruled out. Instead, the 
sentence would be more natural in a context in which a certain period of time is 
under discussion (i.e. “Do you know where Putin has been this week?” “Well, 
he hasn’t been inside the Kremlin” (= “there does not exist any point in time 
5This does not mean that the sentence-internal presence of a temporal adverb automatically
forces an existential reading. Imagine the following as an extract from a conversation: “I went 
to visit the Kremlin, and there I met Putin.” “When did this happen?” “It happened last year.” 
In the last sentence “it happened” refers to a definite point in time, and this definite point in 
time is located within the period of last year. The crucial problem seems to be whether the 
temporal adverb serves as a topic or a focus for the event. 
36
The Pragmatic Nature of Grammatical Categories 
during this week at which the event X has occurred”)). The important point is 
that the perfect picks out an indefinite point in time, either in the entire past or in 
a subpart of it, whereas the preterit refers to a given, definite point in the past. It 
can be concluded that in an existential tense like the perfect, the existence of a 
point in time is promoted as new/focalised information, while in a referential 
tense like the preterit, the existence of a point in time must be given/presupposed 
information, outside the scope of focus. 
Having said all this on the perfect-preterit-opposition, let us consider the
pluperfect:
(7) a. I had slept well. 
b. I had slept well the day before. 
Is it existential or referential? The pluperfect seems at first to be referential, in 
the sense that it cannot occur out of context, but must be bound to a contextually 
given point in time (e.g. “I felt so fine when I woke up this morning. Obviously
I had slept well,” where the moment of my waking up is the given point). But
notice that the event itself, in this case the event of my sleeping, is not bound to 
the given point, but to indefinite points in the time span preceding my waking 
up. It appears that the pluperfect is both existential and referential. The most
straightforward explanation of this paradox is the morphological complexity of 
perfect tenses in English. The auxiliary is conjugated in a referential tense like
the present or the preterit, while the auxiliary together with the participle 
constitutes an existential tense (the perfect and the pluperfect), which picks out 
indefinite points in the time-span preceding the reference point of the auxiliary’s 
referential tense. 
But on closer scrutiny it turns out that the pluperfect construction is not
exclusively existential. Comrie’s observation that the present perfect is distinct 
from the secondary perfect tenses (the pluperfect and the future perfect), is 
among other things based on the acceptability of the latter in the presence of 
temporal adverbials, as seen in (7b). The pluperfect in (7b) deviates from the 
present perfect, as the latter cannot be used with a temporal adverbial which 
excludes the reference point of the auxiliary’s tense. In (5b) the use of the
present perfect is illicit, because the present tense of the auxiliary refers to the 
point of speech, but this is not included in the adverbial “yesterday”, hence the 
preterit must be used instead, as in (5c). In (7b), however, the past tense of the 
auxiliary does not refer to a point which is included in the adverbial “the day 
before”, but nevertheless the pluperfect is accepted. 
Furthermore, the pluperfect can also be referential in the same way as the 
preterit, in the sense that the event is assigned to definite points in time provided 
by the context: 
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(8)
(9)
I had met Putin the year before. I had gone to visit the Kremlin one 
day, and there he had shaken hands with me. 
It was shown in (4) that the present perfect inevitably yields an existential 
interpretation to the point in time to which the event is assigned, but both the 
second and the third token of the pluperfect in (8) have the event coincide with 
the point in time given in the preceding context. These instances correspond to 
cases where the present perfect would have failed and would have been replaced 
by the preterit, due to the opposition between existentiality and referentiality.
The pluperfect, however, accepts such usage. Thus the pluperfect seems to
accept both existential and referential readings. How is this possible? 
I will argue that the function of the pluperfect is to fulfil some additional
logically possible roles in the English tense system. It has already been shown 
how the perfect can predicate the existence of a point in time in the past (i.e. in 
the time span preceding the point of speech), and how the preterit can refer to 
the same point afterwards. The pluperfect makes it possible to repeat both these
processes: The pluperfect can predicate the existence of a point in time 
preceding a formerly given point in the past – and, as seen in (8), it can also 
refer to the same point afterwards. It can even be used to repeat the process a 
third time, as in the third clause in (9): 
I had tried to visit Putin the year before. I had come to the Kremlin,
but he had already left. 
In theory, the procedure can be repeated indefinitely, but the longer the process 
is driven, the harder it gets to interpret the results. In most cases the referential 
part is taken over by the preterit tense, as the latter only demands a past time
context, no matter at what preceding level that point has been predicated. 
Nevertheless, the strict perfect-preterit-opposition only exists at the first step of 
predicating a point in time; the pluperfect is left with all subsequent steps. In 
fulfilling this double role, being both existential and referential, the pluperfect is 
similar to the Russian past tense. The difference is that the Russian past tense
covers the existential and referential interpretations at all steps of predication in
the past tense, i.e. for all points in time preceding the point of speech, while the 
English pluperfect covers existential and referential tense only for secondarily 
predicated points in time. In any case, this is where the English and Russian 
tense systems meet – in performing the processes of predicating and referring to
points in time. The question now is how it is possible for one tense form, be that 
the English pluperfect or the Russian past tense, to have both existential and 
referential temporal functions; how these are kept apart, and how they are 
repeated.
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3 A pragmatic analysis of the Russian past tense 
As said earlier, the wanted semantic description of the Russian past tense must
allow for the intended interpretations to be rendered through different pragmatic
structures overlaying that semantic description. The interpretations in question 
are the existential and the referential tenses, and the difference between the two 
has been defined as to concern the pragmatic status of the existence of a point in 
time. In the existential tense its existence is focus information, and in the
referential tense it is presupposed information. Thus, in order to predict the
interpretational outcome of a single semantic tense, it must be possible to show
which parts of its semantic description that are topic and focus.
I will propose a simple semantic description of the Russian past tense, in the
shape of a locative predicate. By “locative predicate” is meant a predicate which 
connects an argument x with an argument y, through a relation which states that 
x is located at/in y, i.e. L (x,y). The argument x in this case is a point in time, and 
the argument y is the time span preceding the point of speech, so that the 
Russian past tense simply states that a point in time is located within a time span 
which precedes the point of speech. The further nature of x and y will be defined 
by other semantic entities in the clause or in the immediate context. The point in 
time x will always be the point in time at which the event of the predicate takes 
place, while the time span y may for instance be restricted by temporal adverbs.
So, for instance, in a clause like “In 1963 Kennedy was shot”, the past tense 
states that a point in time x is located within a time span y (which must precede 
the point of speech), and that x is the time at which the event of Kennedy being 
shot took place, and that y is the time span between the 31st of December 1962 
and the 1st of January 1964.
I will argue that the distinction between existential and referential tense may 
simply be described as a matter of whether L (x,y) is the focus together with the
event in question, or if only the event is focused, while L (x,y) is the topic. If 
both L (x,y) and the event constitute the focus (in other words, the new 
information), it means that the new information is that there exist a point x in the
time span y, and that an event z takes place at point x. If L (x,y) is topic (in other 
words, presupposed information), it means that the only new information is that 
the event z takes place at the presupposed point x.
These two different pragmatic structures can be further explained through 
paraphrases in terms of “normal” locative sentences. A sentence like “There is a 
book on the table” both focalises the existence of an entity at the table, and the 
fact that this entity is a book, like the existential tense both focalises the 
existence of a point in time, and the fact that the event z takes place at this point. 
A sentence like “The thing which is on the table is a book” only focalises the 
description of the entity at the table – its existence on the table is given 
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information. In the same manner the referential tense only focalises a description 
of a point in time, namely that the event z takes place there – the existence of the 
point in time is given information. Such a distinction in locative clauses is 
reflected grammatically in many languages, and is therefore not any ad hoc 
distinction. In both Russian and in Turkish these two types of locative clauses
are kept apart by the presence vs. the absence of a grammatical morpheme (est´
in Russian and var in Turkish).
Turning back to how these operations actually are performed, consider the 
following example: 
(10) Putin þita-l   “Vojnu i mir”.
Putin read.IMP-PST.M.S “War and Peace”.
'Putin has read/was reading/had read “War and Peace”.' 
Without any preceding past tense context in the conversation, there would be no
contextually given past time point x to which the event could refer. Likewise, 
the past tense would be in use for the first time in the immediate context, so that 
L (x,y) would be utterly new information. The existence of a point in time x in 
the past would therefore also be new information. It follows that the perfect 
tense is preferable in the English translation, given such a lack of past time
context: “Putin has read “War and Peace”.” 
If (10) had been immediately preceded by a context stating that I have met 
Putin, and that I met him in his private study, the point in time for which it is 
true that Putin was reading “War and Peace” could easily be interpreted as 
identical to the point in time mentioned immediately before in the context, e.g. 
our meeting in his study. In such a context the point in time x is presupposed as 
existent, since it has already been presented in the preceding context. On this 
interpretation the only new information which is expressed by (10) is that the
event of Putin reading “War and Peace” holds for the point in time of our 
meeting, and the English translation would have used the preterit tense: “Putin
was reading “War and Peace”.” It follows that the Russian past tense 
morphology does not predicate the existence of any points in time in this latter 
case. Arguably, it is instead used to mark a topic of the clause, i.e. that the 
clause gives information about a (topicalised) point in the past. 
The definition of the Russian past tense is not yet complete. It must be 
ensured that the secondary (and subsequent) existential and referential 
interpretations, like the pluperfect translation of (10), are also covered by the 
definition. The different levels of existential and referential interpretations 
depend on the definition of the time span y. At the first level (the English present 
perfect) y is interpreted as all points in time preceding the point of speech. The 
secondary level (the English pluperfect) involves the points in time preceding 
the point x of the first level’s L (x,y). A third level (like in (9)) can be
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established through the x of the second level, and so it continues, as long as 
interpretations are practically possible. 
Since the definition of the time span y is not necessarily lexically expressed
(although it may be expressed through temporal adverbials), the context must
once again be the defining factor. As demonstrated above, each level is defined 
relatively to all points in time preceding a presupposed point in time. This point 
is either equal to the point of speech, or is itself preceding the point of speech, 
and usually this point is the most recently mentioned point in the context.
Hence, if (10) has a preceding context in which I describe a meeting I had 
with Putin in the past, during which we discussed the works of Tolstoy, and 
“War and Peace” was raised as a topic after a while, a pluperfect interpretation 
of (10) is possible: If the context does not invite the interpretation that Putin is 
reading the book there and then, a secondary interpretation is called upon – 
Putin’s reading must be assigned to an even earlier moment. In order for this to 
happen, the L (x,y) of (10) cannot be a topic. If it were, it would have been 
identical to the L (x,y) in the preceding context, and thus also the x of Putin’s 
reading “War and Peace” would, mistakenly, have been identical to the x of our 
discussion of the book. Instead, L (x,y) of (10) must be a focus; it must be new 
information. It will then predicate a new x, which not only precedes the point of 
speech, but which also precedes the x of our discussion. This amounts to saying 
that context defines the time span y as not merely all points preceding the point 
of speech, but as all points preceding the x under discussion.
There is much more to be said on the use of the Russian past tense, 
especially its interaction with aspect. However, I will only illuminate one 
particular type of interaction between aspect and tense, which demonstrates the 
flexibility and the explanatory force of the pragmatic analysis given to the
Russian past tense. I will not offer any in-depth analysis of Russian aspect as 
such, but just rely on the analysis given by Klein (1995). In short terms he 
describes imperfective aspect as the assertion of a single state, where “state” is 
understood in its broadest sense, covering both on-going activities and persisting 
states. Perfective aspect involves the assertion of two successive states: a source 
state (which is interpreted just as broadly as the state of the imperfective aspect) 
and a succeeding target state, which appears as a result of the source state. There
is much more to be said on his analysis of aspect, but this main distinction 
between one or two asserted states is what is crucial for the current theory. 
Now consider the fact that a series of perfective verbs in the past tense in 
Russian typically denotes a series of successive events: 
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(11) Ja nade-l  kurtku, otkry-l  dver´ i
I put.on.PEF-PST.M.S jacket, open.PEF-PST.M.S door and
vyshe-l.
exit.PEF-PST.M.S
'I put on a jacket, opened the door and went out.'
If imperfective verbs had been used in (11), a reading with successive events
would have been hard to achieve. Rather it would imply that all events took 
place at the same time, or at random times. So there is a question of how 
successive events are dependent on perfective aspect, but an even more 
important question concerns the current theory: Given that the past tense in all 
these verbs is arguably a case of referential tense (given the preterit tense 
translation), how can the topicalised L (x,y) in all these verbs refer to a
presupposed point in time, when the reference point clearly changes for each
verb? The event of the donning of the jacket takes place at a different time from 
the opening of the door, which again is different from the event of walking out
the door. 
The solution lies in the nature of the perfective aspect. As this aspect
involves two successive events, they cannot refer to the same point in time.
Consequently, when the source state of the donning of the jacket refers to a 
reference point x, the target state cannot refer to the same point x. By default the 
perfective aspect’s target state establishes the existence of another point in time,
succeeding the previous point. This default operation of the perfective aspect is 
functionally the same as using a locative predicate like L (x,y) – i.e. the 
existence of a point x is established in a time span y. Consequently, the past
tense L (x,y) of the following verb, “opened”, may be a topicalisation of the
perfective aspect’s identical operation. It furthermore follows that the point x to 
which the source state of “opened” refers, is the point which has been 
established by the previous verb’s target state. This operation still satisfies the 
requirements of the referential tense, i.e. that the existence of a point in time
must have been given in the preceding context. Then we see the same operation
being performed again, when the target state of “opened” establishes the 
existence of yet another point in time, to which the referential tense and the 
source state of “went out” may refer to.
The use of the referential tense is thus not restricted to cases where the 
presupposed point in time was originally established by a morphological tense 
as such. The same fact may hold for cases where a referential tense is used
together with a temporal adverb, like in (5c). Arguably, the temporal adverb 
“yesterday” itself establishes the existence of a point in time x within the time 
span denoted by “yesterday”. This therefore constitutes an L (x,y), to which a 
referential past tense may refer, and this in turn explains why the otherwise 
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purely referential preterit in English seemingly has an existential reading in such 
cases. The answer is that the tense itself remains referential, but that the 
existential reading is caused by the temporal adverb’s establishing of a point in
time x.
4 Conclusion
In the main discussion in this paper I have demonstrated how the distinction 
between different past tenses in English may be described as a purely pragmatic 
distinction, and that by extension of this analysis the single Russian past tense 
may be given a simple semantic description, but nevertheless be shown to
achieve the same interpretations as the different English past tenses, by virtue of 
the same pragmatic distinctions. 
The main idea, though, is that similar analyses are possible, and should be
preferred, when analysing other grammatical categories. In Eriksen (2006) I 
attempt to offer a similar analysis of the distinction between habitual aspect and 
durative/progressive aspect (as in English “I smoke” as opposed to “I am
smoking”), among other reasons in order to explain how Norwegian and Russian 
may do without such a formal distinction. Other candidates for pragmatic 
analyses are the distinctions between imperfective and perfective aspect;
indicative and subjunctive mood; evidential and non-evidential mood; non-
future and future tense, and distinct types of future tense; indefiniteness and 
definiteness of DPs, etc… 
Evidently, not all grammatical categories are suitable for a pragmatic 
analysis, however. First of all, the traditional division between TAM-categories 
(i.e. tense, aspect and mood) and PNG-categories (i.e. person, number and 
gender) is crucial. Only the former can be argued to contribute by themselves to 
the interpretation of the sentence. Consequently, it is in such cases it must be 
explained how one language may offer such a contribution through the addition 
of a category, while another language does not. This is where I have argued that 
a pragmatic analysis becomes necessary. PNG-categories, on the other hand, are 
used to index semantic features on one member of the clause, which is 
syntactically dependent on another member, which again is the source of these 
features. Thus, the PNG-categories do not necessarily contribute information of 
their own. Arguably, the same might be said about case. 
Turning back to “contributory” grammatical categories again, it must be 
emphasised that there will still remain several cases for which it would be 
difficult to offer a pragmatic explanation. This difficulty increases the more 
specific the contribution of the given category becomes. For instance, the South-
American Indian language Toba has a set of so-called directionals, i.e. a 
grammatical category describing the directionality of the event, but when Toba 
makes a distinction between a directional meaning “toward water” and a 
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directional meaning “toward fire” (Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 491), it is difficult
to see how this distinction could be explained in purely pragmatic terms.
Nevertheless, apart from such extreme cases, the conclusion of this paper stands 
firm: Whenever practically possible, contributory grammatical categories, like 
TAM-categories, should be analysed as pragmatic rather than semantic 
categories, in order to explain their redundancy in the world’s languages. 
Abbreviations
ACC – Accusative 
F – Feminine
IMP – Imperfective 
M – Masculine 
PEF – Perfective 
PST – Past tense 
S – Singular 
References
Adelaar, W. F. H. and P. C. Muysken (2004): The Languages of the Andes,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Comrie, B. (1976): Aspect, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Comrie, B. (1985): Tense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Eriksen, P. K. (2006): On the Typology and the Semantics of Non-Verbal 
Predication. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oslo. 
Jackendoff, R. (1972): Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Klein, W. (1995): 'A Time-Relational Analysis of Russian Aspect', Language
71, pp. 669-695. 
44
WE CONGRATULATE – BY … 
CATHRINE FABRICIUS-HANSEN 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
c.f.hansen@ilos.uio.no
Abstract
The present paper is an inconclusive discussion of questions related to 
Kjell Johan Sæbø’s semantic analysis of so-called criterion predicates 
and the by locution (adjuncts of the form by V-ing) often accompanying 
them. The construction type can be illustrated by the following quotation 
(from Google) – which, substituting the name of KJS for the anaphor, is 
not only an illustrative example but also an adequate statement in the 
present context: 
Als Autoren und Leser können wir [ihn] vermutlich am angemessensten 
ehren, indem wir uns von seinen Arbeiten faszinieren lassen.1
1 Abstract predicates and the by locution (Sæbø, to appear) 
In his ingenious paper “The structure of criterion predicates”, Sæbø (to appear) 
discusses the semantic representation of constructions with instrumental by
adjuncts (by + V-ing) as illustrated in (1); other relevant examples are seen in 
(2).
(1)
(2)
a. She kept her promise by dancing. 
b. She maddened me by dancing. 
a. Kjell Johan planned to celebrate his birthday by taking his 
 family on a bicycle tour. 
b. However, his colleagues surprised him by turning up 
 uninvited. 
c. Obviously expecting to be invited in, they congratulated him 
 by presenting him with a “Festschrift”, 
d. By doing so, they almost prevented him from going 
 through with his plans. 
e. But finally he made them leave by promising to throw a party 
 some days later. 
1 ‘As writers and readers, we can probably honour [him] most adequately by letting ourselves 
be fascinated by his works.’ 
Cathrine Fabricius-Hansen 
Sæbø proposes an analysis where the modified predicate “involves reference to 
an indefinite predicate and where the function of the instrumental by adjunct is 
to fill that predicate with content by unification” (Sæbø, to appear: 1). Like 
Kearns (2003), he takes the modified predicates to come in two main variants, 
subsumed under the terms abstract predicates: manner-neutral causatives
like madden me, make them leave, prevent him from realizing his plans, surprise
him; and criterion predicates like keep her promise, respond, obey an order.2
Adjoined to a causative predicate, the by-locution identifies the type of event or 
action having the causing effect specified by the matrix predicate; with a 
criterion predicate, the by-locution gives us the property of the event or action 
making the abstract predication true – an action matching the conventional
criteria laid down by the matrix predicate.
From the perspective of formal semantics, the crucial question is how to 
account for the meaning of these constructions in a compositional way. Sæbø 
argues that a compositional analysis is possible only within a formal framework 
allowing composition to be driven by unification rather than functional 
application (“flexible composition”). The solution he offers is cast in the format 
of the presupposition-based two-stage bottom-up version of Discourse
Representation Theory outlined in Kamp (2001). 
Thus, the adjunct by dancing in (1a, b) is represented as in (3) whereas the 
matrix predicates, abstracting from Tense, Voice and the Agent get the 
representations shown in (4) and (5), respectively (Sæbø, to appear: 12). 
(3) a. by dancing
 b. ¢{¢3, constant²} , ²3 = Oe dance(e)
(4) a. madden me
b. , ,
¢e, O²
¢P, indefinite²
e1
P(e)
Bec(mad(i))(e1)
Cause(Bec(mad(i))(e1))(P(e))
2 The term “criterion predicate” was introduced by Kearns, who characterizes such predicates
as follows: “The key notion here is some conventional criterion that an action must fulfil in 
order to qualify as an event of the criterion-matching kind.” (Kearns 2003: 599; quoted by 
Sæbø, to appear: 1). Sæbø’s manner-neutral causatives correspond to Kearns’ “causative 
upshot predicates” (ib.). 
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(5) a. keep a promise
b. ¢e, O²
¢P, indefinite²
f  Q
P(e)
P  Q
Promise(Q(pro))(Agent(e))(f)
,
Here, the box to the right is a DRS representing the content of the node in 
question; to the left is the store: a set of pairs3 consisting of a variable (e: event 
variable, P: predicate variable, 3: second-order predicate variable) and a 
binding condition. When two nodes meet under the bottom-up construction of a 
representation, unification of store variables is driven by the binding conditions, 
and the corresponding two content DRSs are merged. Indefinite store variables 
may stay unbound until the top level, where they enter the DRS as normal
(indefinite) discourse referents. The binding condition constant, on the other 
hand, is introduced by Sæbø as a sub-sort of quantificational binding, and must
find an indefinite variable for 3to bind. The O-condition assigned to the event 
variable e in (4b) and (5b) – likewise an innovation as compared to Kamp
(2001) – should be understood as classical abstraction. The bipartite structure
¢store, content² is characteristic of preliminary nodes: eventually, the store will 
disappear, and the meaning of the sentence as a whole will be represented as a 
standard DRS (often in addition to a set of presuppositions seeking jusitification 
in the preceding context).
In the present case, then, the 3 variable of the by locution will unify with
the indefinite predicate variable introduced by the matrix predicate, thus 
identifying the indefinite predicate with the constant dance. This amounts to
substituting the latter for the variable P in the content DRS of the node modified
by the by adjunct. The resulting representations are shown in (4’) and (5’): 
e1
dance(e)
Bec(mad(i))(e1)
Cause(Bec(mad(i))(e1))(dance(e))
(4’) Oe
3 A simplification of Kamp (2001) where the store is a set of triples: a variable, a constraint 
DRS, and a binding condition. 
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f  Q 
dance(e)
dance  Q
Promise(Q(pro))(Agent(e))(f)
(5’) Oe
In ‘normal’ words:
(6)
(7)
(8)
a. An event e is of the type A maddens B by dancing iff e is of 
 the type A dances and there is an event e1 of the type B
 becomes mad such that B becomes mad holds of e1 because A
 dances holds of e.4
b. An event e is of the type A keeps a promise by dancing iff e is 
of the type A dances and there is an event (action) f and an 
event (action) type Q such that f is of the type A promises 
(has promised) to Q and A dances is included in Q (dancing
may be just one of several action types matching the promise
 made by A).
Abstract predicates may, of course, occur without a by locution or any other
adjunct answering the question “How?” that such predicates implicitly give rise
to. In that case, the type of the causing or criterion-matching event remains
indeterminate at the sentence level but may be identifiable cross-sententially: the
indefinite event type referent P and the event e it is predicated over may in the 
end be unified with referents established in the following or preceding context.
Unification of this kind induces discourse relations known e.g. under the names
of Elaboration/Specification (or Explanation?) and Abstraction (or Result?), 
respectively, between the discourse segments in question (Sæbø, to appear: 18);
cf. (7) and (8).
a. The boy insulted me in your bar. He told me to shut up. 
b. She really surprised me. She finished her paper on time. 
a. You said you didn’t go! You lied to me!
b She finished her paper on time. She really surprised me. 
Sæbø’s analysis is elegant and avoids the drawbacks he points out in earlier 
approaches to the semantics of criterion predicates and the by-locution. Viewed 
4 Note that Sæbø like Dowty (1979) and Bennett (1994) represents causation as a relation 
between propositions (facts) rather than events. This is a necessary device in order to achieve
a unified account of by locutions in criterion and causative contexts.
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in a broader perspective, however, it raises some questions, partly hinted at in 
his paper, that I discuss below – albeit without presenting an answer. 
2 Implications and questions 
As can be seen from the representation of by dancing in (3), Sæbø does not
assign a causal or instrumental meaning to the by phrase or the preposition by
itself; its sole function is to substitute a predicate constant for the indefinite 
predicate store variable which the modified abstract predicate comes along with. 
Consequently, combinations of by locutions and matrix predicates that do not 
provide such a store variable should be ruled out for semantic reasons since in 
such cases the store variable 3of the by adjunct will find nothing to bind. But,
as Sæbø notes, the by locution may in fact combine with predicates that are
apparently not of the demanded abstract – manner-neutral causative or criterion
– type, without causing any semantic trouble: achievement predicates as in (9) 
and activity predicates as in (10) (examples from Sæbø). And here “the by
phrase seems to contribute a causal relation of its own” (Sæbø, to appear: 19).
a. They find prey by detecting minute vibrations from a 
 distance away.
b. He claimed that he had escaped by crossing the water. 
(9)
(10) a. Snakes move by throwing their bodies into backward-
 moving waves.
b. It swims by flexing its body from side to side. 
c. They feed by filtering food particles from the water. 
Sæbø defends his analysis by arguing that “on closer inspection, predicates
which do not appear to be abstract really are, at least in the circumstances; in 
other words, predicates that may not be intrinsically causative or criterial can, 
under the influence of certain factors, be interpreted as causative or criterial, one
of these factors being the merge with a by phrase” (ib.) In cases like (9), then, 
the (non-causative) achievement predicates are coerced into (causative) 
accomplishments – something that may happen under other conditions, too; and 
the matrix verbs in (10) are arguably used in a “derived, more abstract sense“ 
involving an indefinite predicate store variable for 3to bind. So in the end, 
“there is reason to embrace the idea that criteriality and causativity are not fixed
and lexical but flexible and contextual categories” (ib.). But then again, some 
predicates, e.g. Fred combed his hair / polished his nails / put on his top hat,
“are simply too concrete or manner-specific to be interpreted as providing an 
indefinite predicate variable playing a part in their interpretation”, i.e. too 
concrete to be modified by a by phrase (Sæbø, to appear: 17). 
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However, do we really want to say that the predicates move, swim and feed
have a somewhat different, more abstract meaning in (10) than e.g. in (11),
where they are modified in other ways (b, d, f) or not modified at all (a, c, e)?5
(11) a. Some bivalves can swim.
b. Many decapods swim using paddle-like limbs called 
swimmarets on the abdomen.
c. The men were so fatigued they could hardly move.
d. A few desert snakes move across the hot sand in a series of 
sideways steps known as sidewinding 
e. The red-billed quelea scatter during the day to feed.
f. During the winter months flocks of redpolls feed among the 
high branches of the trees. 
Move and swim are both “indefinite change-of-state predicates” (in the terms of 
Dowty 1979), involving iterated change of place along a path, which, in the case 
of swim, is located in water; and living beings have ways of intrinsically
bringing about such locomotion that are determined by their genetic equipment.
By adjuncts may be used to describe how intrinsic movement is brought about 
for a given species, as in (10a); or they may describe deviations from some 
standard way, or specify within the agent-dependent range of normal options;
etc. But when there is no explicit information in the context, we fill in the
picture ourselves, assuming that the causing activity falls within the range of 
possibilities determined by the nature of the agent and the circumstances
described in the context. A similar case can be made for the intransitive
predicate feed, which – as noted by Sæbø (p. 19) – also involves iteration of an
action with a culmination point, viz. getting food inside oneself. Note, by the 
way, that relevant information may come from other types of adjuncts than by
phrases; cf. (11b, d, f). 
More generally, it may be asked whether the distinction between manner-
neutral accomplishment predicates like she maddens me, we surprise him etc.
and manner-specific ones6 like Fred combed his hair / polished his nails / put on 
his top hat is as absolute as the explication proposed by Sæbø implies (presence 
vs. absence of an indefinite predicate variable in the semantic representation of 
the predicate), or whether manner-specificity is not rather a matter of degree, as
Bennett (1994) seems to suggest: a question of the range of values S can take for 
a given I and a given agent D in the formula D I-s by S-ing. Speculating on the
verb “to nod”, for instance, Bennett (1994: 43) claims that it “does not permit
5 Most of the examples are (in some cases adapted) from the Oslo Multilingual Corpus; see 
http://www.hf.uio.no/forskningsprosjekter/sprik/english/corpus/index.html.
6 The distinction was introduced by Pusch (1980).
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such a wide range of values of S as does ‘to raise one’s hand’; nor does ‘to clap 
one’s hand’, ‘to kick’ and some others. However, these narrower verbs still 
leave, in their ordinary meaning, some room for answers to ‘How?’ questions 
other than the answer ‘By doing it immediately’”, i.e. answers that specify some
“mediating” causing action different from S itself. At any rate, it is quite
conceivable that Fred may put on his hat or polish his nails in non-standard ways 
that call for a by locution; or that the level of descriptive detail demanded in the
speech situation makes the use of such a modification natural.
Simple physical acts – whether accomplishments as ‘to raise one’s hand’ or 
achievements in a broad sense, including “intergressives”7 like ‘to nod’ – do not
allow much variation as to how they are brought about. Criterion predicates, 
while specifying “conventional (normative) or intentional criteria”, are 
“unspecific about the physical criteria an action must meet” (Sæbø, to appear:
2). However, as with causatives, (un)specificity or abstractness may be a matter 
of degree rather than an absolute property. In cases like break a promise, obey 
an order, for instance, there is no default value for S in Bennett’s (1994) 
formula D I-s by S-ing: which action types fall under these predicates depends 
solely on what the agent has promised or been ordered. Predicates like 
congratulate and celebrate seem different: in the default case, we take an act of 
congratulation to involve a specific type of speech act, and we also have more or 
less stereotypical celebration concepts which we may activate when there are no
other clues. But of course, more special ways of congratulating or celebrating 
are conceivable – specified in a by adjunct, for instance, as exemplified in (2a, c) 
(repeated below). 
(12) a. Kjell Johan planned to celebrate his birthday by taking his 
family on a bicycle tour.
b. His colleagues congratulated him by presenting him with a 
 “Festschrift”. 
To be sure, the observations made above do seem compatible with Sæbø’s 
analysis: When combined with a by phase, predicates that are not inherently 
abstract in the defined sense acquire a derived meaning that meets the demands
of the by adjunct, viz. a semantic representation involving an indefinite predicate 
store variable. And when an inherently abstract predicate is not modified by a by
phrase, its indefinite predicate variable is turned into an indefinite discourse
referent, which, in its turn, may or may not be specified in the linguistic context
– or by way of knowledge-based stereotypes (cf. congratulate, celebrate).
However, we are still left with the problem of how to decide which predicates 
7 Intergressives are bounded events that differ from accomplishments and achievements in the
strict sense by not involving a change of state (Egg 1994).
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are intrinsically abstract and which are not; on closer inspection that borderline 
may turn out to be quite arbitrarily drawn. 
It should be noted that shifting a non-abstract predicate to a criterion 
predicate may involve a shift of aspectual class and thematic role assigned to the 
external argument. The predicate honour him is a case in point: When used as in
(13a) it is non-abstract, denoting a type of emotional attitude with the subject 
referent as Experiencer or Holder; modified by a by adjunct, as in (13b),
however, it is an agentive criterion predicate denoting a set of actions that are 
(more or less conventionally) correlated with holding such an attitude.
(13)
(14)
a. As he was valiant, I honour him. 
b. We can honour him most adequately by letting ourselves be 
fascinated by his work.
That is, the meaning of honour in (13b) is derived as compared to (13a), 
involving an indefinite action predicate ‘do something [showing that …]’. But 
how can the representation assigned to by by abstracting over (3) have such an 
effect? In more general terms: How can an analysis that ascribes a purely 
identifying function to by explain the fact that the construction type is restricted 
to or has a marked preference for action predicates demanding an external 
Agent?
3 Related constructions 
The question asked above may seem somewhat unfair since the Agent issue, in 
addition to Tense, Aspect and Voice, is precisely that part of the formalization 
story Sæbø explicitly leaves out, referring to Kratzer’s (1995) theory of the 
Agent relation. But the issue is of central importance when we look at other 
constructions doing the same or a similar job as the by locution: 
(i) Corresponding in locutions (in -ing):
a. Ty's dad had shown additional good sense in marrying a plain 
 woman.
b. All these tales suggested that the golem-maker had acquired 
arcane secrets: yet, in doing so, had transgressed Holy Law. 
c. In eating the plants we combine the carbohydrates with 
oxygen dissolved in our blood and so extract the energy that 
 makes us go.
d. Fibich had, in buying it [the picture], aspired to nobility.
e. In solving one problem we have only encountered a more
 curious question.
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f. He grabbed it and held it before his face and in doing so 
spilled most of the powder all over the front of his fancy 
 tweed jacket.
(ii) Non-prepositional -ing adjuncts: 
(15)
(16)
(17)
a. Many decapods swim using paddle-like limbs called 
swimmarets on the abdomen.
b. Getting rid of the glasses, you`ve become less womanish. 
c. They fought against going, enlisting me and their father 
 against Rose.
d. They mistook his gentleness, taking it for what it appeared to 
be instead of the strength of will.
e. Mostly it was hot chocolate she made, warming the milk in a 
saucepan on the stove before mixing it. 
(iii) Prepositional adjuncts of the type with + NP:
a. They congratulated him with a Festschrift.
b. We celebrated the event with vintage wine and quiet talk. 
c. She silenced him with a sharp remark. 
c. I hinted we might seal our new-found solidarity with a dram. 
d. He goes outdoors to feed with wild things. 
(iv) Various other “event-internal” (Maienborn 2003) prepositional adjuncts: 
a. They feed on the sugary nectar of flowers. 
b A few desert snakes move across the hot sand in a series of 
 sideways steps.
It would take us too far to discuss the options mentioned in (iii) and (iv), which 
differ from our main subject by involving genuine prepositional phrases instead 
of non-finite verb phrases.
As for (i), it is an interesting question whether and how in locutions differ 
semantically from by locutions. The two adjunct types seem exchangeable in
some contexts, as for instance in (14a); but at the same time, in adjuncts might
appear to be less restricted with respect to causativity than by locutions; cf.
(14f); and Kearns (2003: 629) suggests that criterion predicates have a certain 
preference for in locutions. But how to capture such distinctions if we ascribe a 
purely identifying, non-instrumental meaning to the by locution, covering its 
function with criterion predicates as well as manner-neutral causatives?
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Regarding (ii), non-prepositional -ing adjuncts have a wider range of 
interpretation possibilities than our by (and in) locutions, partly because they are 
typically used as free adjuncts, i.e. without being fully integrated in the matrix 
clause, and partly because the interpretation is not restricted by whatever 
constraints the preposition by (or in) induces. Behrens & Sæbø (1997) have 
outlined a semantic analysis of free -ing adjuncts within the framework of 
classical DRT (see also Behrens 1998). They represent the adjunct as a DRS 
with an anaphoric discourse referent for the controlled external (PRO) argument.
The adjunct DRS is merged with the matrix DRS in the usual presupposition-
driven way, involving a certain amount of knowledge-based accommodation etc. 
In this way, Behrens & Sæbø (1997) are able to account for the interpretation of 
abstract predicates modified by free -ing adjuncts, i.e. constructions where the
latter can have the same effect as by (or in) locutions; cf. for instance (15a-b).8
In the framework of Sæbø (to appear), these cases would represent a non-finite
variant of contextual identification of the indefinite event type referent
introduced by the abstract main predicate; compare (7) in section 1. With other
main predicates, however, updating must proceed in a different way.
Obviously, the classical DRT account of free -ing adjuncts to abstract
predicates (Behrens & Sæbø 1997) and the analysis to be derived from Sæbø (to 
appear) deserve a more thorough comparison. It might be that the former is after 
all more flexible and that it could be adequately exploited for an alternative 
analysis of by locutions.
A look at German and Norwegian may be interesting in this connection (cf.
Fabricius-Hansen & Behrens 2001). German has no direct counterparts to the
three -ing variants under discussion here. Instead it has a finite-clause 
subordinating connective (subjunction) indem ‘in that’ that covers the semantic 
domain of by and in locutions as well as certain usages of free -ing adjuncts 
falling outside the range of the two prepositional -ing adjuncts. In addition,
indem occurs, rather marginally, in a “purely” temporal use, expressing temporal
inclusion, and occasionally in an “event-external”, i.e. higher-level, causal use 
corresponding to (causal) as/since. In Norwegian, we find a prepositional ved å
‘by to’ + infinitive as a counterpart of the English by locution as well as a 
subjunction idet corresponding to German indem. However, the instrumental use
of the subjunction seems to be stylistically somewhat marked in Norwegian, 
characteristic of non-fictional genres – perhaps due to the existence of a 
competing instrumental locution (ved å). Below are some characteristic
examples from the Oslo Multilingual Corpus (OMC). 
8 Except that as free adjuncts, the former do not focus on the (relation between) adjunct (and
main predicate).
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(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
a. Begab man sich nicht einst auf der Flucht unter den Schutz 
 eines Menschen, indem man sich auf dessen Schwelle 
 niederließ? 
b. Didn't a fugitive put himself under someone's protection by
 sitting down on his threshold?
c. Når noen var på flukt i den gamle tid, da kunne han gi seg inn 
under en annens beskyttelse ved å sette seg på hans 
 dørterskel.
a. He swung into action at once to make his room his own, 
stripping off the ugly bedspread and stuffing it into a closet. 
b. Er ging unverzüglich daran, sich in seinem Zimmer häuslich 
 einzurichten, indem er die scheußliche Bettdecke abzog und 
in den Schrank stopfte.
a. Det grønne fløyelsskjørtet med border nederst delte seg, idet
hun la celloen mellom knærne. 
b. Der grüne Samtrock mit der Borte am Saum teilte sich, als
sie das Cello zwischen die Knie nahm.
c. The bordered green velvet skirt divided itself as she placed 
the cello between her knees. 
a. Det er en nær sammenheng mellom sosialitet og selve idéen 
 om individualitet, idet denne idéen bærer i seg spiren til 
 sosialitet. 
b. Es besteht ein enger Zusammenhang zwischen Sozialität und 
der Idee von Individualität, da [‘as/since’] letztere, insofern 
sie universelle Geltung beansprucht, in sich selbst den Keim 
zur Sozialität trägt. 
‘there is a close connection between sociality and the idea of 
individuality the latter carries in itself the seedling of 
 sociality’ 
Accounting for the semantic variation of indem/idet constructions in an adequate
way will demand a very abstract, underspecified semantic representation of the
connective and strong general principles of pragmatic reasoning governing the
interpretation, e.g. in the spirit of Zeevat 2005; compare also Maienborn (2003).
The common denominator might be an abstract notion of “inclusion”, covering a
set of conceptually related relations (set inclusion, set membership, part-whole 
relation, …). How this relation is instantiated in a given context depends on the
nature (semantic type) of the entities indem connects, i.e. on whether the indem
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clause is an event-internal modifier or adjoined higher up in the tree. – But I 
shall stop speculations and come to an end. 
4 An inconclusive conclusion 
The comments made in sections 2-3 above do not necessarily represent 
objections to Sæbø’s theory: they are explorative and inconclusive reactions to a 
thought-provoking paper. However, with a view to competing constructions in 
English and the cross-linguistic data mentioned above, I am not convinced that 
representing by (adjuncts) as void of instrumental or causal meaning is an 
optimal solution; it seems worth while to try out possible alternatives within the 
same framework (cf. Solstad, to appear, this volume). I also suspect that in the
end, pragmatics will have even more to say than suggested in Sæbø’s fascinating 
paper.
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Abstract
Man can in some deep sense connect speech, symbols and meaning. This 
is an everyday experience which we only partly understand. Linguistic 
theory recognizes three representational modules, phonology, syntax, and 
conceptual structure. In the first part we explore the relationship between 
the syntactic and conceptual structures. In the second part we look closer 
at the conceptual module and stress the importance of its intrinsic 
geometric structure. In the third part we explore how this geometry could 
emerge out of brain dynamics. We are far from an integrated account of 
how man connects speech, symbol and meaning. We may have opinions 
and stories to tell, but science consists in doing what is do-able – we 
conclude with some modest remarks and suggestions concerning 
cognitive architecture and "mid-level" representational formats.  
We have in recent years seen great advances in linguistics and the related 
cognitive sciences. Experimental and observational techniques at all levels from 
basic neuroscience to the study of grammar and text have been transformed and 
lifted to new levels of sophistication. Modeling skills and theory have been 
significantly expanded using increased insights from the mathematical and 
natural sciences. Simulations have been extensively used to mimic cognitive 
behavior. But we do not yet fully understand what human beings so effortlessly 
can do, how to connect into one seamless unit speech, symbol and meaning. 
There are no lack of general accounts and strong claims of having found the 
"final solutions" to this challenge. And, indeed, beyond well confirmed 
observations and generally accepted facts there are many plausible stories to tell. 
But too often we see how scientists with sound contributions within their own 
special domain of expertise, have to resort to a bit of wistful handwaving when 
sorting out the last pieces of their preferred "solution". 
Not every attempt at a synthesis is handwaiving. An interesting overview of 
current knowledge as seen from the various perspectives of the speaker, the 
listener and the reader, can be found in a recent book, The Neurocognition of 
Language, edited by C.M.Brown and P.Hagoort (1999). The book also includes 
a review of the main components of language structure as seen from the 
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linguist's point of view. And there are several survey articles aiming to link the
cognitive architecture of speaking, listening and reading with the 
neurobiological level. I shall touch upon all of these aspects. But first some 
remarks on grammar and the representational structure of language. 
1 The deconstruction of syntax 
Linguists generally recognize three main representational modules in the 
description of language structure, the phonological structure, the syntactic 
structure, and the semantic/conceptual structure. The disagreement comes when
we ask about the inner structure and relative autonomy of the different parts and 
how the parts are bound together.
There are, indeed, many different stories being told. One version, which I in
many ways find attractive, can be found in two recent books Foundation of 
Language by R.Jackendoff (2002) and Simpler Syntax by P.W.Culicover and 
R.Jackendoff (2005); see also the paper by Jackendoff in Brown and Hagoort 
(1999). In the latter book, starting with Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of
Syntax from 1965 Culicover and Jackendoff tell a story of how "mainstream"
syntax has developed – or should develop – through various stages of the 
chomskian enterprise, including the current version of minimalism, ending in a
final "flat" structure inspired by the attribute-value formalisms of Lexical-
Functional Grammar (LFG), see Bresnan (1982, 2001), and Head-Driven Phrase 
Structure Grammar (HPSG), see Pollard and Sag (1987, 1994). This is a piece of 
"deconstruction" where the elaborate tree stuctures and transformations of 
chomskian syntax are transformed into a relational form, which - and this is a 
central claim of the authors – is more amenable to interacting with a 
semantic/conceptual structure. 
I would like to tell a somewhat different story – different, but with many 
points of similarity. Instead of Chomsky I take as my starting point the work on 
logic and language by K.Ajdukiewicz and A.Tarski in the mid 1930s; for fuller 
details see Fenstad (1978, 1996, 2004). Ajdukiewicz pioneered the modern
study of categorial grammar, Tarski opened up the new field of formal
semantics. In Warsaw of the 1930s they met and could have joined forces, but it 
remaind for H.Reichenbach and H.B.Curry in the late 1940s to connect the 
syntax of categorial grammar and the semantics of model theory through the
formalism of higher order logic. The work of Curry did not receive the attention 
it merited at the time, and it was the later contributions of R.Montague, see 
Thomason (1974), that revitalized the links between logic and linguistics. This 
represents, in fact, another piece of "deconstruction": The tree structure of 
categorial grammar is mapped into the relational form of model theory. One
should not be confused by the complexities of the lambda-terms of logic. Higher 
order logic defines the map between the tree structure of categorial analysis (the
60
Grammar, Geometry and Brain 
subject-predicate form) and the flat relational form of model theory – the higher
order logic is the tool, not the substance. This use of logic as a connecting map
has led to a number of interesting insights. Particularly important is the
structural identification between noun phrases and generalized quantifiers; see 
Fenstad (1978) and Barwise and Cooper (1981). 
Higher order intensional logic is a powerful and elegant mathematical tool.
But when this instrument is used to establish a map between syntax and meaning 
there is a tendency to formalize too much. This was a criticism voiced, among
others, by J.Barwise and R.Cooper in their study of the relationship between 
noun phrases and generalized quatifiers; see Barwise and Cooper (1981). The 
Barwise-Cooper study of generalized quantifiers was an important step forward. 
Further reflection on the proper semantic structure for the study of natural 
languages led to the subsequent development of situation semantics; see 
J.Barwise and J.Perry (1983). Language and formal semantics have been an area 
of great activity. The full story remains to be told, many interesting overviews 
can be found in the Handbook of Logic and Language (edited by J. van Benthem 
and A. ter Meulen (1997)). The theory of generalized quantifiers and the 
development of situation semantics can be seen as simplifications on the 
semantic/conceptual side. What should be done on the syntactic side? And how
should syntax and the new semantics be linked? 
The Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI) was 
founded at Stanford in 1983. The logician J.Barwise and the linguist J.Bresnan 
were both leading members of the Center. I happened to be present as visitor at 
Stanford for the academic year 1983-84. The opening year of CSLI was marked 
by a general wish to explore the connection between the many disciplines
present. LFG was the prominent syntactic theory at CSLI. Situation semantics
had a similar status on the meaning side. Syntax and semantics must be related. 
Thus the question of how to interpret the functional structures of LFG in 
situation semantics became urgent. The solution, simple when first recognized, 
was the concept of situation schemata; see Fenstad et al. (1985, 1987). This is a 
representational form derived from the f-structures of LFG. And in contrast to 
the lambda-terms of Montague grammar, questions of efficient computability
was always an important concern. The technology of situation schemata was 
later adopted by Pollard and Sag (1987) in their development of HPSG. 
Seen in retrospect the story can be slightly rephrased. What we did in 
developing the theory of situation schemata can be seen as an act of double 
replacement: replacing the categorial syntax of language with the formalism of 
LFG and replacing the formulas of higher order logic of formal semantics with 
the situation schemata format. It is important to point out that the technology of 
situation schemata is not necessarily tied to LFG and situation semantics. The 
particular attributes and value slots in the schemata were in our analysis selected
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for the task at hand, viz. to link LFG and situation semantics, but the technology
is general as e.g. the later application to HPSG shows. 
I called this an alternative story to the one told by Culicover and Jackendoff 
(2005). In both cases a somewhat rigid syntactic tree-structure (in one case 
minimalism, in the second case categorial grammar) is replaced by an LFG-like 
simpler structure. In both cases the simpler syntax is linked to a
conceptual/semantic structure. And here is the point where the two accounts 
come together. The similarity between the CS (Conceptual Structures) of 
Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) and the situation schemata of Fenstad et al. 
(1985) is deep and immediate. Both are constraint-based formalisms and both
allows for partiality, and their basic formats are quite similar.
For the reader who is familiar with the notions of conceptual structures 
and situation schemata I add the following technical remark: The basic format of 
a CS, as introduced in Culicover and Jackendoff (2005), is: 
FUNCTION(ARG1, ... ARGi); MOD1, ... MODm; FEATURE1, ..., FEATUREn.
The basic format of a situation schema, as introduced in Fenstad et al. 
(1985,1987), is: 
REL, ARG1, ...ARGn, LOC, POL. 
We see the similarities, FUNCTION corresponds to REL; both formats have an 
ARG-list; FEATURES correspond to LOC. The MOD-list is missing from the 
situation schema format. This is because we at that time had the task to create a 
tailormade interface between LFG and situation semantics. In LFG modifiers are 
basically attached to either the REL, an ARG, or possibly the LOC attribute.
Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) argue for a flatter syntax; see as an example
the different treatment of NPs in LFG and in Simpler Syntax. The need for a 
semantic/conceptual representational interface is clear; its particular format will 
have to depend on your choice of syntax and semantic structure. We shall 
elaborate this issue further below, in particular, in connection with the theory of 
Conceptual Spaces, see Gärdenfors (2000).
Returning from technicalities to the main story let me conclude by one 
further remark. In Jackendoff (2002) there is a fourth component, the spatial 
structure (see fig. 1.1 on p. 6 of the book). Precisely how this part is linked to
the others components is not explained in any detail. In Fenstad et al. 
(1985,1987) there is a well-defined fourth component, viz. the model structure
or, in other words, the semantic/conceptual space. And there is a well-developed 
theory of interpreting situation schemata in the model structures; see Fenstad et
al. (1987, pp. 52-76). We remind the reader once more that in this work situation 
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semantics defines the class of models, but the technology is general. It is to the 
theory of semantic spaces in general that we now turn. We shall – extending the 
standard approach – explore the role of geometry in understanding semantic
structure.
2 The structure of semantic space 
In logic we make a clear distiction between syntax and semantics. Syntax is the
domain of formulas and their structure. A fundamental notion is "provability",
i.e. how one formula I of a certain well-defined formal language L is provable
from a set of formulas ' of the same language. Semantics deals with structures
or models. Typically, a model consists of a non-empty domain M of objects, 
which can be finite or infinite. In addition there are sets of relations R1, ... , Rn
and functions f1, ... , fm defined over the domain. The basic notion in model
theory is "validity", that some assertion Rk(a1, ... , av) or a functional equality
fs(a1, ... , av) = at is true in the domain. It was the great contribution of Tarski to 
set up a precise formalism and inductive definitions of these notions. The 
connecting link between syntax and semantics is the notion of "interpretation", 
i.e. how a formula I of L is assigned a meaning over the model M. If I is a 
closed formula (a sentence) of L, then the meaning is a truth-value, true or false. 
There are two basic results in (first order) logic, the Gödel completeness
theorem, which asserts that a formula I is provable if and only if it is valid in all 
domains, and the Gödel/Church/Turing incompleteness theorem, which asserts 
that the notion of provability is undecidable. Note that the notion of proof is 
algorithmic, but that provable, which asserts that there exists a proof, is not 
necessarily so. 
This is, very briefly, the formal tools used in Montague grammar. From
categorial grammar via higher order logic to the model structure we have precise 
constructions and well-defined maps. But there is a price to pay. The class of 
semantic structures consists of all models of the kind described above. And a 
general model of this kind is nothing but sets of lists. A first order model is 
essentially two lists, one list of positive facts, which are basic assertions Rk(a1, ...
, av) valid in the model, and a second list of negative facts, i.e. assertions Rk'(a'1,
... , a'v') which are not valid in the model. As explained in Fenstad (1998) the
standard way of extending the notion of model only leads to more lists, e.g.
partial models are partial lists, possible world models are indexed sets of lists, 
and higher order models are just lists of lists. This may be adequate if the aim is 
technological applications of natural language systems, since in this case the 
models or semantic structures at the current level of technology are data bases, 
which in bare structure are nothing but systems of lists. But if the aim is 
cognitive science, we need something more.
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This leads us back to the pairing of LFG and situation semantics discussed 
in the previous section. We reproduced the basic format of a situation schema 
above. Let us now be a bit more specific about the semantics, see Barwise and 
Perry (1983). The starting point is a multi-sorted structure 
M = (S, L, D, R), 
where S is a set of situations, L is a set of locations, R is a set of relations and D 
is a set of individuals. Note that in situation semantics all basic types are
primitive, which, in particular, means that a relation is not a set of n-tuples of 
individuals. Sets of tuples may be used to classify relations, but, as argued in 
Barwise and Perry (1983), this is not sufficient as an analysis in a broader 
cognitive context. Basic facts are either positive or negative, 
r, a1, ... , an; 1 
r, a1, ... , an; 0 
where r  R and a1, ..., an  D. Partiality is present in the format since we do not 
necessarily have either r, a1, ... , an; 1 or r, a1, ... , an; 0, for all n-tuples a1, ... , an.
Facts may be located,
at l: r, a1, ... , an; i  (i = 1 or 0) 
where l  L is a connected region of space-time. A situation is determined by a 
set of located facts of the form 
in s: at l: r, a1, ... , an; i. 
The main contribution of Fenstad et al. (1985,1987) was a formal construction 
of a method which to every sentence of (a fragment of) a natural language (taken 
e.g. from some text corpus) gave an interpretation of that sentence in a system of
situation semantics via its associated situation schema. From one point of view 
this is a piece of theoretical linguistics, but there were also some early 
applications of the techniques to natural language technology, in particular, to 
question-answering systems, see Vestre (1987), and to machine translation 
systems, see Dyvik (1993). Today techniques have changed and have been 
vastly extended, but basic insights still remain. For one example of current 
activity in language technology see KUNSTI (Knowledge Generation for 
Norwegian Language Technology), which is a research programme with main
focus on machine translation and speech recognition financed by the Norwegian
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Research Council (see the website www.forskningsradet.no/kunsti, where you 
will find further links to the individual projects). 
The theory of conceptual spaces, see Gärdenfors (2000), is an attempt to 
provide a theory of semantic structures suitable for linguistics and cognitive
science. We noted above that standard model theory is basically a theory of lists. 
For technological applications, where the equation "model = data base" is still 
the operating modus, lists may well suffice – for cognitive science it does not. 
We have seen a refinement in situation semantics, where the location 
component, representing a connected region of space-time, plays an important
role. But situation theory is very much a realistic theory. There is always a given 
discourse situation with a speaker, an addressee, an utterance and a location – 
and a described situation "out there", i.e. in a suitable sense "a situation in the 
world" (see chapter 5 of Gärdenfors (2000) for a more careful analysis). And the 
meaning relation in situation semantics is a complex relation between two 
situations and an utterance, the latter represented, as in Fenstad et al. (1985), by 
a situation schema; see Barwise and Perry (1983) for an extended discussion. 
But even with this refinement of standard model theory situation semantics is 
not exactly right for the analysis of concepts, mind and brain. 
The starting point of Gärdenfors (2000) is the insight that concepts should
be structured relative to several domains, which form clusters well separated 
from each other. Color and shape are typical examples of such domains. In the
case of color we usually recognize three dimensions, hue, chromaticness and 
brightness – thus the color domain is a three dimensional space. Concepts are 
usually related to several domains, "red cube" relates both to the color and the 
shape domains (and possibly to many others – what is the cube made of?). A 
property, following Gärdenfors (2000), is a concept related to one domain, e.g. 
"red" is related to the color domain only and can be identified with a subset of 
color-space.
In standard model theory properties are arbritary subsets – there is no 
further general analysis. This has caused philosphers endless difficulties in their 
attempts to give an analysis of notions such as "natural kinds" within the
framework of standard logic. The added ingredient in the theory of conceptual 
spaces (taking a clue from the study of perception) is geometry. Each domain 
carries a geometric structure, e.g. the hue dimension is represented by a cirle, 
chromaticness and brightness are linear. In this case we have a natural geometric 
structure, and – to cut the story short – with this insight the property red is 
immediately seen to be a convex subset of color space. The analysis is general 
and is related to the analysis of properties as prototypes, see E.Rosch (1978). To 
sum up, we can now define, following Gärdenfors (2000), a conceptual space M 
as a collection of one or more domains D1, ... , Dn, where each Di represents a 
quality dimension of the total space. 
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From one point of view the analysis presented by Gärdenfors can be seen as 
an extension or enrichment of standard model theory. In standard model theory 
there is a perfect match between syntax and semantics, every relation and 
function on the model domain has a name in the language. In the theory of 
conceptual spaces red as a region in a quality domain has an intrinsic geometry, 
whereas red as a syntactic entity has no geometry. Many years ago I argued for 
the need to enrich standard model theory with geometry, see Fenstad (1978), and 
pointed to the analysis of R.Thom (1970,1973), but I did not pursue the matter 
further at that time. In situation schema theory the LOC attribute may hide some 
geometry not visible in the syntax, see the analysis of prepositional phrases by 
E.Colban in Appendix A of Fenstad et al. (1987). There are close connections 
between the theory of conceptual spaces, cognitive grammar, and the geometric 
approach to semantics by R.Thom, see the discussion in Gärdenfors (2000) and 
Petitot (1995).
The theory of conceptual spaces lies in the middle ground between language
stucture and brain dynamics. From the linguistic side we seem to have the 
technology available to connect a syntactic analysis in an LFG format to the 
semantics of conceptual spaces, using an attribute value formalism extending the 
approach used in connection with LFG and situation semantics – we note that 
refinements such as multi-dimensionality of domains and geometry are no 
serious technical obstruction. Explicit constructions, however, need to be
supplied to turn this opinion into a solid fact. But far more challenging is the 
interface between conceptual level and actual brain. How is the geometry of 
conceptual spaces generated by an underlying brain dynamics?
3 Beyond simplicity 
If we are to succeed in the task of explaining how meaning and mind are 
grounded in the physical brain, we first of all need detailed models of brain 
structure and functioning. This is a very active area of research. Much is now 
known about structures, less about functions.
Out of a vast literature let me mention a few general surveys which may be
usful as a background to our speculations about grammar, geometry and brain:
G.Marcus (2004), The Birth of the Mind. How a Tiny Number of Genes Creates
the Complexities of Human Thought; P.Gärdenfors (2003), How Homo became
Sapiens. On the Evolution of Thinking; and M.Donald (2001), A Mind So Rare.
The Evolution of Human Consciousness. The books all report many facts and 
observations. They all try to weave this information into a coherent story 
connecting mind and brain. The stories may be plausible, but it is not "hard" 
science. Current research is regularly reviewed in journals such as Nature and 
Science. Some recent examples are: "Language Development", Science vol. 303, 
February 2004; "Neuroscience: Higher Brain Function", Science vol. 2306,
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October 2004; and "Neuroscience: System-Level Brain Development", Science
vol. 310, November 2005. At regular intervals we have handbook-type 
comprehensive reviews, of special relevance is M.S.Gazzaniga (2004).
Closer to our immediate concern are the review articles in the book The
Neurocognition of Language, Brown and Hagoort (1999). Of particular interest 
are the reviews in the section on the neurocognitive architecture of language, 
dealing with the basic brain architecture underlying the process of written and 
spoken word forms, the functional and neural architecture of word meaning and 
the neurocognition of syntactic processing. As the word architecture indicates, 
we are here dealing basically with structure. Other sources deal with the
dynamics of brain modeling; we may mention D.J.Amit (1989), Modeling Brain
Function. The World of Attractor Neural Networks, A.Scott (2002), 
Neuroscience – A Mathematical Primer, and C.Eliasmith and C.H.Anderson 
(2005), Neural Engineering: The Prinicples of Neurobiological Simulation.
These books are attempts to model brain and cognitive behavior in general. One 
attempt aimed directly towards language behavior, is D.Loritz (1999), How the 
Brain Evolved Language. Loritz uses systems of non-linear reaction equations to 
model linguistic behavior. He has some successes with phonology and certain
morphological and syntactic phenomena, but is rather vague when moving from 
syntax to semantics. In this area there is a recent attempt by C.Eliasmith (2000), 
How Neurons Mean. A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational
Content. This is noteworthy, but it is fair to say that we are only in the very early 
stages in our quest for understanding.
Let me for a moment retreat to simplicity and some early attempts to model 
language and brain based on neural network models. One example is the work 
by J.Elman on recurrent networks for grammatical discrimination; see the 
review of this work in P.M.Curchland (1995) and, for further references, the 
comprehensive survey of network models in P.S.Churchland (2002). Let me also 
recall a proposal within the context of optimality theory, A.Prince and
P.Smolensky (1997), "Optimality: From Neural Networks to Universal 
Grammar", in Science vol. 275, March 1997. This is interesting reading, but
details have, as far as I know, not yet appeared in print. There has been a heated 
debate between rule-based approaches versus network models. Stated in a very
crude way the proponents of the first approach want to extend chomskian type
syntactic rules into the brain, whereas the network camp believes that recurrent 
networks do indeed model brain in a faithful way and that language structure 
can be explained as an emergent behavior of such networks.
Some years ago I sketched an attempt to close the gap between meaning and 
brain, the missing link being geometric structure, see Fenstad (1998). Via a 
more gently executed rule-based approach we are now in a position to move
from phonology and syntax to a conceptual structure; see the first section above. 
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The conceptual part has two components, first, the representational form in the 
form of an attribute-value matrix (e.g. a situation schema), and, second, the
model structure, where we have opted for the format of conceptual spaces. A
conceptual space is a collection of domains, where each component domain is a 
standard model structure enriched with an intrinsic geometric structure; see the 
second section above.
And it is geometric structure which points to a link between concept and 
brain, see Fenstad (1998). We spell this out in some detail: A natural kind is, as 
explained above, a property related to one of the domains of a conceptual space, 
more specifically a natural kind is a convex region of a domain. This is the view 
from the language side. Seen from the brain modeling side we recognize that the
various dynamic processess in the brain have associated geometric constructs.
This was explicitly used by Thom in his early attempts towards a topological 
semantics for language, Thom (1970, 1973). Thus similar to the prototypes and 
convex regions in the domains of a conceptual space we have attractors and 
domain of attraction in the "potential surfaces" of topological semantics. If one 
identifies the two, and there are certainly mathematical theorems to prove in this 
connection, a link is established between language, concept and brain. Note, that 
this is an account very much consistent with the discussion in P.M.Churchland 
(1995) of coding and pattern recognition. There is also some recent research on 
attractor dynamics and memory which can be taken to support our account, see 
T.J.Wills et al. (2005). But one need to be extremely careful in chosing the 
"right" geometrical representations on both the conceptual side and the brain
side to make sense of the connection.
At this point we need to return from simplicity to the real world. Much of 
current global brain modeling employ neural network models. But despite their 
rich mathematical structure – see Amit (1989) – they are too simple to catch the 
complexity of a real brain – see the critical discussion in Scott (2002). Doubts 
about this simplicity do not only concern the structure and dynamics of the
network models, it extends even to the choice of basic unit, the neuron, see the 
recent critical assessment article by T.H.Bullock et al. (2005). The cognitive 
neurosciences have, indeed, made rapid progress. And this includes 
sophisticated modeling of structures and functions on many levels. But what we 
really need, and what some popular texts pretend to supply, is a connected story 
– with experiments and mathematical models at the level of Hodgkin and 
Huxley (1952) – reaching from basic anatomical structure up through the 
various stages of complex cognitive behavior, and ending up with high-level
phenomena such as attention, consciousness, and speech.
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4 Representations at mid-level 
Science consists in doing what is do-able. We will, therefore, abstain from
further speculations, scale down the grand visions, and conclude with a few 
simple remarks on cognitive architecture and representational formats.
A convenient starting point for these remarks is the "neurocognition of 
language" book edited by Brown and Hagoort (1999). The surveys in this book 
separate into three levels. At one end we see the perspective of the linguist, 
which rests on a long research tradition in the classical disciplines of phonology,
syntax and semantics. At the other end we have the perspective from the 
neuroscience research community, which by now is in command of a vast and 
extremely detailed knowledge of brain structures. But when the linguists try to
reach deeper into mind and brain and the neuroscientists try to explain how 
higher cognitive functions emerge out of bare structure, we are in a somewhat 
uncertain middle ground. The two middle parts of Brown and Hagoort (1999) 
survey various attempts to bridge this gap. In one part the linguistic analysis is 
supplemented by an account of cognitive architecture, building on a rich 
research tradition in cognitive psychology. Here we find mid-level blueprints of 
the speaker, the listener and the reader. In a second part we find a survey of 
steps towards a neurocognitive architecure of language, aiming to connect the
blueprints of cognitive psychology with basic brain structure. What is 
particularly attractive with the Brown and Hagoort (1999) book is the effort to
spell out the interaction between the different parts. On the one side the 
blueprints are so constructed to be consistent with the linguistic analysis, and on 
the other side the blueprints serve as guiding principles in the identification of 
the basic neural architecture.
Language, blueprints and structure bear some analogy to our discussion in 
the first part of this paper. We have advocated the use of an LFG type syntactic 
format. This is very much consistent with the grammatical analysis used by 
J.M.Levelt (1999) in his blueprint for the speaker, where a unification-based 
grammar formalism is a tool in the transformation of meaning into speech. This 
unification-based analysis was first developed by G.Kempen and T.Vosse 
(1989); see also the account in Fenstad (1998). But at mid level there are many
strctures interacting, not only meaning and speech. Placed in a particular context 
you may listen, observe, speak and write. All of this interact at many levels in 
the brain to create meaning and response. To fix ideas let us return to an early 
example of language technology, a question-answering system developed by 
E.Vestre (1987 – in Norwegian); see the exposition in Fenstad et al. (1992). The 
basic architecture follows a familiar pattern: 
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declarative utterance question   answer 
p   p    n
       parser  parser          generator 
p   p    
 situation schema       situation schema n
p   p    
 data base o       interference o       situation schema 
This is a technology application based on the simple assumption that "model = 
data base". The system can be updated by new facts as indicated by the left
column. Sentences are represented by situation schemata, and a special 
algorithm was developed to extract basic facts from the schemata and to add
them to the data base. A question is asked resulting in an incomplete schema. 
This schema acts as a query to the data base and produces an answer in form of 
a complete schema, which in turn generates the appropriate response.
If we are allowed a brief moment of speculation, we could argue that at a 
very general level this architecture can also be used in a cognitive context. The 
right column will then have to be modified to represent a "blueprint" for a 
speaker or, more generally, an actor. The left column must in a similar way be 
modified to "blueprints" for the reader or the listener. And we must in addition 
make allowance for visual and other types of perceptual inputs. The middle
column will represent some "attention mechanism" and will determine the 
appropriate context and form of response. The main move would be to replace
the data bases of simple language technology with the category of conceptual 
spaces. And, as a concequence, the situation schemata need to be enriched to a 
suitable attribute-value matrix form. We could even entertain the thought that
this is a possible architecture for memory recall, pointing to the similarity
between recall and the above sequence: questions – incomplete representational 
form – data base – inference – answer. 
But this is speculation and yet far from respectable theory. As pointed out
above we seem best prepared at either end, we are at a loss in the middle ground. 
But we are slowly gathering the tools in our quest for a deeper understanding. 
On the brain side we have seen interesting mathematical models; I want, in
particular, to point to various forms of neuronal assembly theories, see Scott 
(2002), and to the approach in Eliasmith and Anderson (2005); see also the 
recent book, Neuromimetic Semantics, H.Howard (2004). The aim is not 
neccessarily to build global brain models, but to model specific functions at their 
appropriate level. On the other side we have the theory of conceptual structures. 
It is now neccessary to study specific examples and try to understand how the 
intrinsic geometry in these examples can be generated by brain mechanisms,
themes in color and vision come immediatley to attention; for vision see
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E.T.Rolls and G.Deco (2002). I submit that proper attention to the larger 
architectural structure is needed to guide this quest.
At mid-level we also need a more detailed study of the space of 
representational forms, in particular, its dynamical structure; see the unification
spaces of Kempe and Vosse (1989) for some early algorithms, see also the
discussion in Fenstad (1998). Algorithmic concerns should always be a focus of 
attention; we need to exploit the fact that the representational level is the 
interface between the linear processing of speech and the parallell processing of 
brain; see Donald (2001, chapter 5) for a general discussion.
To take command of the middle ground is, in my view, the main challenge.
We can, as we did above, argue for this within a cognitive science context. But 
barriers to progress in language technology – in machine translation and speech 
recognition – tell us with equal urgency that we need to conquer the middle
ground. Incremental progress in current language technology is still important 
for viable applications. But real progress in the technology needs an 
understanding that is far beyond theory today. No amount of wistful handwaving 
can hide this fact. 
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Abstract
The distribution of bare singulars in Norwegian was thoroughly 
examined in Borthen (2003). The present paper outlines an account of 
these data in a type-logical semantics of the Neo-Carlsonian kind. The 
focus is primarily on the syntax-semantics interface, which here, 
somewhat simplified, amounts to assigning semantic types in the 
appropriate sortal domain to bare singulars. I argue that bare singulars 
can have their denotation both in the domain of ordinary individuals and 
kinds. Furthermore, they can either be used with their property type or 
function as names. This explains why bare singulars can be both 
predicates and arguments. Concerning bare singulars in the direct object 
position, the phenomenon of incorporation also seems to play a role. The 
various restrictions on the use of bare singulars can basically be 
accounted for in terms of competition with more marked grammatical 
forms, notably (in)definite DPs. 
1 Introduction
In the Montagovian tradition, common nouns – or bare nominals – are basically 
properties, that is, the NP “semanticist” denotes for each world or situation the 
set of individual semanticists in that world. In English, count nouns are rarely 
used in the pure form of the lexical entry, but turn up in variants like the DPs “a 
semanticist”, “the semanticist” or the bare plural “semanticists”. The interest in 
bare nominals in the semantic community was given an impetus when Carlson 
(1977) proposed that bare plurals in English basically refer to kinds: 
(1)
(2)
Semanticists are rare in Mainland Scandinavia.1 (kind reference)
Semanticists are observed in Kjell Johan’s garden. (object
reference)
1 ‘Semanticists’ can, of course, always be replaced by ‘dogs’ or by the reader’s favourite well-
established kind. 
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In examples like (2), the context suggests that concrete individuals might realise 
the abstract kind we find in (1). With a stage-level predicate (“to be observed”), 
we get an indefinite reading of the bare plural, which in the Carlsonian analysis 
can be paraphrased as existential quantification over (spatio-temporal) stages of 
objects realising the kind “semanticist”. Carlson’s ontology is thus richer than
the standard Montagovian machinery: ordinary individuals (objects) interact 
with stages and kinds.
The Neo-Carlsonian approach of Chierchia (1998) maintains the idea of 
bare nominals being kind-denoting, now through a covert “down-operator”, 
which turns a property into a kind. For contexts such as (2) above, Chierchia 
introduces covert operations in several steps; first “semanticists” is shifted from 
a property to an atomic kind (the down-operator) in order to fill the subject
position of the sentence; next, a rule labelled “derived kind predication” repairs 
– in two steps – the mismatch between the object-level predicate “to be 
observed” and the kind-denoting subject. An “up-operator” takes the kind entity
as input and returns, once again, a property – the set of semanticists (Arnim, 
Cathrine, Ede, Torgrim, etc.) now conceived as a “mass”, and, finally, 
existential quantification ensures that at least some of these guys can be found in
Kjell Johan’s garden. Chierchia no longer talks about “stages”, so the Neo-
Carlsonian ontology merely distinguishes between ordinary individuals (objects) 
and kinds.
Chierchia’s paper is important in many respects, not the least because it
shifts focus from English bare plurals to cross-linguistic investigations into the 
nature of bare nominals. The conventional wisdom says that in languages 
without articles, such as Russian, bare singulars do double-duty as indefinites 
and definites:
(3) Pozdnej osen'ju v seredine dnja s rejsovogo "Ikarusa" [...] soshel 
[molodoj muzhchina]j[bare singular]. Byl [on]j odet v sportivnye botinki 
i dzhinsy [...] [Muzhchina]j[bare singular], ne obrashchaja vnimanija na 
veter i na dozhd', [...] postavil chemodan mezhdu nog i tak ostalsja 
stojat' tam, gde soshel. (Uppsala Corpus) 
Late in the autumn, in the middle of the day, [a young man]j got off 
the "Ikarus"-express. [He]j wore jogging shoes and jeans [...] [The 
man]j, not paying attention to the wind and rain, [...] put his 
suitcase between his feet and remained standing where he got off. 
In such languages, type shifting in the sense of Partee (1987) occurs relatively
freely. More generally, however, a universal blocking principle is invoked both 
for Partee’s covert operators (such as  and L – producing indefinite and definite 
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interpretations, respectively) and Chierchia’s operators (mediating simultan-
eously between types and sorts):
NP denotations can be type shifted freely, unless the type shift is lexicalised 
(marked) in a language through the existence of an overt determiner. 
This kind of iconicity is in line with a common principle of current Optimality 
Theory: marked forms should be used for marked expressions. 
Chierchia makes an additional claim concerning the category of number:
the down operation – which produces kind entities – is undefined for singular
terms. Hence, bare singular kinds are ruled out in his system.2
Concerning Germanic languages, Chierchia’s theory makes the following 
strong prediction, which is presented as a “fact” in (Chierchia 1998: 341): “[In 
Germanic,] bare singular arguments are totally impossible”. Arguments are 
prototypically referring expressions of type <e>, but since a covert shift to <eo>
is blocked by (in)definite determiners and a shift to kinds <ek>3 is barred for 
singular terms in Chierchia’s theory, bare singulars can only be predicates. 
Nevertheless, as the readers of this volume dedicated to a Norwegian
semanticist probably are aware of, Norwegian is a Germanic language, which, 
interestingly, does exhibit bare singulars both in predicate and argument
positions. In the Neo-Carlsonian literature, Chierchia’s theory is constantly 
challenged and refined as more “exotic” languages are under scrutiny. And now
time is ripe for us to have our say. 
2 This blocking is not due to the existence of a kind-forming determiner (no languages have 
special determiners for kinds), but is related to the ontological status of kinds in Chierchia’s 
theory. Chierchia argues that properties whose extensions do not have a greatest individual 
cannot be mapped to a kind. Concerning our initial example “semanticist”, it does not make
any sense to say that Kjell Johan is greater than Arnim or that Arnim is greater than Kjell 
Johan; they are both atomic entities from a semantic point of view. This is contrasted with the 
bare plural  “semanticists”, where the greatest individual equals the sum of all semanticists in
the world of evaluation. I do not share this assumption, and follow Krifka (2003) who finds 
Chierchia’s restriction to plural kinds unjustified. Imagine, 30 years from now, that every 
linguistic department in the world decided to abandon semantics due to some global quality 
reform. Despite this deplorable situation, the kind “semanticist” would still be defined and 
well-established (in memory of happier days) even though the specimen making up this kind 
could possibly be reduced to the singleton set {Kjell Johan}, an untouchable professor 
emeritus at the department of German studies. 
3 I use the familiar type <e> for entities with subscripts ‘o’ and ‘k’ distinguishing sortally
between ordinary individuals and kind individuals, whenever necessary. For simplicity, I will 
typically omit the world parameter and stay within an extensional semantics. This means that
I tend to gloss over the distinction between, say, the property type <s,et> and the predicative 
type <et>. 
77
Atle Grønn 
2 Calling Up Norwegian
A serious treatment of the thorny data was given in Kaja Borthen’s dissertation 
(2003) on bare singulars in Norwegian. She distinguishes four main cases:4
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
I: the “conventional situation type” construction
a. Kjell Johan holdt på med doktorgrad[bare singular] i 1984. 
'Kjell Johan was working on a doctoral degree in 1984.'
b. Kjell Johan var doktorgradsstudent[bare singular] i 1984. 
'Kjell Johan was a PhD-student in 1984.'
II: the “profiled have-relation” construction
a. Kjell Johan har gul ytterfrakk[bare singular].
'Kjell Johan has a yellow coat.' 
b. Kjell Johan, det er hammer[bare singular] i verktøykassa. 
'Kjell Johan, there is a hammer in the toolbox.'
III: the “comparison of types” construction
a. Kjell Johan, hammer[bare singular] er et nyttig verktøy. 
'Kjell Johan, a hammer is a useful tool.'
b. Den beste typen framkomstmiddel er t-bane[bare singular].
'The best type of conveyance is the subway.'
IV: the “covert infinitival clause” construction5
a. Bil[bare singular] er kjekt. 
'(Having) a car is handy.'
b. Trenger du bil[bare singular]?
'Do you need (e.g. to borrow) a car?'
The question which will be our main concern here, is how these data can be
related to a type-logical framework. Borthen does not address this issue, but 
points out that bare singulars are prototypically type-emphasizing, cf. the 
minimal pair below: 
4 Limitations of space force me to refer the reader to Borthen’s dissertation for a justification
of this classification and the raison d’être behind her labels. Below I illustrate each class with
two examples, which, like most of the Norwegian data presented in this paper, are borrowed 
from Borthen’s work (with minor modifications, basically “modulo Kjell Johan”). 
5 In the following, I will ignore this particular construction, which from a semantic point of
view perhaps should ultimately be grouped together with other constructions. There is a 
certain overlap also in Borthen’s work, where data belonging to the “covert infinitival clause”
construction also show up in the discussion of the “profiled have-relation” construction.
78
Norwegian Bare Singulars: A Note on Types and Sorts 
(8)
(9)
Kari fikk en fin sykkel[indefinite singular]. Den var blå. (token reference)
'Kari got a nice bike. It was blue.'
Kari fikk sykkel[bare singular]. Dét fikk Ola òg. (type reference)6
'Kari got a bike. Ola got one too.' (literally: “That Ola got too”).
It might seem paradoxical, but characteristics like “type emphasis” or “type 
reference” do not belong to the jargon of type-logical semantics, as they do not 
tell us which type we should assign to bare singulars. In this respect, consider 
also the following remark from Gerstner & Krifka (1993: 970): 
“The well-known type/token distinction can be treated as a case of this 
ambiguity of count nouns. For example, book may refer to individual
books (‘tokens’), like the book with the red cover on the top of my 
shelf, or to a subspecies of books (‘type’), like Milton’s Paradise lost.
In a sentence like This book sells well it is obviously the latter reading
which is selected.” 
However, this is presumably not what Borthen has in mind, as she does not 
adhere to a kind-interpretation of Norwegian bare singulars, cf. for instance this
little footnote: “A type discourse referent must not be confused with a kind in 
the sense of Carlson (1977)” (Borthen 2003: 23). What, then, does Borthen 
mean by “type”? Is “type” referring to types or sorts? If it’s not the sort kind, it 
must be the type <et>, the predicative type. Or maybe the term is intended to be 
ambiguous, an ambiguity which, perhaps, is rather welcome and indeed reflects 
the essence of the proposal I will sketch below.
My approach will share many features with Neo-Carlsonian approaches – 
including a type-logical framework and the idea of competition, but it will be 
more conservative and less complex than Chierchia’s iterated covert type shifts. 
As pointed out by Krifka (2003: 177) with respect to rules like the “derived kind 
predication”, simpler derivations are possible and preferable. The big question is 
what makes it possible for bare singulars to appear in argument positions despite
the existence of (in)definite determiners in Norwegian? I will claim that kind
reference and incorporation are two independent ways of avoiding the blocking
by articles, and both these phenomena seem to play a role in the Norwegian
grammar.
6 The peculiar pronoun “dét”, which according to Borthen signals “type reference”, is not the
whole story, since “Dét fikk Ola òg” is a possible follow-up of the first sentence in (8) as 
well. Borthen is, of course, aware of this fact. 
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3 Two sorts and two types 
The exact ontological status of kinds and how they relate to ordinary individuals
is a matter which cannot be addressed properly in this setting. As noted in a 
recent paper on bare nominals by de Swart, Winter & Zwarts (2004), the Neo-
Carlsonian community is currently rethinking and redefining the notion of kind.
Still, everybody seems to agree that we need both kinds and ordinary objects,
and here I will simply assume that these two domains coexist without addressing 
possible interactions. This is basically also the stand taken in (Dayal 2004) and 
(Katz & Zamparelli 2005). 
Following these authors, I further claim that NPs (common nouns) can be 
ambiguous between an object-level and a kind-level interpretation. More
specifically, this ambiguity is what we observe in the case of so-called well-
established kinds. The denotation of a bare nominal is split into a property of 
objects and a property of kinds:
[[dog]] = {Fido, Lassie, Pluto, …} or {dogk, German shepardk, Golden 
Retrieverk , …} 
This accounts for different readings such as: 
A dog is barking in Kjell Johan’s garden. (object level)(10)
(11)
(12)
A dog was selected for its special features. (kind level)
In (11), we get the so-called subkind or taxonomic reading. Note that the 
“superkind” ‘dogk’ is part of the set denoted by the bare nominal; however, the 
indefinite DP “a dog” in (11) clearly picks out one of the subkinds (say, 
‘German shepardk’) from the dog-taxonomy. As we will see in section 5, the 
definite article picks out the superkind itself, when the context selects a kind 
interpretation. Thus, the standard determiners combine compositionally with the
relevant property – be that in the domain of ordinary individuals or kinds. 
The question is, of course, how bare singulars in Norwegian relate to these
properties. The answer is twofold. As expected, bare singulars can, in principle, 
occur in predicative positions (see section 4). But, importantly, I will argue that 
bare singulars lead a double life not only with respect to their sorts, but also with 
respect to their types. Following various works by Krifka, I claim that common
nouns can function as names and are thus able to apply to their kind directly. An 
exceptional case from English illustrates this phenomenon: 
Man has lived in Africa for more than two million years. (Gerstner 
& Krifka 1993: 967) 
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I will not invoke type shifting for such cases. Type shifting by, say, the L -
operator should be ruled out in (12) on principled grounds due to the existence 
in English (and Norwegian) of a definite determiner. Instead, I will simply
assume that common nouns are inherently ambiguous in the sense that they can 
be used in the appropriate context with this additional naming function.
Furthermore, at the end of the next section I will also argue that this 
naming function is not restricted to the kind domain.
4 Bare singulars in the domain of ordinary individuals 
But let’s not rush ahead. Let’s first see how far we can get with our standard 
assumptions, starting with the predicative type. Examples like the following are, 
of course, just what we expect in a compositional semantics.
(13)
(14)
(15)
Kjell Johan er professor[bare singular] i tysk. 
'Kjell Johan is a professor of German.'
A predication such as the one in (13) expresses a membership relation, where 
the predicate NP (“professor i tysk”) denotes a set of <e>-type entities, and the 
speaker claims that the subject of the sentence, “Kjell Johan” of type <e>, 
belongs to this set. This is also known as quantitative predication. We can
truthfully assert that Kjell Johan belongs to the set of professors of German, but 
there is more to say. Let’s qualify him as in (14): 
Kjell Johan er en utsøkt semantiker[indefinite singular].
'Kjell Johan is a distinguished semanticist.'
Of course, one would like to know why a bare singular cannot be used in the last 
example. For some reason, Norwegian patterns with English in (14), but not in
(13). It is natural to assume an underlying competition, but since no covert type 
shift is involved in (13), I predict that the indefinite article, expressing 
qualitative predication as in (14), is the marked form which should be accorded 
the more specialised meaning.7
Many of Borthen’s examples can be treated compositionally just as 
straightforwardly as in (13). For instance, in the following case, the correlation
with the predicative type falls out on a standard semantic analysis of the
existential there-construction:
Det er lege[bare singular] i Mandal. 
'There is a doctor in Mandal.'
7 See de Swart, Winter & Zwarts (2004) for an alternative view and a discussion of the 
relationship between these two kinds of predication. 
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The sentence in (15) expresses a relation of non-empty intersection between the
set of doctors and things in Mandal. Another point worth making is that the 
felicity of the bare singular in (15) can actually be considered an argument
against treating bare singulars as bona fide kinds (i.e. [[lege]] = legek) since kind 
terms are definite, and definite (strong) expressions are known to be ruled out in 
this environment (the so-called weak/strong distinction).
Finally, we come to the question of when and why we get bare singulars in
argument positions. First we recall that such cases are unexpected since 
arguments are of the basic type <e> or the type of generalised quantifiers <et,t>, 
and a covert shift from the inherent predicative type of bare singulars to an 
argumental type is blocked by the existence of determiners in Norwegian. 
However, let’s push the predicative type still a bit further. It is sometimes
claimed that transitive verbs come with different type requirements on their 
objects. For instance, Zimmermann (1993) argues that certain intensional verbs 
actually take properties as direct objects on their opaque interpretation. In the 
case of Norwegian, this gives a quite straightforward compositional semantics 
for minimal pairs like the following: 
Jeg ønsker meg sykkel[bare singular]. (only narrow scope reading)
'I want a bike.'
(16)
(17) Jeg ønsker meg en sykkel[indefinite singular]. (both narrow and wide 
scope readings)
'I want a bike.'
Bare nominals always have narrow scope, as with the property argument in (16).
This is to be contrasted with (17) on a transparent, wide-scope reading, where an 
indefinite generalised quantifier has to be invoked, conveying the meaning that 
the speaker has a specific bike (token) in mind. If (17) only had this wide scope 
reading, we could have argued that the wide scope reading, which triggers a 
shift from the property type to type <et,t>, is overtly encoded by the article, 
while the bare singular is preferred when the property type is required (narrow
scope reading in intentionalised contexts). However, this competition
perspective does not explain why a narrow scope reading exists also for 
indefinite DPs as in (17). Indefinites (the preposed article “en” in Norwegian) 
must express more than just existential quantification. Krifka (2003: 127) briefly 
addresses this issue with respect to Brazilian Portuguese, which patterns with 
Norwegian in allowing bare singulars in argument positions despite having a full
inventory of determiners. Krifka mentions a possible solution to this competition 
problem: A possibility would be to let indefinite expressions introduce a choice 
function, in which case we get a wide-scope interpretation of the existentially 
bound choice function also on a narrow scope reading of the NP.
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In any case, it should be clear that the common noun “sykkel” is not a bona
fide indefinite (even if one assumes that indefinites have the basic type <et> as 
in various DRT-based approaches). Unlike true indefinites, bare singulars 
cannot take wide scope. They are scopally inert, to use the expression of Farkas 
& de Swart (2003). At the same time, it seems implausible that the 
intensional/extensional distinction should play any major role in the distribution
of bare singulars. At least it does not explain why bare singulars are often 
perfectly natural in purely extensional contexts:
(18)
(19)
(20)
Kjell Johan og Kirsten kjøpte rekkehus[bare singular] på Tveita. 
'Kjell Johan og Kirsten bought a row house at Tveita.'
Instead, a large part of the data discussed by Borthen – probably the majority of 
the cases where the bare singular occurs in a direct object position – invites an 
analysis in terms of semantic incorporation, also referred to as “pseudo-
incorporation” in (Dayal 2003). Pace Borthen, I thus propose to distinguish 
between (19) and (20) below, which both allegedly belong to “the conventional
type construction”. However, in my view, the syntax-semantics mapping is too 
different in these cases to allow for a unified analysis. 
Kjell Johan er spydkaster[bare singular].
'Kjell Johan is a javeline thrower.'
Kjell Johan kaster spyd[bare singular].
'Kjell Johan throws the javeline.'
The analysis of incorporation proposed by Asudeh & Mikkelsen (2000) for 
Danish seems to be highly relevant also for Norwegian.8 In fact, even Dayal’s 
incorporation data from Hindi shows strong similarities with Norwegian bare 
singulars in object position (and as complements of prepositions). For reasons of 
space, I will here just mention some of the characteristics valid for semantic
incorporation cross-linguistically, exemplified with bare singulars in direct
object position as in (18) above: the VP forms a complex predicate with an
“institutionalised”, stereotypical meaning; the noun phrase is scopally inert (it 
contributes no quantifier, hence a wide-scope reading with respect to operators 
such as negation and intensional elements is impossible); the bare singular is 
8 Contra Asudeh & Mikkelsen, I prefer the term “semantic incoporation” instead of “syntactic 
incorporation”, since the incorporated noun – at least in Norwegian – can often move quite
freely, e.g. to topic positions: 
(i) Bil[bare singular] er kjekt å ha.
'Having a car is handy.'
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semantically number neutral9; and the bare nominal has reduced discourse 
transparence.
The last point is interesting and much debated. Let’s look at some relevant
data from Borthen: 
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
Kari kjørte bil[bare singular] til hytta forrige fredag. ??Den står der 
fortsatt.
'Kari drove her car to the cottage last Friday. It is still there.'
Kari sparket fotball[bare singular]. ??Den var blå. 
'Kari was playing soccer. It was blue.'
These incorporation constructions with the bare nominals “bil – car” and
“fotball – soccer” in direct object position show full discourse opacity, as 
expected given an analysis of incorporation where the bare nominal does not
contribute any discourse referent (in the sense of DRT). But then, what about
Borthen’s counterexample in (23) below? 
Kari har bil[bare singular], men hun bruker den aldri. 
'Kari has a car, but she never uses it.'
One possibility would be to give a different analysis of (21) and (23), such that 
only the former is treated as a case of incorporation, but then we should argue 
that verbs like “å ha – to have” differ in their inherent logical type from
transitive verbs like “å kjøre – to drive” in taking complements of type <et>. A 
second option would be to treat both cases as incorporation and consider the
anaphor (“den – it”) in (23) as an “inferable” (or “bridging” in a broad sense), 
similar to discourses like (24), where the pronoun “hun – she” lacks an overt 
antecedent:
A: Kjell Johan er gift. B: Det visste jeg ikke. A: Jeg tror hun heter 
Kirsten.
'A: Kjell Johan is married. B: Oh, I didn’t know. A: I think her 
name is Kirsten.'
9 Number is a highly important, but rather tricky issue for any theory of bare nominals.
Pragmatically, sentences like (18) will of course be interpreted as involving a single house,
but as shown by Borthen (2003: 146), in the appropriate context a plural interpretation may
emerge:
(ii) Per har hatt hund[bare singular] i ti år. Alle har vært veldig snille.
'Per has had a dog for ten years. They have all been very kind.'
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Finally, in recent analyses of semantic incorporation there have been several 
attempts to incorporate (sic!) a certain limited dynamic potential into 
incorporated nouns, cf. Dayal (2003) and Farkas & de Swart (2003). The 
proposal of the latter is couched in a DRT-framework in which they distinguish 
between normal discourse referents and thematic arguments. Determiners (or the
plural morpheme) are the locus for introducing discourse referents, hence in the 
case of an incorporated bare singular, we merely get a “thematic variable”. This 
enrichment of the DRT-architecture is not so straightforward to implement
formally. But even if we assume with de Swart and Farkas that there is such a 
distinction, and furthermore that discourse referents are better antecedents than 
thematic arguments, then how do we account for examples like (25), where the 
pronoun seems to be able to pick up the bare singular despite the presence of a 
“better” alternative, the full-fledged discourse referent of the definite subject? 
Traktoren i[definite singular] til naboen har tilhenger j[bare singular]. Deni/j er 
lite brukt.
'My neighbour’s tractor has a trailer. It is seldom used.'
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
The issue of semantic incorporation and its formalisation will most certainly
receive much attention in the future. Here I can merely suggest that the
Norwegian data seems to share all the relevant features with pseudo-
incorporation in Hindi (not to say Danish!) – and deserves further investigation.
This line of research was ultimately dismissed by Borthen mainly because bare 
singulars are also found in subject position (sisterhood seems to be required for 
incorporation). And, indeed, pseudo incorporation is not all there is to say about 
bare singulars in Norwegian. 
In section 3, I mentioned the possibility of using bare singulars with a 
naming function in the domain of ordinary individuals. These are the data I had 
in mind:
Kelner[bare singular], kan jeg få menyen? 
'Waiter, can I have the menu?'
Rektor[bare singular] var rasende. 
'Our headmaster was furious.'
Vesle[definite singular adjective] mor[bare singular] sto ute i hagen. 
'My dear mother was outside in the garden.' (literally: “little 
mother”)
These examples are all from Borthen’s introductory chapter, where she
explicitly excludes this kind of construction from her definition of bare singular
85
Atle Grønn 
count nouns because of the “definiteness”, which, true, shows up in agreeing
adjectives as in (28).10 My claim is that the alleged definiteness is due to the use 
of the bare nominal in the naming function, which must be of type <eo>. For 
some reason, the overt definite determiner is ruled out in the examples above, 
and it is therefore conceivable that this function of the bare singular is due to a
covert type shift. However, in this paper, I entertain the possibility that we have 
a genuine ambiguity: Lexical nouns, which traditionally are thought of as 
properties, can be used as names of type <e>. 
5 Bare singulars in the kind domain 
There is a subject-object asymmetry with respect to bare singulars in argument
position: When the bare singular has the syntactic function of a direct object, we
are typically dealing with incorporation, but in a subject position the NP 
denotation is often in the kind domain (except for cases like (27)-(28) above). 
Furthermore, I claim that kind reference with bare singulars is achieved through 
the naming function, which gives us the requisite argument of type <ek> and 
saves the type-logical machinery by referring directly to an atomic entity.
The kinship between kinds and proper names is particularly transparent 
when the verbal predicate itself puts “naming” on the agenda:
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
Denne arten kalles “ulv”[bare singular].
'This species is called the “wolf”.'
Consider finally some examples with bare singulars in subject position:
Bil[bare singular] er ikke det samme som buss[bare singular].
'A car is not the same as a bus.'
Tiger[bare singular] og løve[bare singular] er beslektede arter.
'The tiger and the lion are related species.'
Tiger[bare singular] er i motsetning til løve[bare singular] en truet dyreart. 
'The tiger is, unlike the lion, an endangered species.'
Examples like (30) are particularly interesting since the generic definite seems
to be blocked (“*bilen”, “*bussen”). In other cases, e.g. (31) and (32), the
definite generic (“tigeren”, “løven”) would be a possible alternative. The use of 
bare singulars as kind-denoting names is in fact quite restricted since this option
is typically outranked by the definite generic article: 
10 I find it somewhat odd that semantic effects of “definiteness” or “indefiniteness” should 
play any role in the demarcation of bare nominals. Bare is bare! 
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Tigeren[definite singular] er truet flere steder i verden. (*tiger[bare singular])
'The tiger is an endangered species in many parts of the world.'
(33)
All the examples (30)-(32) of the bare singular in subject position belong to
Borthen’s third group (“comparison of types construction”). In this respect, it is 
worth noting that an entity, according to Dayal (2003), qualifies as a subkind 
only if it belongs to a contrast set. 
This is how I propose to account for the observed competition between the
bare NP and the definite DP: The definite generic article is nothing more than 
the definite article applied to the taxonomic domain. As always, the definite
determiner picks out the maximal element out of a set, which, in this case, is the
superkind itself. The relevant domain of quantification is the domain of 
subkinds, which includes the superkind, as noted in section 3. This 
disambiguation of the definite article is a welcome result of our ontological
(sortal) distinction between the domain of ordinary individuals and kinds. In 
other words, there is nothing special about the so-called generic definite
determiner; it is the common noun that has two possible denotations, one in the
object domain, the other in the taxonomic/kind domain, cf. similar ideas in 
(Dayal 2003) and (Katz & Zamparelli 2005). 
Thus, the speaker has the following choice in examples like (32) and (33) 
above:
a) tigerk
vs.
b) [[tiger-en]] = L k. tiger(k) iff ‘tiger’ is a property of kinds. 
Given standard OT-reasoning, the marked form in b), the overt definite article,
is the preferred choice, everything else being equal. Then why is the alternative
in a) still viable in contexts like (32)? The reason for this seems to be that the 
definite article comes with an additional familiarity presupposition which is 
absent in the case of the direct kind reference with a bare singular in its naming
function. In the case of well-established kinds, the presupposition is readily 
accommodated in absence of any “distracting factors”, hence the definite 
determiner “wins” in cases like (33). On the other hand, the so-called 
“comparison of types construction” makes salient taxonomic hierarchies in
which the kind denoted by the bare singular is not a superkind, but a “proper” 
subkind. I suggest that this fact reduces the chances of the definite determiner
coming out as a winner. For instance, in (32), both the tiger and the lion are 
conceptualised as subkinds of “endangered species” in a taxonomy of wild
animals. Although it would have been possible to refer to each noun in the 
comparison construction as the maximal element, i.e. the superkind “tigeren – 
the tiger” of the set of tigers and the superkind “løven – the lion” of the set of 
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lions, the comparison construction makes the speaker more reluctant to invoke
the familiarity presupposition of the generic definite. The question under 
discussion (topic) is not the otherwise well-established kinds of these wild cats, 
but a different taxonomy. The comparison of types construction is thus a case of 
partial blocking, where direct reference to kinds by a bare singular is possible
despite the existence of the generic definite article. The common feature of (30)-
(32), where a bare singular is licensed, is that a different/larger taxonomic
hierarchy is under discussion in which the well-established kind of the bare 
nominal is not a superkind.
6 Conclusion
For a common noun N which is considered a well-established kind by the 
language community, I have argued for the following type-sort ambiguity:
N is of type <eo/k>
or
N is of type <eo/k,t>
In this paper, I have left open the question of whether we should reduce this 
picture by letting some variants be primitive and others arise through coercion. 
The existence of (in)definite determiners in Norwegian puts severe 
restrictions on the use of N in its purest form. However, in the data discussed 
above, we have encountered 3 out of the 4 admissible variants: <eo>, <eo,t> and 
<ek> with the last two being most frequent, explaining prototypical occurrences 
of bare singular count nouns in predicative/incorporated positions and in the
subject position, respectively. 
While a type-logical framework equipped with this sortal distinction shows 
why a bare nominal is possible in various contexts, it cannot explain the 
restrictions on its use and I have only discussed a subset of the intriguing data 
presented by Borthen (2003). However, I believe that this paper shows that 
Norwegian bare singulars do not constitute an isolated phenomenon, but should 
find their proper place in the Neo-Carlsonian research paradigm.
These somewhat sketchy remarks invite a closer inspection of the
competition at each micro level (i.e. for each construction/context) between the 
bare singular, various determiners, the bare plural form etc. Something like weak
bidirectionality (see for instance Blutner, this volume) seems to be what we are
looking for. This version of Optimality Theory allows for partial blocking,
where the unmarked form (the bare singular) “survives” and is accorded its own 
unmarked meaning. However, since the bare singular competes with different 
marked forms in different contexts, the set of “unmarked meanings” assigned to
the bare singular may become rather large and heteroclite. 
88
Norwegian Bare Singulars: A Note on Types and Sorts 
Acknowledgments
Unfortunately, Kjell Johan can hardly be held responsible for anything said
above. But, like some of the kind-referring constructions above, he deserves my 
kind reverence for being the organiser of the circle of theoretical linguistics at 
the University of Oslo, where a preliminary version of this paper was presented 
October 5th, 2005. 
References
Asudeh, A. and L.H. Mikkelsen (2000): 'Incorporation in Danish: Implications
for interfaces' in R. Cann, C. Grover & P. Miller (eds.): A Collection of 
Papers on Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar, Stanford University. 
Blutner, R. (2006): 'Embedded implicatures and optimality theoretic pragmatics',
this volume. 
Borthen, K. (2003): Norwegian Bare Singulars, dr. art. thesis, Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology, Trondheim.
Carlson, G. (1977): Reference to Kinds in English, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Chierchia, G. (1998): 'Reference to kinds across languages', Natural language 
semantics 6, pp. 339-405. 
Dayal, V. (2003): A Semantics for Pseudo-Incorporation, Manuscript, Rutgers 
University.
Dayal, V. (2004): 'Number marking and (in)definiteness in kind terms',
Linguistics and Philosophy 27(4), pp. 393-450. 
Farkas, D. and H. de Swart (2003): The Semantics of Incorporation: from 
Argument Structure to Discourse Transparency, CSLI.
Gerstner, C. and M. Krifka (1993): 'Genericity', in J. Jacobs, A. von Stechow, 
W. Sternefeld & T. Venneman (eds.): Handbuch der Syntax, Berlin: Mouton
de Gruyter.
Katz, G. and R. Zamparelli (2005): Genericity in natural language, lecture
notes, ESSLLI. 
Krifka, M., F. Pelletier, G. Carlson, A. ter Meulen, G. Chierchia and G. Link 
(1995): 'Genericity: an introduction', in G. Carlson and F. J. Pelletier (eds.): 
The Generic Book, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Krifka, M. (2003): 'Bare NPs: Kind-referring, Indefinites, Both, or Neither?', in 
Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 13, Cornell: CLC 
Publications.
Partee, B. (1987): 'Noun phrase interpretation and type-shifting principles' in J. 
Groenendijk, D. de Jong & M. Stokhof (eds.): Studies in Discourse 
Representation Theory and the Theory of Generalized Quantifiers,
Dordrecht: Foris. 
89
Atle Grønn 
de Swart, H., Y. Winter and J. Zwarts (2004): 'Bare predicate nominals in 
Dutch', in Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 9. 
Zimmermann, E. (1993): 'On the Proper Treatment of Opacity in Certain Verbs',
Natural Language Semantics 1, pp. 149-179. 
90
JUST ANY PRONOUND ANYWHERE? 
PRONOUNS AND "NEW" DEMONSTRATIVES 
IN NORWEGIAN1
JANNE BONDI JOHANNESSEN 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
jannebj@iln.uio.no 
Abstract
In this paper, I investigate whether the pronominal system of feminine 
pronouns in Oslo Norwegian – one of very few pronouns to have 
seeemingly retained some case distinctions – is still a case system. An 
alternative might be that just any pronoun can occur just anywhere, i.e., 
that there is a free choice. The investigation has been conducted using 
new and older spoken language material. I have found two things. First, 
there is no free choice between the pronouns; while the nominative one 
can be used in almost any position and with any syntactic function, the 
accusative one is more limited. The second finding is exciting: The 
Norwegian deictic system is more complex than hitherto known. In 
addition to spatial deixis, there is also grammatically encoded 
psychological deixis. 
1 Introduction
The pronominal system in Norwegian has been the last set of words in the 
language to retain some case distinctions, but even here there are few. One 
might rightly ask whether just any pronoun can occur just anywhere, i.e. 
whether there is a free choice of pronouns in any given position. In the written 
variety of Eastern Norwegian, Bokmål, the feminine pronouns have retained 
their case. In this paper, we shall investigate whether these distinctions prevail in 
the spoken language. Two corpora of spoken Oslo dialect, recorded thirty years 
apart, will be used in the investigation: the new Norwegian Speech Corpus-Oslo 
(NoTa),2 and the TAUS speech corpus.3
1  I am grateful to Helge Lødrup, Thorstein Fretheim and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments, and 
to Anne Marit Bødal, Kristin Hagen and Arne Martinus Lindstad for having been informants on the Sunnfjord 
dialect of Førde and the Hedmark dialects of Hamar and Stange, respectively. 
2 The NoTa corpus (of spoken Oslo Norwegian) is a web searchable corpus under development at the University 
of Oslo as of December 2005. It’s planned to be finished with 150 informants transcribed, audio and video-taped 
by March 2006. It is available at present from the web-address in the references at the end of this paper, but is 
presently only two thirds of the planned full size. The informants have been selected according to socio-
linguistic variables such as age, gender, socio-economic, and geographical status. The codes on the examples 
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After a brief look at the Bokmål pronoun system, we shall investigate to 
what extent the feminine pronouns are used in various syntactic positions. It 
turns out that the nominative pronoun can be used in a variety of positions and 
functions, while the accusative pronoun is rarer. A more interesting result is that
one of the uses of the pronoun turns out to be a deictic one. Investigating the
data more fully, we see that Modern Spoken Norwegian has psychological 
deixis in addition to the well-known spatial deixis. More specifically, there is 
clearly a psychologically distal demonstrative in the Oslo dialect. Some dialects
seem to have a proximal counterpart with at least some kinds of nouns (proper 
names), but this is not the case in the Oslo dialect. 
2 The pronominal system of Bokmål Norwegian
For an overview of the pronominal system, let us take as a starting point the
Norwegian Reference Grammar (Faarlund et al. 1997), which describes the 
system of the written language. Only the Bokmål variety will be presented here, 
since this is the one most frequently used in Eastern Norway, and also reflects 
the Oslo variety to the highest extent. 
Table 1: The pronominal system in written Norwegian Bokmål
(Faarlund et al. 1997: 317) 
Singular Nominative Accusative
1st p. jeg meg
2nd p. du deg
3rd p. 
M han han/ham
        F hun [ho] henne [ho] 
Plural
1st p. vi oss
2nd p. dere dere
3rd p. de dem
We see that 3rd person singular masculine forms have syncretised (even though 
there is a separate accusative form still available). Thus, with masculine 
pronouns we get sentences such as: 
sentences are informant codes: F: Feminine, M:Masculine, digits:age, WO:West Oslo, RO: Rest of Oslo, H:High
education, L:Low education. All the names taken from authentic sources and referring to non-public people used
in the paper have been anonymised to Kjell Johan and Kirsten (for males and females, respectively), and to a
smaller extent, to Signe and Andreas.
3 The TAUS corpus is a collection of Oslo speech from the 1970s, see Hanssen (1986), in the process of being
transformed into a modern searchable web corpus.
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(1)
(2)
Kjell Johan fyller år. Han blir 50. 
Kjell Johan fills years. he (subject) becomes 50 
‘Kjell Johan is having his birthday. He’ll be 50.’ 
Kjell Johan fyller år. Han har jeg kjent lenge. 
Kjell Johan fills years. he (object) have I known long 
Kjell Johan is having his birthday. Him, I have known for a long 
time.’
It will be more interesting to focus on the feminine pronouns, where there is 
supposed to be a difference between hun (nominative) and henne (accusative).
Faarlund et al. (1997) say that the “main rule for use of the case-forms in 
modern Norwegian is that the nominative variety is used when the pronoun is a 
subject, and accusative when the pronoun is the complement of a verb, 
preposition or adjective” (Faarlund et al. 1997: 318, my translation). However, 
they also give some exceptions, and state that hun ‘she’ is occasionally used as 
an object or a preposition object, especially if the pronoun is a) modified by 
another phrase (their example is a relative clause), b) topicalised (object), c) a 
conjunct (op.cit. 1997: 322). The loss of case contrasts is not new; a hundred
years ago, Larsen (1907: 28) said about the 3rd person plural nominative pronoun 
de ‘they’ that it had basically taken over from the accusative pronoun dem
‘them’ in the upper layers of the population.4 Many others have also discussed
the pronominal case forms, see e.g. Lødrup (1982, 1984) and Papazian (1983,
1985). In the next section, we shall see what some of the facts are in the present 
day Oslo dialect. 
3 The 3rd person singular feminine pronoun, hun, in Oslo
In this section, we shall look at various uses of the pronoun hun, and find that it 
is indeed used in many contexts which should clearly not be characterised as 
subject positions. Furthermore, we shall see that one of its uses is hitherto 
undescribed.
Let me spend some words on methodology before we continue. When a 
phenomenon is complicated and at odds with what is stated in the grammar
books, it would be a problem to use standard written corpora as a data source, as 
written texts have clearly undergone critical proof reading following the given 
norms. At the same time, using one’s intuition as a grammarian in a topic like
this is bound to be difficult, both since the norms for the written language are 
4 Larsen (1907:28-29)’s exact words: “Vulgærsprog er dette di hittil ikke blitt, men opad er bruken derav også
utenfor nominativ trængt så høit op, at det vel kun er særlig literært interesserte familier, hvor ikke yngre voksne
børn sædvanlig siger: jæi så di.” [The use of 3pl nom in object position has not become common in the lower 
classes, but in the higher classes, only the very literary families have no children that use this nominative form in
the object position.]
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sieving into one’s judgements, and since one’s data might be too narrow and too 
uncreative. A corpus of spoken language is a solution to many of these
problems. We shall look at the pronoun hun as it is used in the NoTa corpus, and 
even in the older TAUS collection. (Of course the web would also be a good 
source for non-standardised language, but there we have no knowledge of the 
dialects of the language users.) In the present version of the NoTa corpus, the 
nominative hun occurs nearly 700 times. Without going into a counting game, it 
is easy to find this nominative form used not only as a subject, but also as a 
direct object, the object of a preposition, in right dislocation, left dislocation etc. 
Most times, the pronoun was used on its own, but it was also used as a head 
modified by another phrase (15 times), and, suprisingly, as a prenominal
determiner (22 times). We will briefly look at some examples from the corpus.
3.1 The pronoun hun as an unmodified phrase 
The nominative hun, when functioning as a phrase on its own, can clearly occur 
in many more contexts than in subject positions. Below are some examples from 
the NoTa corpus. These contexts are others than those mentioned by Faarlund et 
al. (1987), and clearly show that the nominative hun can be used in a wide
variety of positions.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Subject:
hun fortjener en god karakter i gym
’She deserves a good grade in gym.’ (F,18,RO,H)
Direct object:
så når hun ikke var der så satt de og baksnakka hun
so when she not was there then sat they and back-talked her 
’So when she wasn’t there they sat and talked about her behind her 
back.’       (F,80y,RO,L) 
P-object:
jeg lånte filmer på hun hele tiden
I borrowed films on her all the-time 
‘I borrowed films in her name all the time.’ (M,21,RO,L)
Right dislocation:
men du vet Kirsten rekker ikke dette hun
but you know Kirsten reaches not this she 
‘But you know, Kirsten won’t have time for this, she won’t.’ 
       (M,58,RO,L)
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3.2 The pronoun hun as the head of a nominal phrase 
The nominative hun is often modified by a phrase (a relative clause in the 
examples below), in which case it has some stress or tonal accent.5 Again, these 
pronoun phrases can occur in a variety of positions, such as subject, object, 
preposition complement, left dislocation etc., not just the typical subject 
positions:
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Subject:
hun som har stiftet Norsk erindringssenter heter Kirsten
she who has founded Norwegian Memory Centre is-called Kirsten 
‘The one who has founded the Norwegian Memory Centre is called 
Kirsten.’       (F,85,WO,H) 
Direct object: 
du vet ... hun der som trengte noen å snakke med
you know she there who needed somebody to talk with 
‘You know, that one who needed somebody to talk to.’ 
       (F,18y,RO,L) 
P-object:
nei dem skulle snakke med hun som hadde # 
no them should talk with she who had 
‘No, they should talk to the one who had...’ (F,79,RO,L)
Left dislocation:
hun som jeg snakket med i telefonen hun sier at dette har du betalt 
siden 2003 she who I talked with in the-phone she says that this 
have you paid since 2003 
‘The one who I talked to on the phone, she says that this you have 
paid since 2003.’      (M, 84,WO,H)
3.3 The pronoun hun as a determiner 
Using a corpus gives the added value of bringing examples of use to one’s 
attention that one might have overlooked. In this section, we see examples of the 
pronoun hun used as a nominal determiner. This use is not mentioned in 
Faarlund et al. (1997). Given that hun is a determiner in these examples, it is 
maybe not surprising that its mother phrase can occur in a variety of syntactic 
5 There are other ways of analysing such examples, e.g. Lødrup (1982) regards similar
examples with the pronoun de as a determiner plus an elided head noun. I will not pursue that 
here, but simply note that with such an analysis, there would be no difference between the 
examples in 3.2 and 3.3, which I think there is, not least semantically.
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functions, but it is worth noting that the form is invariably the nominative form 
of the pronoun.
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
Subject:
i dag da hun der vikaren kom 
today when she there substitute came 
‘Today, when that substitute came...’   (F,18,RO,L) 
Direct object:
har du spurt hun Kirsten om det?
have you asked she Kirsten about it? 
‘Have you asked that person Kirsten about it?’ (F,72,WO,L)
P-object:
hvordan går det med hun der venninna di?
how goes it with she there the-friend yours? 
‘How is that friend of yours?’ (F,18,RO,L)
Left dislocation:
hun von der Lippe hun e hun e hadde lært seg skikkelig
she von der Lippe she ehm she ehm had taught herself properly
‘That woman von der Lippe, she had taught herself properly...’
       (F,80,WO,L)
Right dislocation:
det var også en # en dame som ikke var god # hun moren til 
venninnen min
it was also a # a woman who not was good # she the-mother to the-
friend mine
‘There was also a woman who wasn’t very good, that mother of my
friend.’       (F,72,WO,L) 
The pronoun as determiner is a phenomenon that we shall discuss in section 4. 
3.4 Other feminine pronoun forms 
There are also other feminine pronoun forms in Oslo Norwegian, such as hu, ho,
henner and a. They are all much less frequent than hun. There are only 77 
occurrences of henne, the accusative form of the pronoun. It occurs as direct 
object (fronted once), indirect object and preposition complement in the NoTa 
corpus, divided equally between the geographical parts of Oslo. It never occurs 
as a subject. There are no examples of the more colloquial henner. There are 
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some examples of ho and some of a, both of which are neutralised between 
nominative and accusative.
The pronoun a is not represented in the table in Faarlund et al. (table 1),
since it is considered to be part of the spoken, not the written language. But
Faarlund et al. (1997: 322) describe it elsewhere, saying that is a clitic pronoun
with no case-difference – a can be used both as subject and object as long as it is 
in a clitic position. Bull (1980) similarly says that the clitic pronouns can be 
used as subject as well as object. In the NoTa material, the examples of use of 
the pronoun a are confined to subject and determiner (the lack of object use is
probably linked to the lack of objects throughout the corpus): 
(16)
(17)
Subject:
Tidligere så jobba a for et firma som het Galleberg 
earlier then worked she for a company that was-called Galleberg 
‘Earlier, she worked for a company called Galleberg.’
       (M,44, RO, H)
Determiner:
Jeg har ... hilst på a Karoline Bjørnsson
I have greeted on she Karoline Bjørnsson 
‘I have met Karoline Bjørnsson.’ (F,84, WO, H) 
4 Pronouns as determiners – a “new” demonstrative
In section 3.3, we saw that the pronoun hun can be a pre-nominal determiner. In 
this section we shall investigate whether this determiner is related to the well-
known preproprial determiner found in many Norwegian dialects. We shall 
investigate its pragmatics, and will see that it is a “new”, in the sense of not 
being mentioned in Faarlund (1997). However, it is mentioned in very recent 
literature, viz. Delsing (2003) and Julien (2005). 
One might be tempted to think that the prenominal determiner above is 
related to the preproprial determiner attested in many dialects (including older
versions of the Oslo dialect). Let us start by exemplifying our determiner by 
repeating one example, and include one with a masculine pronoun as well, for 
the record:6
6 The masculine example here could possibly be a an example of the preproprial article, since these have
syncretised, but the fact that it occurs only with the second name, not the first, indicates that it is not purely an 
article (cf the criteria that will be presented below, especially that of obligatoriness).
97
Janne Bondi Johannessen 
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
Direct object:
har du spurt hun Kirsten om det?
have you asked she Kirsten about it? 
‘Have you asked that person Kirsten about it?’ (F,72,WO,L)
 Men når Andreas og jeg tar en tur blir han Kjell så forskrekkelig 
sur
but when Andreas and I take a trip becomes he Kjell so very sour 
‘But when Andreas and I take a trip, that person Kjell becomes so 
sour.’
stp.ling.uu.se/~malwes/esc/lander/norge.html
In the Norwegian Reference Grammar, Faarlund et al. (1997: 338) mention 
briefly that most Norwegian dialects use a preposed pronoun together with 
proper names. In the Toten dialect (described in Faarlund 2000), the preproprial
article is obligatory before first names and family nouns such as father, mother,
grandma etc. I also include an example of the masculine variety, from the 
Stavanger dialect, just for the record: 
Har du sett a Berit?
have you seen the Berit 
‘Have you seen Berit?’ (Faarlund 2000: 51) 
Han Kjell hadde krangla me morå, så han sa: [...]
the Kjell had argued with the-mother, so he said 
’Kjell had argued with his mother, so he said...’
stavangerguiden.com/Sted/sletten
The Reference Grammar says nothing directly about the Oslo dialect(s). Hence, 
we could make a first guess that our hun is an instance of the preproprial article. 
However, there are several reasons to think that this guess is wrong. First, the 
form of the pronoun is not the same. The unstressed version of the feminine
pronoun used to be, and is for many Oslo-speakers, a (Larsen 1907: 112, Bull
1980: 53, 69), not hun. Second, the two pronouns are different w.r.t. stress. The 
preproprial article in Norwegian dialects is always unstressed. Our preposed 
pronouns as they appear in the NoTa corpus are all stressed (see also Fretheim
and Amfo 2005 about this fact) (see (20) and (18) above for translations):
Har du sett a BErit? 
Har du spurt HUN KIRSten om det?
98
Pronouns and "New" Demonstratives in Norwegian 
This strongly indicates a different grammatical status for these two 
prenominal determiners. Third, the two determiners are different w.r.t. 
obligatoriness. The informants who use our preposed article with some names, 
also choose not to use it with other names. For example, the woman who uttered 
(i), also uttered (ii) in the same conversation (for translation of (24), see (18)): 
Har du spurt hun Kirsten om det? (F,72,WO,L)(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
en gang Signe og jeg da ... 
one time Signe and I then 
’Once Signe and I, then...’ (F,72,WO,L)
While the preproprial article is obligatory in some dialects with first names, our 
prenominal article is never obligatory. But it should be mentioned that the 
preproprial unstressed articles have different status w.r.t. obligatoriness in
different dialects. Faarlund (2000) says that they are obligatory in the Toten 
dialect, but it seems that in the Hamar and Stange dialects, they are not. Delsing 
(2003: 22-23) says that they seem to be obligatory in Swedish Norrland, but not
in Västerbotten, in the latter case they can only be used when certain pragmatic
conditions apply, as we shall see in section 5. However, our preposed pronouns 
are not obligatory, and are therefore clearly not inflectional articles, but are 
voluntarily added to obtain a certain effect. They are some kind of 
demonstratives with some meaning attached to them.
Fourth, unlike preproprial articles, our determiners can occur with other 
types of nominals. We have seen this earlier in section 3.3, and with one new 
example below, uttered by the same informant as (24). I include one example of 
the masculine variety, just for the record: 
Jeg var skolevenninne med hun piken der (F,72,WO,L)
I was school-friend with she the-girl there
’I was a school friend of that.’
Han professoren nevnte "zoologi". 
he the-professor mentioned zoology 
’That professor mentioned zoology.’
www.tvnorge.no/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?p=24242&
5 The Semantics and Pragmatics of the Norwegian Demonstratives 
We have seen that the preposed pronouns are not inflectional articles, but have
some independent meaning that determines their occurrence with a nominal
constituent. Being a native speaker of this dialect, I have been able to ask myself
and discuss with fellow dialect speakers, and I have arrived at the following:
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The preposed pronoun is used to invoke psychological distance to the person 
referred to by that noun. In other words, they have a deictic use, and can be 
coined: ”psychologically distal demonstratives” (PDD for short).7 More detailed
descriptions of its meaning and use will be given below.
While it is well-known that Norwegian has spatial demonstratives divided
into distal and proximal ones (see Faarlund et al. 1997: §3.2.2), the forms of 
which are the same as the non-human definite articles den ‘that’ and denne
‘this’, this psychologically distal demonstrative has only recently been 
mentioned in the literature. Fretheim and Amfo (2005) discuss some
intonational properties that distinguish the animate from the inanimate 
determiners, but they do not discuss any semantic or pragmatic differences 
between them. Julien (2005: §4.3) argues for the fact that they are
demonstratives, but does not look at their meaning. Delsing (2003: 23) mentions 
our pronominal determiner in a footnote only. It will therefore be useful to look 
at the phenomenon of deixis and see how they fit in with different kinds
described in the literature for other languages.
Spatial deixis is quite common among the languages of the world, but there
are also other types of deixis. Levinson (1992) mentions both discourse deixis 
and social deixis, The first of these is not relevant here, as it concerns deixis that
refers to entities already mentioned in the discourse. The second type, social 
deixis, on the other hand, seems more relevant.
Levinson (1992: 90) describes the social deixis as either relational or 
absolute, and the former one, which is the one interesting for our purposes, is 
further divided into four groups: (i) speaker and referent honorifics, (ii) speaker 
and addressee honorifics, (iii) speaker and bystander honorifics, (iv) speaker and 
setting. Out of these, clearly the first group seems most suitable for our deixis, 
but there are two factors with our psychologically distal demonstrative that do 
not fit into this group.
First, it is not the case that our demonstratives have anything to do with 
honorifics, even if this group by Levinson is assumed to extend over such 
qualities as kinship relations, totemic relations and clan membership. In a 
modern, egalitarian, social-democratic society such as Norway, everybody is in 
principle equal, and there are certainly no social differences that have a 
grammaticalised expression. Indeed, when Norway was less egalitarian, there 
7 One of the reviewers agrees that there is psychological distance when the PDD is used with
only a first name, but thinks that used with both a first and a second name, there is less
psychological distance. I do not get the latter effect at all, and neither do the (admittedly few)
people I have asked. I leave open the possibility that this effect can occur, but would like to
have it confirmed before I take it into account.
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used to be a distinction between formal and informal forms of the second person 
singular pronoun, but this distinction is not known by the younger generations:8
(28)
(29)
(30)
Vet du /De hva klokka er? 
know you (informal)/(formal) what the-clock is 
‘Do you know what time it is?’ 
Second, the participants that are relevant or our demonstratives are none of the 
four groups listed by Levinson, but rather [[speaker and/or addressee] and 
referent]. In other words, the PDD can be used if either the speaker or the 
addressee or both have a relationship to the referent that the speaker wants to 
indicate as remote. Thus, the PDD can be used in a variety of contexts. Below, 
the speaker does not know – or wants to distance herself from -–the mother of 
her friend: 
det var også en # en dame som ikke var god # hun moren til 
venninnen min da 
there was also a – a woman who not was good – she the-mother to 
the-friend mine then 
‘There was also a woman who wasn’t good, that mother of my 
friend.’       (F,72,WO,L) 
The PDD can be used even about close relatives, underlining the fact that the
PDD is indeed psychological, not social. Delsing (2003: 23) suggests that its 
core meaning in Swedish is exactly this: for the speaker to indicate uncertainty 
about the addressee’s knowledge of the referent. The sentence below could 
indicate that the speaker distances herself from her sister, but it may equally well 
be a case of the speaker knowing that the addressee does not know the sister, 
and so accomodates to the psychological relationship of the addressee to the 
referent. Indeed, since this is a posting on an open Internet forum, with an 
infinite audience, the latter interpretation is the most likely one: 
Men hun søsteren min er sånn som ser auraer og merker stemninger
i hus.
but she the-sister mine is such who sees auras and feels 
atmospheres in houses
 ‘But my sister is the kind who sees auras and feels atmospheres in 
houses.’ forum.gaiaforum.com/viewtopic.php?p=51584
8 I am of course not claiming that lack of linguistic distinctions with necessity reflects lack of
social distinctions, but the converse holds: It is impossible to keep linguistic distinctions for a
missing social distinction.
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The PDD can be further modified by the distal adverb der ‘there’. The effect 
is not only one of psychological distance w.r.t. how well the speaker knows the 
referent, but is one of a somewhat negative attitude towards that person: 
i dag da hun der vikaren kom 
today when she there substitute-teacher came 
‘Today, when that substitute teacher came...’ (F,18,RO,L)
(31)
(32)
We saw many examples of the PDD with proper names in sections 3.3 and 4 
(one is repeated below). As with the other uses, the PDD indicates some 
distance by the speaker towards the referent. Actually, there is one thing that is 
interesting to note about this use of the PDD. In the Norwegian society, referring 
to somebody by both first name and surname would indicate that one did not
know that person very well. It therefore calls for some kind of explanation that
the PDD is used with proper names (especially if the surname is known by the 
speaker, as it often would be). The reason for this use is probably that the
egalitarianism has gained more and more ground. A sentence such as that below 
would typically be used when the addressee knows the person referred to very 
well, but the speaker does not. If the speaker chose to use the surname to
indicate his or her own lack of intimate knowledge of the referent, the situation 
would become very uneven between the speaker and the adressee. The use of the 
PDD makes it possible for both to refer to the referent by first name only, even 
though their relationship with that person is very different. 
Har du spurt hun Kirsten om det? 
have you asked she Kirsten about it? 
‘Have you asked this person Kirsten about it?’ (F,72,WO,L)
There are also examples of the PDD being used with ordinary noun phrases such 
as the one below. It is possible that the PDD indicates general, psychological
distance between the speaker and the singer referred to – the hearer knows from 
this that the speaker does not know the singer. But here, the noun phrase 
contains so much presumably new information that it seems less likely that the 
speaker would need to indicate distance to the referent. Norwegian definite noun 
phrases containing an adjectival modifier generally need a pre-adjectival
determiner. This is often the distal demonstrative, which is often called the 
“definite article of the adjective”. It is possible that it is the PDD that has taken 
on the role of being this article in examples such as the one below. It would still 
be true, though, that the PDD is psychologically distal in such cases, even 
though it would not be important to communicate this aspect since the rest of the 
noun phrase also indicates non-familiarity.
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og så hun e kvinnelige solisten og Bocelli som sku- sang duetter
and then she ehm female soloist and Bocelli who should- sang 
duets
‘and then that female soloist and Bocelli who were to – sang duets.’ 
       (F,74,RO,H)
(33)
(34)
Finally, one might ask whether there is also a psychologically proximal
demonstrative, given that there are both kinds in the spatial system. I have not
found any in the Oslo dialect – the preproprial article could have been a 
candidate, but it seems to have more or less disappeared. There may be dialects 
that have both, though. In the town dialect of Hamar and the country dialect of 
Stange, both of the Hedmark county North of Oslo, both determiners seem to be 
present, and the same seems to be the case as far away as in the Sunnfjord
dialect of Førde in West Norway. In the example in (34), from the Stange 
dialect, the preprprial a indicates familiarity with the referent, while the
pronominal hu indicates the by now well-known psychological distance.
Interestingly, these dialects seem to differ from the Toten dialect mentioned 
above, in which the preproprial article is obligatory. Julien (2005: 124) reports
that both varieties exist in the Solør dialect near the Swedish border, but does
not characterise them semantically. Delsing (2003: 23) reports that the 
preproprial article is used in many dialects only with the names of people that 
the speaker knows well. However, he does not mention whether these dialects 
have the something like the PDD.
Jæ såg a/hu Kirsten 
I saw her/she Kirsten 
‘I saw our/that Kirsten.’ 
However, the parallellism is only partial, because there is no psychologically 
proximal article to be used with nouns and noun phrases other than proper 
names.
6 How old is the psychologically distal demonstrative?
One might be tempted to think that the PDD is new in Norwegian. This seems to
be the opinion of Fretheim and Amfo (2005: 106): “[...] has become a popular 
alternative [...] in urban and rural dialects alike”. But it is actually possible to 
test this, to some degree, since there exists spoken language data from the early 
1970s Oslo, the “TAUS” material (Hanssen: 1986). If it can be found there, it 
must be at least 30 years old. And indeed, there are many examples of the PDD 
from that time: 
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jæ vill ikke akkrat vekke hun vennindn min
I will not exactly wake she the-friend mine
‘I don’t want to exactly wake up my friend’ (TAUS: F,21,EO,H) 
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
da hadde hu dama kåmmet løpne ut etter å vært så læi sæ får å ha 
tatt træddve krone få mye få kjoln #
then had she woman come running out after to have been so sad 
herself for to have taken thirty crowns too much for the-dress 
‘Then that woman had come running out after having been so sad 
that she had taken thirty crowns too much for the dress.’ 
      (TAUS: F,20,EO,H)
Dyvik (1979: 73) mentions the use of han ‘he’ as an alternative to den (the
spatial distal demonstrative) in some example sentences, but does not discuss the
difference between them (the focus of his discussion at this point is the adverb 
der ‘there’):
Lykkelig er han/den der(re) mannen som får deg til kone 
happy is he/that there the-man who get you as wife 
‘The man who get you as a wife will be happy.’ (Dyvik 1979: 
(67b))
Han var blitt han/den der(re) fine mannen
he was become he/that there fine man 
‘He had become an incredible fine man.’ (Dyvik 1979: (67d)) 
Lødrup (1982: 55) also mentions the pronouns han ‘he’ and hun ‘she’ as 
determiners, and compares them with the distal demonstrative den ‘that’. He 
does not discuss them from our perspective, but instead discusses their ability to 
have specific or non-specific reference (only han/hun apparantly can have the 
former).
We can conclude that the PDD is not brand new, since it occurs several 
times in the (relatively small) material of spoken Oslo dialect from the 1970s. 
Going further back into history is difficult, since it is very much a feature of 
spoken language, and we have no older spoken language data. Looking in 
written sources is futile. The PDD is non-existent even in the Oslo Corpus of 
Tagged, Norwegian Texts, and in the Bokmål Lexicography Corpus, both of 
which contain a substantial number of novels that have dialogues that at least to 
some extent would attempt to replicate spoken language. However, we can call 
it “new”, given the missing descriptions in the existing grammatical literature. 
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7 Conclusion
In the title and the introduction, we asked the question whether just any pronoun 
can be used anywhere, i.e. whether the speaker has a free choice. We saw that
this is not the case. While the nominative feminine pronoun hun ‘she’ can occur 
in a variety of positions and functions, the accusative henne ‘her’ is much more
limited.
However, during the investigation we discovered a demonstrative that has 
not been described previously in the literature. This demonstrative means that
the system of deixis in the Oslo dialect, possibly in all Norwegian dialects, is 
more complicated than has been previously known. In addition to spatial deixis,
there is also psychological deixis, which is grammatically encoded.
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1 Technology and science
In the growing ﬁeld of language technology, a reemerging issue is the proper
place of linguistics—whether language technology should be based on linguistic
insights, models and theories or not. An equally interesting question arises when
we turn the question around and ask how language technology may and should
inﬂuence linguistic theory and practice.
Let us ﬁrst take one step to the side and consider the relationship between
science and technology in other ﬁelds. Our ﬁrst thought is that science is pri-
mary, while technology combines scientiﬁc insights from several ﬁelds and ap-
plies them to speciﬁc cases. The construction of suspension bridges, to take one
example, applies Newtonian mechanics to calculate the optimal arcs of the deck
and the bearing wires and the height of the towers and the suspender cables. At
the same time the mass and strength of the materials used must be taken into
consideration to make sure the bridge can hold itself and its load. In addition,
it is mandatory to test a model of the bridge in a wind tunnel to see how well it
will perform under varying conditions.
But the interaction between science and technology is not unidirectional.
First, technological developments result in better tools which open opportu-
nities for new scientiﬁc insights, as witnessed from Galileo’s telescope to the
PET scanner. Second, in many cases the scientiﬁc results are not available be-
forehand. The quest for a technological solution to a certain task may initiate
research leading to new scientiﬁc results. Today, we can witness this in the
biotechnological ﬁelds. Third, methods from technology, in particular simula-
tions, enter the sciences. Returning to the suspension bridge, there is no easy
way to calculate the behavior of the bridge under different wind conditions.
But it is possible to see what happens by simulations in a wind tunnel. Lately,
computer simulations have supplemented physical simulations, and they are be-
coming accepted as scientiﬁc discovery procedures in several ﬁelds, including
population dynamics, climate studies, quantum chemistry and nuclear physics.
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In the sequel, we start by considering some experiences from one particular
effort, the LOGON project, and relate them to the ﬁeld of language technology
as a whole. We will then discuss possible consequences for linguistics as a
scientiﬁc enterprise.
2 The LOGON project
2.1 Machine translation
The focus of the LOGON project is machine translation from Norwegian to
English of texts from the hiking domain (Oepen, Dyvik, Lønning, Velldal et al.
2004, LOGON web page). The project, which is supported by the Norwegian
Research Council’s KUNSTI program for the advancement of language tech-
nology in Norway, lasts for roughly 4 years, involves three universities, Bergen,
Trondheim and Oslo, and employs on average three researchers on the post
doctoral level and 4 doctoral students in addition to 5 (part time) principal in-
vestigators.
Machine translation (MT) started as a research ﬁeld already in 1949 when
Warren Weaver (2003) circulated a memo proposing to use the emerging com-
puter technology for automatic translation. A year later Yehoshua Bar-Hillel
was employed as the ﬁrst machine translation researcher at MIT. The ﬁeld grew
rapidly during the 1950s with active research groups in several countries and
various international conferences. The earliest approaches to MT were later
classiﬁed as the direct approach. Somewhat simpliﬁed, the basic idea is to use
a dictionary to ﬁnd the proper translation of each word. In addition, the source
language input is partly analyzed morphologically to identify features like num-
ber and case, and the target language output is rearranged to get the word order
correct.
It was soon observed that this approach was insufﬁcient and that a deeper
understanding of the linguistic structures of the two languages was required. At
about the same time, Noam Chomsky (1957) introduced and argued for gen-
erative grammars in linguistics; ﬁnite mechanisms sufﬁcient for generating an
unlimited number of different sentences. Generative grammars, in particular the
non-transformational variants, came to play a large role in the development of
MT and later in computational linguistics in general. Chomsky’s concern was
not machine translation, but linguistics and psychology. Apparently, this is an
example of a technology (MT) applying an available theory (generative gram-
mar), but it is tempting to speculate whether it was more than a coincidence that
generative grammar was ﬁrst conceived at MIT, where there was already active
MT research.
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In the next approach to MT, the source language sentence is translated into
a semantic representation language, a lingua franca or interlingua, and a target
language sentence is generated from this representation. Not only a morpho-
logical, but also syntactic and semantic analyses of the source sentence are ap-
plied in the construction of the interlingua representation. The problem for this
approach is to construct a universal interlingua in which the semantic content
of any human language can be represented. Different languages use different
means to express meaning and to classify the world.
The transfer approach tries to take this into consideration. In semantic
transfer the source language sentence is analyzed syntactically and semanti-
cally, resulting in a monolingual semantic representation. This representation
is transferred to a similar representation for the target language from which the
target sentence is generated. The same semantic representation of the source
language sentence may be used for translation into several different languages,
while the transfer step is ﬁne-tuned to a particular language pair. In contrast, in
a syntactic transfer approach the transfer step is done between syntactic repre-
sentations instead.
2.2 Semantically based transfer
The semantic representations in LOGON are expressed in what is called Mini-
mal Recursion Semantics (MRS) (Copestake, Flickinger, Pollard & Sag to ap-
pear). The formula (1b) is an MRS representation of sentence (1a).
(1) a. Hver fjellfører skimtet ei hytte.
b. 〈h0, {h1:hver(x,h2,h3), h4:fjellfører(x),
h0:skimte(e5,x,y),
h9:en(y,h6,h7), h8:hytte(y)},
{h2 =q h4, h6 =q h8}〉
The basic units are the elementary predications (EP), e.g., skimte (e5,x,y). This
represents a formula in predicate logic, with x and y as variables. The argument
e5 is a Davidsonian event variable which may be modiﬁed by an adverb or a
prepositional phrase. While it is a goal in logical representations of semantics
to get the scope relations right, MRS allows for scope underspeciﬁcation. Thus
the MRS (1b) can be further speciﬁed to the MRS (2a) which represents the
logical formula (2b), as well as to an MRS corresponding to formula (2c). The
last part of the representation is a set of restrictions on scope, here h2 = q h4
and h6 = q h8. The ﬁrst one expresses that h4 must equal h2 except that some
quantiﬁers may intervene. Together with some general principles, the equations
assure that (1b) cannot represent other formulas than these two.
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(2) a. hver(x, fjellfører(x), en(y, hytte(y), skimte(e5,x,y)))
b. ∀x(fjellfører (x)→∃y(hytte (y)∧ skimte (e5,x,y)))
c. ∃y(hytte (y)∧∀x(fjellfører (x)→ skimte (e5,x,y)))
One possible translation of this sentence is shown in (3a) with the associated
MRS in (3b).
(3) a. Every mountain guide saw a cabin dimly.
b. 〈h0, {h1:every(x,h2,h3), h4:compound(e9,x,z),
h10:udefq(z,h11,h12), h13:mountain(z), h4:guide(x),
h0:see(e5,x,y), h9:a(y,h6,h7), h8:cabin(y), h0:dim(e12,e5)},
{h2 =q h4, h6 =q h8, h11 =q h13}〉
We observe that there are many one-to-one correspondences between words in
sentence (3a) and sentence (1a), and recognize them as correspondences be-
tween EPs in (3b) and (1b). There are also some mismatches. The morpholog-
ical compound fjellfører is expanded to mountain guide, and the simple verb
skimte is translated to the complex see. . . dimly.
Such mismatches are harder to handle in an interlingua system. Since the
interlingua is in principle intended to work with many different languages, it
has to anticipate the possible variations and contain a rich enough inventory of
expressions. Moreover, the mapping between a language and the interlingua
must be constructed independently of the other language. For example, whether
skimte should be decomposed in the interlingua has to be decided independently
of its translation in English. In the transfer system, on the other hand, the trans-
fer module is particularly constructed to handle the mismatches between two
speciﬁc languages.
In addition, many properties which are unique to one of the two languages,
like idiosyncratically chosen prepositions, do not show up in the MRS represen-
tation at all. They are taken care of by the monolingual parsing and generation
modules between the surface realization and the MRS. This is an advantage over
a purely syntactically based transfer system.
Minimal recursion semantics was originally developed in the context of
Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammars (HPSG), a strongly lexicalized uniﬁ-
cation-based grammar formalism (Pollard & Sag 1994). In the modern form of
HPSG, all feature structures are typed and respect type constraints, and uniﬁca-
tion is between typed feature structures (cf. e.g. Sag, Wasow & Bender 2003).
For the English generation, LOGON has adopted and developed further the
large, publicly available, HPSG-based English resource grammar (ERG) im-
plemented in the LKB system (Flickinger 2002, ERG web page).
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For analysis, LOGON has made use of and extended an existing gram-
mar for Norwegian, NorGram, developed within the framework of Lexical-
Functional Grammar (LFG) and implemented in the XLE system from PARC
(Dyvik 2000). The slightly unconventional choice of using both LFG and HPSG
was partly practically motivated; we wanted to reuse ERG and NorGram, and
partly theoretically motivated; we wanted to use semantic transfer and abstract
away from the particular grammar formalism. A ﬁrst challenge was to combine
MRS semantics and Lexical-Functional Grammar. This was done successfully
by the use of LFG’s projection mechanism (Oepen et al. 2004).
The transfer formalism has been developed and implemented speciﬁcally
for the project. The transfer is done by rewriting rules. They are written in a
type-based formalism and implemented in a system on top of the LKB. Finally,
the three different components for analysis, transfer and generation are built
together into one functional system. Technically, this is a fairly large and com-
plex system gluing together several different processes running simultaneously
in different programming languages.
2.3 Stochastic ranking
During the 1990s, two new approaches to machine translation appeared; statisti-
cal machine translation (SMT) and example based machine translation (EBMT).
Instead of founding MT on linguistic models and hand-crafted rules, the two
approaches start with large collections of translated texts and try to extract, or
learn, regularities. When new text is to be translated, they exploit the similari-
ties with previously encountered translations. More speciﬁcally, an SMT system
tries to learn two types of probabilities during training: how likely a word w′ is
as the translation of a word w by counting how frequently w gets translated as
w′, and how likely a sequence of words is as a sentence in the target language.
Later on, when given a sentence in the source language, the SMT system will, in
principle, consider all possible strings of words in the target language and calcu-
late the joint probability of it being a sentence and its words being translations
of the words in the source sentence.
In many ways, SMT can be considered a return to the earliest, direct, word-
based approach to MT. At the same time, by adding the stochastic component,
it also introduces a new dimension compared to all earlier approaches. It is es-
sential for an SMT system that it can consider huge amounts of translated text
during training, and the computations involved are so resource-consuming that
they would not have been possible twenty years ago. Pure SMT is an extreme
representative for language technology without linguistic theory (Jelinek 2005).
The initial results of SMT were quite promising, and by some evaluation mea-
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sures, SMT seems to outperform traditional rule-based systems. At the same
time SMT also has clear limitations. A fair amount of the output produced is
ungrammatical or it totally misrepresents the content of the source sentence—
ceiling effects which cannot be overcome by pure word-based SMT.
In the LOGON project we try to combine insights from SMT with the rule-
based transfer system. For one Norwegian sentence, the transfer system may
produce 10, 20 or even several hundred different translations in English. A
string may be ambiguous and get several different analyses. During transfer,
there might be many different alternative translations for many words. And ﬁ-
nally, one MRS may have many different realizations in English. So far we
have experimented with ranking the output on the basis of English text (Velldal
& Oepen 2005). The ﬁrst results of these rankings are promising, and clearly
better than a random selection. During the remaining project period we plan to
apply ranking of the Norwegian analyses on the basis of a tree bank for Nor-
wegian to get the most likely grammatical structure as input to the translation
process. Finally, we should calculate the probability of the output sentence as a
translation of the input sentence. But to get this step right, we will need large
amounts of translated text as training material, and we will probably not reach
that stage within the remaining project period.
2.4 Proﬁling and regression testing
Constructing large-coverage grammars, like NorGram and ERG, is a stepwise
and gradual process. The language engineer continually extends the grammar to
increase the coverage. But this may lead to overgeneration and false analyses.
After a while the grammar becomes so big and complex that it is impossible for
her to oversee all the consequences of her changes. She has to test the grammar
empirically. To do this efﬁciently, in LOGON we apply a method of system-
atic regression testing (Oepen & Flickinger 1998) together with an advanced
programming package, [incr tsdb()] (available from Delphin web page). A test
suite is a set of sentences with optional annotations. After a round of changes
to the grammar, all the sentences in the test suite are parsed in a batch process
and the results recorded and stored in a database. By comparing the results of a
batch run to earlier results in the database, the language engineer gets immedi-
ate feedback to the changes to the grammar. She immediately sees which new
analyses have appeared and which old analyses have disappeared.
In the LOGON project, we use this method in the development of each of
the different grammars and the transfer module. But we have also taken the
method one step further (Oepen, Dyvik, Flickinger, Lønning, Meurer & Rose´n
2005). Not only may the changes to a grammar inﬂuence the performance of
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that component, it may also inﬂuence other components. We have adapted the
method of proﬁling and the [incr tsdb()] system to the translation process as
a whole. We repeatedly batch translate test suites and compare the outcome
with earlier rounds. This is particularly important since the development of
the system involves about ten researchers at three different sites working on
different modules, including grammars and software for parsing, transfer and
generation.
The test material used in LOGON consists of some hand-constructed test
suites of between 100 and 300 sentences, one for simple grammatical construc-
tions and one for closed class vocabulary. In addition, we have selected a corpus
of about 3000 authentic Norwegian sentences from the hiking domain. We have
two or three different English reference translations of these sentences. This ref-
erence corpus is a useful guide for the writers of the transfer rules, even though
it is not a goal to reproduce the example translations in all cases. In addition, it
is used for continuous regression testing. Parts of the corpus are kept aside for
evaluation purposes.
3 Philosophy of linguistics
3.1 Holism
At ﬁrst look, the LOGON project ﬁts well with the idealistic view of the rela-
tionship between science and technology. Where the bridge engineer applies
theories from physics and provides speciﬁc lengths and other parameters, the
language engineer applies theoretical syntax and semantics and provides a lexi-
con of words and their properties. But the contribution from the language engi-
neer amounts to more than this. From theoretical syntax, she gets some general
principles, and she gets detailed analyses of some speciﬁc phenomena. Each
detailed analysis typically considers a limited set of data, data intended to il-
lustrate exactly these phenomena. But when the language engineer tries to glue
together these different detailed analyses, she often experiences that they do not
ﬁt together. To get a working system, she has to make adjustments and cor-
rections and also invent analyses for several phenomena not considered in the
theoretical literature. In addition, the language engineer departs from the theo-
retical linguist with respect to the data on which she tests her grammar. Besides
carefully chosen, tricky (but typically short) test sentences, the language engi-
neer considers sentences from a corpus. And often a grammar which seems to
work on the shorter sentences gets problems on longer sentences where several
phenomena interact.
It is easier for the theoretical grammarian who considers a more limited set
of data to “verify” her proposal. The language engineer serves the job of an
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experimental scientist testing the theoretical proposals under harder conditions
and more realistic settings than what the theorists do. This conﬁrms Quine’s
(1961) thesis that one cannot test theoretical statements in isolation. What has
to be tested are whole theories and systems. Rather than being a consumer of
theoretical grammar, the language engineer adds to the ﬁeld. In this respect, the
use of computational implementations serves as a tool for advancing generative
grammar. The computer serves a similar function as Galileo’s microscope, and
could be named a “macroscope” for theoretical linguistics.
By taking this holistic approach, it not only becomes harder to “verify” a
grammar than what is sometimes assumed in the theoretical literature, it also be-
comes harder to falsify individual grammar rules. Most often there is more than
one way to ﬁx a shortcoming in a grammar. For example, whether a particular
PP should be considered an argument or adjoined to the verb, whether the word
down in (4a) should be described as a particle, an adverb or a preposition with
no complement, and what the role of down is in (4b), can only be determined
by reference to the grammar as a whole.
(4) a. The Titanic went down.
b. Sam went down to the supermarket.
3.2 Syntactic theorization
Quine (1961, p. 46) in his description of holism envisaged “our so-called knowl-
edge or beliefs” as “a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only
along the edges.” Statements closer to the periphery are most likely to be re-
vised to accommodate observations. Statements further from the periphery are
less prone to revision, but might get revised because of their logical interconnec-
tions to other statements. In a similar vain, Lakatos in his description of research
programs talked about a protective belt of less ﬁrm statements that were apt to
revision to accommodate observations and at the same time protect the core of
the program from changes. Theories of generative grammar can be considered
such research programs. Within these theories we can recognize several layers:
from the most basic assumptions which cannot be changed without rejecting the
theory, through intermediate principles which may be changed, but only rarely
and after long discussions, to the surface layer of particular grammar rules and
lexical entries which may be changed on a daily basis.
There are several different theories of generative grammar alive today, and
two of them, LFG and HPSG, are applied in the LOGON project. The two
share some basic assumptions. Both are aiming for broad coverage and com-
putational tractablity. They are lexicalized, and they use feature structures and
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uniﬁcation as basic ingredients. They depart, however, on the intermediate prin-
ciples. In LFG, the principles include the strict separation between the different
projections, the relative role of the c(onstituent)-structure and the f(unctional)-
structure, and the way arguments are selected by the completeness and coher-
ence principles. In HPSG, the intermediate principles include the sign as an
integrated unit of phonological, syntactic and semantic features, taking care of
both conﬁgurational and functional information, together with the principles for
combining signs, like the head feature principle. In addition, HPSG uses types
for expressing generalizations. Today, the two theories live more and more sep-
arate lives. In particular, they both have their own annual conferences.
As far as we know, LOGON is the ﬁrst project to apply both theories in
the same large computational system. And even though we apply them to two
different languages, this gives us a unique opportunity for comparing them. So
far, we see no reason for rejecting either of them on empirical grounds. It is
also interesting that in spite of the different principles on the intermediate level,
which make it impossible to translate grammar rules or lexical entries directly
between the two frameworks, there are clear convergences on the surface level.
For example, the bracketing of a string or whether a particular PP is an argument
or an adjunct can be discussed across the two frameworks.
This convergence is on the one hand encouraging, but it also raises some
concerns. What is the substance of the two theories? What is the theoretical
status of the intermediate principles? Are there any ways to falsify them? To
defend the grammatical theories, one could argue that the situation is not that
different from other scientiﬁc ﬁelds, where basic and intermediate principles can
be protected by adjusting the surface statements. But the situation in generative
grammar seems more exceptional, as there are several different theories that
neither communicate nor compete. In a way, the relationship between LFG and
HPSG can be compared to the relationship between English and French, two
different languages for talking about the same phenomena.
3.3 Semantics and translation
We will turn to the role formal semantic theories play in our technological
MT project. Formal semantics tries to get the truth conditions for declarative
sentences right, and to calculate them systematically. Though not a necessity,
the truth conditions are often calculated by translating sentences into a logi-
cally perspicuous notation where formulas “wear their truth conditions on their
sleeves”. An ambiguous sentence has to be translated into several different for-
mulas which each represent a reading. Conversely, if two different sentences
have the same meaning, they should be translated into formulas with the same
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truth conditions, and it should be possible to deduce one from the other. More
generally, the logical formalism should support inferences and make logical re-
lationships between different sentences visible.
In the LOGON project we try to apply formal semantic representations in
MT. But on our way from theory to technology, we also make some adaptations.
We have chosen to use underspeciﬁed semantic representations. Semantic am-
biguities which are not reﬂected in syntax are not spelled out when translating
into MRS. They are kept underspeciﬁed in the semantic representations to trans-
late more efﬁciently. The ambiguities may in many cases be preserved when
translating into a closely related language. In cases where the ambiguities can-
not be retained, we spell them out during transfer, rather than during analysis.
As a result, the MRSs are constructed systematically from the syntax, but not
compositionally in the traditional sense.
Like in syntax, the language engineer encounters phenomena which are not
fully covered by any theoretical analysis. She has to ﬁll in the details herself.
She might also have to make adjustments to get different bits and pieces to
work together. There is generally more than one way to solve a problem, and
an analysis of a class of phenomena can only be evaluated in the context of the
whole system. To take one example, the questions regarding how down should
best be handled from example (4) is as much a question for semantics as it is
for syntax.
In addition, we see one more degree of freedom. The semantic represen-
tations may be chosen close to the truth-conditional interpretation and further
from the surface form of the natural language, or closer to the surface form and
further from the interpretation. To take a simpliﬁed example, if one thinks the
interpretation of the simple past tense is that the event took place sometime be-
fore the utterance event, any of the following might be ways to represent this in
logic, where (5a) is quite close to language and (5c) close to the interpretation.
(5) a. run (PAST ,kim )
b. P(run (kim ))
c. ∃t ′(t ′ < t0∧ run (kim , t ′))
The translation process constrains the semantics somewhat, however. In
theory it is perfectly possible to make different choices for the two languages.
In practice, however, there is much to gain from choosing as similar representa-
tions in the two languages as possible. For example, it seems rather unnecessary
to write transfer rules for transforming something like (5c) into something like
(5a), even though it would be possible.
116
Language Technology and the Science of Linguistics
3.4 Simulations
Are there any similarities between our experiences regarding language technol-
ogy enriching linguistics and how simulation techniques have entered into other
sciences? David Marr’s (1982) view on methodology has had a large impact
on artiﬁcial intelligence and computer science. In solving what he calls an in-
formation processing problem one has to separate the questions about what is
processed and why from the questions about how it is processed. The answers
to the how-questions can be further split between an abstract representation and
algorithm, on the one hand, and the actual hardware and software realization, on
the other hand. Marr (1982) also pointed out that Chomsky’s then current syn-
tactic theory with its transformations should be taken to be a what-theory and
not a how-theory, and related this to the distinction between competence and
performance in linguistics. In a lesser known earlier paper, Marr (1977) drew
an additional distinction, between what he called a type 1 and a type 2 theory.
Type 1 theories are the “how and what” theories described above. Type 2 theo-
ries occur “when a problem is solved by the simultaneous action of a consider-
able number of processes, whose interaction is its own simplest description.” It
is a goal to construct type 1 theories as they add to our understanding, but not
all phenomena may have good type 1 theories. In particular, he pointed out that
“[v]iewed in this light, it becomes entirely possible that there may exist no Type
1 theory of English syntax of the type that transformational grammar attempts
to deﬁne”.
In the LOGON project, we have assumed from the outset that syntax has
a type 1 theory. Both LFG and HPSG are type 1 theories where a particular
grammar is a declarative what-level description, telling what is grammatical and
and what is to be computed on the how-level. On the other hand, our empirical
approach to grammar development with repeated batch testing and stepwise
extensions bears some resemblance to the testing of a (model of a) bridge in a
wind tunnel. This is a type of simulation. Does this parallel indicate that our
grammars are simulations of type 2 rather than type 1 theories? Not directly,
since what is simulated in the wind tunnel is the behavior of the bridge under
various conditions, while the bridge itself is a constructed artifact. Similarly,
the grammar itself is constructed and not (the outcome of) a simulation. The
similarity to the bridge shows ﬁrst and foremost how radically underdetermined
the grammatical model is by the observations.
A striking property when a competence grammar is turned into a computa-
tional grammar is the large amount of ambiguity, both in parsing and generation.
One string of 15–20 words can easily get several hundred different analyses.
Still, a human who hears or reads this sentence will most often only get one or
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a few different readings. Our use of statistical techniques to rank the outcomes
of the parsing, generation and translation, is an attempt to approximate what the
human does. Marr pointed out that for a type 2 theory to be interesting, it must
show good performance since that is the only way it can show its value. Thus, if
our rankings are successful, i.e., correlate well with the preferences of a human,
they might be classiﬁed as successful type 2 theories. But to get anything like a
type 1 theory of how humans choose the best or most likely analysis, we would
need more. We would need a theory of what it is the human prefers.
4 Prospects
Computer systems for writing and for parsing linguistically motivated grammars
have existed for about 25 years. But it is only during recent years that the
formalisms have reached sufﬁcient maturity, the computers sufﬁcient power,
and the grammars sufﬁcient coverage for applying the systems on real texts.
This has resulted in a new tool for grammar writing and testing, bringing a new
dimension to theoretical syntax and semantics. This will gradually alter our
views on the status of grammars and semantics. We might also eventually have
to rethink our views on the relationship between competence and performance,
but by now it is still open where this will lead us.
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Abstract
The paper first outlines some motivations of translational upgrading of 
subordinate clauses to independent sentences in a German-Norwegian / 
Norwegian-German parallel corpus of popular science text. Taking 
German non-restrictive relative clauses as a frequent type of example in 
the German-Norwegian corpus fragment, I then discuss some 
consequences shifts from syntactic subordination to paratactic sentence 
sequences have on the interpretation of the target language vs. source 
language text. 
1 Introduction
There is little doubt that the sentence, the textual unit between two full stops (or 
comparable punctuation marks), forms the basic unit for translation, and in fact 
there is usually a high degree of correspondence between sentence boundaries in 
a source language (SL) and a target language (TL) text. However, almost every 
translation contains instances where the translator has chosen to deviate from 
this general strategy by rendering one SL sentence as two (or more) TL 
sentences (sentence splitting), by combining two (or more) SL sentences into 
one TL sentence (sentence fusion), or by shifting sentence boundaries through 
combinations of the two. These deviations from the default translation strategy 
can often be put down to different options (typological differences) and 
preferences between languages as concerns the (hypotactic or paratactic) linking 
of clauses or language-specific options and preferences for information 
packaging within clauses. 
The questions to be addressed in this paper are how shifts from hypotactic 
to paratactic clause structure in translation are motivated and which 
consequences they have for the discourse organisation of the translation as 
compared to the original text. I shall investigate examples of sentence splitting 
in translation where a SL clause complex containing a subordinate clause is 
translated by a paratactic sentence sequence in the target language. The study is 
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part of my PhD project on adjustments of sentence boundaries in translations 
and is based on a Norwegian-German and German-Norwegian parallel corpus of 
popular science texts. The main corpus is a collection of 17 popular science 
articles on various aspects of the history of German-Norwegian relations written 
by different authors (Simensen 1999) which is available in a Norwegian and a 
German version, each of about 200 pages in length. The corpus contains original
texts in both languages, fourteen of the texts are Norwegian original texts 
translated into German, while three of them are German original texts translated 
into Norwegian. 
In the German-Norwegian corpus fragment, syntactically subordinate 
clauses, such as adverbial clauses, complement or relative clauses make up the
most frequent type of SL structure leading to sentence splitting in the Norwegian
translation. In the Norwegian-German corpus fragment this type of adjustment is 
much less frequent. This may be due to typological differences between the two 
languages, namely restrictions on hypotactic complexity for Norwegian as 
compared to German. I will comment on this in the following section (Section 2) 
in which possible motivations for the characteristic types of subordination-
induced sentence splitting are identified. In Section 3.1 I will give an overview 
of the formal/syntactic changes in sentence structure for the individual types of 
SL subordinate constructions translated by TL paratactic constructions. In 3.2 
and 3.3 I will then have a closer look at the upgrading of non-restrictive relative 
clauses and describe the consequences sentence splitting has on the discourse 
structure and discourse processing of the TL as compared to the SL text. Section
4 gives a summary and closes with some remarks on the possible (in-)adequacy 
of underlying language-specific discourse organisation strategies reflected in the
examples discussed in this paper. 
2 Sentence splitting in translation and its possible motivations 
Why do translators change sentence boundaries in certain cases? Differences 
regarding the grammatical system of the languages, language-specific options 
and preferences for information distribution on sentence level and other 
typological differences, e.g. regarding basic word order, seem to play an 
important role in this context. In her investigation of cross-linguistic variation 
between German and English, Teich (2003) makes a methodological distinction
between contrasts in the grammatical/semantic system of the languages (the 
research field of language typology) and contrasts observable in instances of the 
language systems realised in form of texts of a specific register for different 
languages (the research field of contrastive linguistics), where the former is an 
important but not the only source and motivation for the latter. These contrasts 
also become visible in translations of text (the research field of translation 
studies), but the situation is even fuzzier here, because features of the SL
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language system as well as features specific for the SL register may have 
influence on the realisation of the TL text, e.g. in form of so-called “shining-
through” effects (Teich 2003: 61). Despite this SL shining-through, for a 
translation to be acceptable at least the rules of the TL language system must be 
followed and it has to meet certain comprehensibility requirements as a text in 
the TL. 
In the German-Norwegian corpus fragment 43 % of all examples of 
sentence splitting are clause complexes containing syntactically subordinate
clauses translated by paratactic sentence sequences, which is the most frequent 
type of sentence boundary adjustment for this translation direction. Among these 
examples are 28 relative clauses, namely 13 non-restrictive relative clauses with 
a nominal element as antecedent in the matrix clause and 15 so-called 
“Satzrelativsätze” (I will use the English term “clause-related relative clause” 
below).
The frequency of sentence boundary mismatches related to relative clauses
in the German SL text can to some degree be explained by contrasts between the 
two language systems, namely by differences in the realisation of relative 
clauses as far as the syntactic function and the lexical inventory of relative
markers is concerned. Whereas relative markers with nominal antecedents in 
German are pronouns, and the case, number and gender agreement requirement
helps to disambiguate potential referents in the matrix clause, the Norwegian 
relative marker som is non-inflecting and usually considered as a subjunction 
(Faarlund et al. 1997: 866). This lack of disambiguation potential, sometimes in 
interaction with changes in word order in the matrix clause, often leaves the 
upgrading of the relative clause as an independent main clause and the re-
introduction of the referent as the only option for the Norwegian translation as in 
example (1a.) vs. (1b.). 
(1) a. Von 1905 bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg existierten kaum 
 außenpolitische Berührungspunkte zwischen dem Deutschen 
Reich und Norwegen, dessen Regierung nach der 
Unabhängigkeit eine permanente außenpolitische Neutralität 
 anstrebte. […]
b. Fra 1905 til utbruddet av første verdenskrig fantes det få 
 utenrikspolitiske berøringspunkter mellom Det tyske riket og 
Norge. Etter uavhengigheten ønsket den norske regjeringen
 utenrikspolitisk nøytralitet, […].
Relative clauses with the whole matrix clause as antecedent, clause-related
relative clauses, are the other type of relative clauses frequently rendered as an
independent sentence in the Norwegian translation. Norwegian equivalents of 
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German relative adverbials such as wobei, weshalb, wodurch and wozu are
missing in Norwegian (or are at least highly marked), thus, translation by an 
independent sentence and rendering the relative adverbial as a corresponding 
connective expressing the same discourse relation (example (2a.) vs. (2b.)) or 
delegating the inference of the discourse relation holding between the two 
clauses to the context (example (3a.) vs. (3b.)) are often the only options. Only 
the relative marker was has a Norwegian quasi-equivalent in (noe) som which
makes sentence splitting dispensable in many of these cases.1
(2) a. Das militärstrategische Primat wird auch daran erkennbar, 
dass die Militärbehörden durch die Rüstungsprogramme über 
erhebliche Kompetenzen in wirtschaftlichen Fragen 
 verfügten, weshalb deutsche Firmen auch mit diesen 
kooperieren mussten, obwohl die Wirtschaftspolitik formell
durch das Reichskommissariat gestaltet wurde. 
b. Et forhold som reflekterer det militær-strategiske primatet, 
var at rustningsprogrammene hadde gitt de militære
 myndighetene en betydelig kompetanse i økonomiske
 spørsmål. Derfor måtte de tyske firmaene samarbeide med 
dem, selv om den økonomiske politikken formelt sett ble 
utformet av rikskommissariatet.
(3) a. Neben diesen engen wirtschaftlichen Kontakten bestanden 
rege kulturelle, technische und wissenschaftliche 
 Beziehungen, wobei für das norwegische Bildungsbürgertum
die deutsche Literatur und die deutsche Sprache den 
 Bezugspunkt darstellte.
b. Ved siden av disse tette handelsforbindelsene fantes det også 
viktige kulturelle, tekniske og vitenskapelige kontakter. Tysk 
språk og litteratur stod sterkt i de utdannede borgerlige 
 kretser. 
The remaining examples of subordinate clauses in German translated as 
independent clauses in the Norwegian translation are clause complexes
containing adjunct (adverbial) clauses or complement (subject or object) clauses. 
These examples cannot be explained by general contrasts between the two
language systems, since adjunct and complement clauses are organised in 
comparable ways in the two languages, and most of the German subordinating 
conjunctions have Norwegian counterparts (although the mapping is not one-to-
1 See Ramm (2005) for a detailed discussion of the translation of German clause-related 
relative clauses into Norwegian.
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one). In most of the examples where the subordinate clause follows the matrix 
clause in the SL text, the syntactic upgrading of the subordinate clause as an 
independent sentence in the translation seems to be related to different 
preferences for hierarchical/hypotactic (German) vs. non-hierarchical/paratactic
(Norwegian) discourse organisation (cf. Fabricius-Hansen 1999), but other 
structural changes required for the translation of the matrix clause may also play 
a role, as in (4a.) vs. (4b.):
a. Als Folge der Weltwirtschaftskrise und der Pfund-Abwertung 
 von 1931 geriet die deutsche Exportindustrie in Skandinavien 
in eine schwierige Lage, weil sie sich mit einer forcierten und 
erfolgreichen britischen Handelsoffensive auseinander setzen 
musste, während die deutsche Exportindustrie innenpolitisch
gegenüber den hochprotektionistisch orientierten Agrariern 
zusätzlich unter Druck geriet. 
b. Da det britiske pundet ble nedskrevet i 1931, havnet den 
tyske eksportindustrien i Skandinavia i en vanskelig 
 situasjon. Den måtte konkurrere med en sterk britisk 
handelsoffensiv, samtidig med at den på hjemmebane ble 
utsatt for et økende press fra de svært proteksjonistiske
 landbrukskretsene. 
(4)
The complex PP with two coordinated genitive modifiers in topic position in the
German version (italicised in the example) is sententialised as a subordinate 
clause in the Norwegian translation (the first genitive modifier is dropped),
leading to a more clausal structure of the counterpart of the German matrix 
clause. This may be one reason why an independent clause without an explicit
connective signalling the discourse relation is preferred, avoiding the attachment
of a further (causal) subordinate clause in the translation. 
The examples of the subordinate (adverbial) clause preceding the matrix
clause, on the other hand, can be explained by typological differences between 
the two languages as regards the options for the realisation of the topic position:
Norwegian does not allow “heavy” constituents in sentence-initial position – 
such as sentence-initial adverbial clauses – in the same way as German does. 
Thus, sentence splitting is a natural option here. Since, as a matter of fact, all 
these examples in the corpus are of a concessive/causal type (obwohl, da, wenn 
auch) the upgrading of the adverbial clause is associated with “presupposition
extraction” (Fabricius-Hansen 1999), i.e. a change in information distribution 
where information presupposed in the subordinate clause in the SL text is 
explicitly asserted in the independent sentence in the translation. 
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Now turning to the Norwegian-German corpus fragment, the examples with 
an adverbial clause preceding the matrix clause are an interesting class as well,
although different from the German examples of this type: They typically 
consist of a conditional/temporal subordinate clause followed by a matrix clause 
containing a kind of cleft/focusing construction which serves to give a reason or 
evidence for what is part of a presupposition in the subordinate clause as in 
(5a.).
(5) a. I Grunnlovens paragraf 2 heter det - uforandret fra 1814 til i 
dag - at "den evangelisk-lutherske Religion forbliver Statens 
 offentlige Religion". Når det er nærliggende å velge dette 
som inngangsportal til vårt tema, er det fordi den formulering
 grunnlovsfedrene på Eidsvoll valgte, er egnet til å feste 
oppmerksomheten ved et av de mest stabile trekk ved norsk 
historie fra reformasjonstiden til i dag, [ ... ].
b. In Paragraph 2 heißt es nämlich unverändert seit 1814 "Die 
 evangelisch-lutherische Konfession verbleibt öffentliche
Religion des Staates." Es liegt also nahe, diesen Satz an den 
Anfang meiner Überlegungen zu stellen. Diese Formulierung
der verfassunggebenden Versammlung von Eidsvoll bringt 
 nämlich einen der stabilsten Aspekte der norwegisch en 
Geschichte von der Reformation bis in die Gegenwart zum
Ausdruck. [ ... ]
The effect of the choice of this construction in the Norwegian version is to put
specific emphasis on the causal relation between the two clauses. Cleft
constructions, although possible in principle, are less frequent and much more
marked in German than in Norwegian, and in these examples translation by a
corresponding German construction would be almost impossible. Instead, the SL
subordinate clause is upgraded to an independent sentence in the TL (also here 
associated with a presupposition extraction) and the causal relation between the 
two sentences is signalled by the connective nämlich (5b.). 
In general, however, shifts from subordinated clauses to paratactic 
sequences of clauses are much more frequent in translations from German to 
Norwegian than in the other translation direction. This does not come as a 
surprise and can to some degree be explained by typological differences 
concerning the options for information packaging within the clause. German
allows for more complex and extended NP modification than Norwegian, in 
particular to the left of the noun (for example by means of extended pre-nominal
participial modifiers), and these constructions often have to be translated by 
more verbal or sentential constructions in Norwegian (cf. Solfjeld 2003).
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German is also known for its “nominal” style in certain registers such as 
(popular) science texts, characterised by a high frequency of nominalisations
and other nominal constructions which also typically are translated by more
verbal/sentential constructions in Norwegian as in ex. (4) (cf. Solfjeld 2000). 
This increase in verbal and clausal structures often goes in hand with changes in 
sentence boundaries in form of sentence splitting. 
Before moving on to some consequences the upgrading of subordinate 
clauses to independent sentences may have for discourse organisation and 
discourse processing, it should be pointed out that the typological contrasts
which systematically seem to favour these shifts are not the only factor 
determining a translator’s choice to shift sentence boundaries. Rather, such 
adjustments are usually the result of the interaction of other factors as well, such 
as lexical gaps or mismatches regarding the main verb or other constituents in 
the SL text, necessary word order rearrangements, or translation problems
resulting from the context before or after the actual sentence split in the
translation.
3 Consequences on discourse structure
Whatever the reasons for shifts of sentence boundaries are, they lead to some 
kind of change in discourse segmentation in the TL as compared to the SL text. 
The question is, whether these changes have influence on what is communicated
by the text, in how far discourse coherence is affected, and whether these 
changes lead to a different processing and understanding of the translated text. 
3.1 Changes of sentence taxonomy 
Holler (2005: 129 ff.) suggests a formal classification of German subordinate 
clauses according to three dimensions/features based on the sentence taxonomy
of Reis (1997), ± DEPENDENT, ± EMBEDDED and ± INTEGRATED. The 
feature ± DEPENDENT relates to the phono-syntactic (in)dependence of the 
clause, i.e. the feature + DEPENDENT corresponds to the traditional notion of 
subordinate clause (”Nebensatz”) in German (Holler 2005: 120). The feature ± 
EMBEDDED concerns the syntactic function of the subordinate clause within 
the matrix clause, and ± INTEGRATED evaluates the prosodic and pragmatic 
integration of the subordinate clause, i.e. describes whether the subordinate 
clause provides an information structure (“Fokus-Hintergrund-Gliederung”) of 
its own or not (Holler 2005: 130). Assuming that it holds for Norwegian 
sentences in a similar way, this sentence classification can be used to 
characterise the sentence-boundary adjustments discussed here in a general way:
All types of SL examples described above are +DEPENDENT, but they 
differ as regards the other two features: adjunct and complement sentences
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would be classified as +EMBEDDED, +INTEGRATED, whereas the non-
restrictive relative clauses (both with nominal and sentential antecedent) are –
EMBEDDED, –INTEGRATED. The shift from subordination to sentence 
sequence in the translation changes the feature +DEPENDENT to –
DEPENDENT for all examples, i.e. TL text involves more than one phono-
syntactic unit in contrast to the SL which only contains one such unit. Sentence 
splitting of adjunct and complement clauses additionally changes the other two 
features, from +EMBEDDED to –EMBEDDED, i.e. the clause upgraded in the 
translation no longer realises a syntactic function within the counterpart of the
matrix clause, and from +INTEGRATED to –INTEGRATED, i.e. the upgraded 
clause receives an information structure of its own. For the relative clause 
examples, however, no further general sentence-typological changes can be 
identified. In the following sections I will show that nevertheless the processing 
and coherence of the SL vs. TL text may differ decisively. 
3.2 Upgrading of (non-restrictive) relative clauses 
As noted above, apart from the syntactic dependency feature, (non-restrictive) 
relative clauses do not change their sentence-taxonomic type when translated as 
independent sentences. But to which degree are sentence sequences equivalent
to relative clauses in discourse? In studies on German continuative relative 
clauses (“weiterführende Relativsätze”), of which clause-related relative clauses 
are a subtype, their similarity to independent main clauses is often emphasised 
(Brandt 1990: 46ff., Peyer 1997: 131ff., Laux 2002: 199ff.). What precisely the 
difference is, and why there exists a choice between the two at all, is only
tentatively explained by stylistic preferences (Laux 2002: 201), or by pointing
out that continuative relative clauses are a borderline case of subordinate clauses 
which only formally (syntactically) are subordinate clauses while textually they 
behave like main clauses (Fabricius-Hansen 1992: 479f., Peyer 1997: 149). 
If in fact there was no relevant functional/textual difference, one would 
expect that translational upgrading from a continuative relative clause to a main 
clause sequence – an operation similar to monolingual main clause 
paraphrases/reformulations – would not significantly affect the TL discourse
structure as compared to the SL. As shown in Ramm (2005), however, this
seems not always to be the case. According to Laux (2002), non-restrictive 
relative clauses can serve two general discourse functions, dis-continuation and 
continuation: a relative clause is continuative if a ‘consequentiality relation’ 
(Sandström1993) holds between the matrix clause and the relative clause as well 
as between the relative clause and the following sentence. All other cases are
classified as dis-continuative. Although the application of her methodology
developed for narrative texts – thus putting the main emphasis on the temporal
structure of the events described in the text – on translations of non-narrative, 
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expository texts is not unproblematic, the continuation/dis-continuation
distinction in fact seems to play a role at least for the translation of clause-
related relative clauses. According to Laux (2002: 199ff.), continuative relative 
clauses are more similar to independent main clauses than dis-continuative 
relative clauses (typically presenting background information or explanations to
what is presented in the matrix clause). Thus, it could be expected that the 
upgrading of continuative relative clauses would have less consequences on 
discourse structure than the upgrading of dis-continuative relative clauses, and 
in fact the corpus study showed that sentence splitting either was avoided with 
dis-continuative clause-related relative clauses (and other translation strategies 
applied) or led to less coherent texts in the translation, in particular as the
interpretation/attachment of the following context is concerned (Ramm 2005) – 
at least if measured with a standard of coherence for texts in German. In (2a.), 
repeated below as (6a.), for example, the dadurch (‘with this’) in the sentence
following the sentence containing the weshalb-clause is ambiguous, i.e. it is 
open whether it refers back to the whole clause complex (the intended 
interpretation?) or only to the clause-related relative clause.
(6) a. Das militärstrategische Primat wird auch daran erkennbar, 
dass die Militärbehörden durch die Rüstungsprogramme über 
erhebliche Kompetenzen in wirtschaftlichen Fragen 
 verfügten, weshalb deutsche Firmen auch mit diesen 
kooperieren mussten, obwohl die Wirtschaftspolitik formell
durch das Reichskommissariat gestaltet wurde. Dadurch
wurde nicht die zukünftige Friedenswirtschaft eines 
 "Großraumes" vorprogrammiert, sondern Norwegen in die 
aktuellen Bedürfnisse der deutschen Rüstungsproduktion 
 eingebaut. 
b. Et forhold som reflekterer det militær-strategiske primatet, 
var at rustningsprogrammene hadde gitt de militære
 myndighetene en betydelig kompetanse i økonomiske
 spørsmål. Derfor måtte de tyske firmaene samarbeide med 
dem, selv om den økonomiske politikken formelt sett ble 
utformet av rikskommissariatet. Følgelig ble ikke Norge 
programmert for en plass innenfor en fremtidig kontinental 
økonomisk blokk, men snarere utviklet i samsvar med i de 
aktuelle behovene til den tyske rustningsproduksjonen.
The følgelig (‘consequently’) in the Norwegian version (6b.), however, has its 
most likely antecedent in the sentence before, which is the upgraded counterpart 
of the German weshalb-sentence. As a result, the connection between the 
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economic influence of the German military administration mentioned in the
German matrix clause, and which consequences this had on the role Norway 
played (economically, after the First World War – which is what this text
paragraph is about) is much harder or almost impossible to infer in the 
Norwegian translation.2
(7) a. Neben diesen engen wirtschaftlichen Kontakten bestanden 
rege kulturelle, technische und wissenschaftliche 
 Beziehungen, wobei für das norwegische Bildungsbürgertum
die deutsche Literatur und die deutsche Sprache den 
Bezugspunkt darstellte. Zahlreiche skandinavische Studenten 
studierten in Deutschland, und zwischen den protestantischen 
Kirchen existierten enge Bindungen. 
b. Ved siden av disse tette handelsforbindelsene fantes det også 
viktige kulturelle, tekniske og vitenskapelige kontakter. Tysk 
språk og litteratur stod sterkt i de utdannede borgerlige 
kretser. Utallige skandinaviske studenter studerte i Tyskland, 
og det fantes tette bånd mellom de protestantiske kirkene. 
In example (3), repeated as (7) above, in which the relative clause is clearly dis-
continuative, the sentence splitting does not lead to referential problems, but the 
Norwegian text seems to be more ”chopped”, and the relations between the three 
sentences – not signalled by connectives – have to be inferred from the context, 
thus the Norwegian (3b./7b.) appears less coherent than the German (3a./7a.).
Moreover, it might be asked whether the discourse relation changes from
elaboration in the German relative clause to background in the Norwegian 
translation, but the difference is possibly not that striking.
Since her methodology was developed for non-restrictive relative clauses in
general, Laux’ continuation/dis-continuation distinction should be applicable to 
non-restrictive relative clauses with a nominal antecedent in the matrix clause in 
the same way as for clause-related relative clauses. However, the analysis of 
these examples turned out to be more problematic, i.e. in several cases it was 
difficult to decide clearly whether the relative clause was dis-continuative or 
continuative. One reason may be that Laux’ criteria are basically designed for 
texts of the narrative type, where the event structure and its temporal
organisation are decisive for discourse structuring and the classification of 
relative clauses as being continuative or dis-continuative. Many text passages in 
the actual non-fictional corpus, however, are of non-narrative text types, where
other criteria, such as the description of (abstract) objects and their properties 
2 I would classify this example as being dis-continuative, using Laux’ criteria, but due to the 
complexity of this sentence this issue is actually difficult to decide.
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and relations, may guide the structuring of the discourse. The problems of 
analysis also seem to be related to the fact that in non-narrative texts a noun-
related non-restrictive relative clause may express very different types of things,
depending on the nature of the entities the relative clause is anaphorically linked 
to and the contribution of the relative clause itself. In (8a.) for example, the 
relative clause contains additional information on a nominal discourse
participant (Hitler), but this description is not continued in the following 
sentence (although it could have been), which rather takes up (gives evidence 
for) what is claimed in the matrix clause, namely that Rosenberg’s 
“Außenpolitische Amt” did not have any influence on the “Auswärtige Amt”
and Hitler. 
a. Das am 1. April 1933 unter Alfred Rosenberg gegründete 
Außenpolitische Amt der NSDAP blieb in der Folge fast 
ohne Einfluss gegenüber dem Auswärtigen Amt und Hitler,[I]
 der seit Ende 1933 punktuell in die außenpolitischen 
Entscheidungsprozesse einzugreifen begann.[II] Rosenberg
scheiterte wie auch Darré, der selbst ernannte völkische
Parteiexperte für den Agrarsektor, damit, seiner Dienststelle 
in der sich herausbildenden polykratischen Struktur des 
 nationalsozialistischen Staates ein Profil und eine Machtbasis 
 zu verschaffen [III]
b. 1. april 1933 ble NSDAPs utenrikspolitiske kontor grunnlagt 
under ledelse av Alfred Rosenberg, men den fikk svært liten 
innflytelse over utenriksministeriet og Hitler.[I] Sistnevnte
begynte fra slutten av 1933 av og til å gripe inn i de 
 utenrikspolitiske avgjørelsene.[II] På samme måte som Darré, 
den selverklærte parti-ideologen for jordbruksspørsmål, 
 mislyktes Rosenberg i å profilere sitt kontor innenfor den 
 flersidige, kompliserte maktstrukturen som var iferd med å ta 
form innenfor den nasjonalsosialistiske staten.[III]
(8)
In terms of discourse relations as defined in SDRT (Asher & Lascarides 2003),
the relative clause would be an elaboration of the matrix clause, which is the 
prototypical case of a subordinating discourse relation. This means that the 
matrix clause as well as the relative clause would be at the “right frontier” of the
discourse representation and thus could serve as attachment points for 
information in the following discourse. In the German version syntactic 
subordination, here correlating with a subordinating discourse relation, helps the
reader to infer the appropriate attachment point for the following sentence (i.e. 
the matrix clause), thus facilitating the processing of the complex information
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presented in this text fragment. In the Norwegian translation (8b.), however, 
syntactic subordination as a discourse structuring signal is lost, and the discourse
structure after (8b.[II]) seems to be more open as to where following sentences
could attach than in the German version. This leads to interpretation problems
(garden path readings) regarding (8b.[III]), i.e. one first tries to interpret the
sentence as a continuation of (8b.[II]) until one has to revise it when reading the
subject Rosenberg.3 Thus, the upgrading of the relative clause, although not
blocking the right frontier after (8b.[I]) semantically – the same subordinating 
discourse relation can in the end be inferred between (8b.[I]) and (8b.[II]) – leads 
to difficulties regarding the identification of discourse referents in the following
context, i.e. the Norwegian version appears less coherent than the German, at
least as far as reference structure is concerned.
While in (8) the relative clause clearly is dis-continuative, ex. (9a.) is not
that clear: 
a. Hubatsch betrachtet die Besetzung des Landes von 1940 
 ebenfalls innerhalb eines Aktions-Reaktions-Schemas, bei 
 dem das Deutsche Reich aus strategischen Gründen den 
 Briten zuvorkommen musste, um die Rohstoffzufuhr aus 
Schweden sicherzustellen, während offensive seestrategische 
Gesichtspunkte für die Kriegsführung gegen England keine 
Rolle gespielt hätten. Erst in der Fischer-Kontroverse 
während der späten 60er Jahre wurden derartige historische 
 Interpretationen in der Bundesrepublik außer Kraft gesetzt. 
b. Hubatsch tolket også okkupasjonen av 1940 som en reaksjon.
I denne tolkningen måtte Tyskland av strategiske grunner 
komme britene i forkjøpet for å sikre råvareleveransene fra 
Sverige, mens offensive sjøstrategiske synspunkter ikke 
hadde hatt noen betydning for krigføringen mot England. Det 
var først under Fischer-debatten mot slutten av 1960-årene at 
slike historiske tolkninger ble satt ut av kraft i 
 Forbundsrepublikken.
(9)
The relative clause explains (elaborates on) an “action-reaction scheme” 
(referring to the German strategy in World War II) mentioned in the matrix 
clause which is a central topic of the whole paragraph. In this case the following 
sentence takes up these derartige historische Interpretationen (”such historical
interpretations”), i.e. what is said in the relative clause and the following 
3 Placing Rosenberg in sentence-initial position as in the German version would possibly have 
facilitated the recognition of this referent, but in my view it would not necessarily have
improved the recognition of the hierarchical discourse structure. 
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contrastive während-adverbial clause. In this example sentence splitting in the 
Norwegian translation (9b.) does not lead to interpretation problems with respect 
to referential structure. On the contrary, it seems that the nominal style in the 
German version – the relative/adverbial clause formally/syntactically being only 
a NP modifier of Aktions-Reaktions-Schema – is quite extreme (although not
untypical for this genre) but this does not ease the processing of the text. The
upgrading of the relative clause from an informationally “heavy” and complex
NP modifier to an independent sentence in which the paragraph topic i denne
tolkningen (”in this interpretation”) is taken up as a sentence-initial adverbial 
makes the Norwegian version easier to understand than the German originalt. 
3.3 Some implications for discourse coherence and discourse processing
These relative clause examples illustrate that sentence splitting in the Norwegian 
translation (for which in some cases there is no alternative) can have different 
effects on the coherence and the processing of the TL text as compared to the 
original. Two factors seem to play a role in this context: The first is the relation 
between the relative clause and its matrix clause, more specifically, whether it 
continues a “main structure”(“Hauptstruktur”) in the sense of Klein & v. 
Stutterheim (1991) or rather gives additional or background information on 
some aspect or participant, i.e. is part of what Klein & v. Stutterheim would call
a “side structure” (“Nebenstruktur”). The other is the relation between the 
relative clause or the matrix clause/relative clause complex and the following 
context.
The translational upgrading seems to be particular problematic for the
maintenance of the referential structure of the TL text in cases where the SL 
relative clause belongs to the side structure of the text and the following 
sentence takes up referents mentioned in the matrix clause (belonging to the
main structure). Here the independent sentence automatically gets more weight 
than the subordinate clause of the original and at the same time potentially 
hinders the accessibility of discourse referents in the counterpart of the SL
matrix clause. Continuative relative clauses in Laux’ terminology, i.e. cases 
where the following context continues what is expressed in the relative clause or 
the matrix clause/relative clause complex, seem to be less problematic when
translated as independent sentences. The upgrading does not change discourse 
prominence (“weight”) significantly, since these relative clauses usually do not 
present background/side structure information but belong to the main structure 
of the text which is important enough to be taken up in the subsequent sentence. 
Neither does referential structure usually cause translation problems here, 
because the following sentence does not refer back to the counterpart of the SL 
matrix clause alone. 
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However, the analysis of the examples has also shown that the decision 
whether a relative clause is continuative or dis-continuative, or whether it is part 
of the main structure or the side structure of the text is far from straight forward 
in many cases. As mentioned above, this may be related to the fact that the 
criteria these distinctions are based on are claimed to hold for narrative texts, 
and their applicability to non-narrative text types is not necessarily given. 
4 Summary and outlook
In this paper I have discussed some motivations and discourse consequences of 
the translational upgrading of subordinate clauses to independent sentences. A
study of a German-Norwegian and Norwegian-German parallel corpus of 
popular science text has shown that shifts from hypotactic clause complexes to 
paratactic sentence sequences are much more frequent in the German-
Norwegian corpus fragment, and that the upgrading of non-restrictive relative 
clauses and adverbial and complement clauses makes up the most frequent type
of sentence boundary adjustment in this translation direction, whereas this type 
of adjustment is not very frequent in translations from Norwegian to German. In 
the case of relative clauses, contrasts in the German vs. Norwegian language
system often seem to trigger upgrading, whereas in the case of adjunct and 
complement clauses no general typological difference can be identified. 
I have then taken a closer look at changes in discourse interpretation which 
the upgrading of non-restrictive relative clauses leads to. It seem that relative
clauses contributing additional or background information to the matrix clause 
and which are not taken up or continued in the following context cause more 
problems for transferring referential structure and discourse relations when 
translated as independent sentences than “real” continuative relative clauses
which both continue the matrix clause and are themselves continued in the
following sentence. 
The relative clause examples also illustrate a property often claimed to be 
typical of German texts of this (popular-)science genre, namely the preference to 
organise discourse and information units hierarchically, e.g. by hypotactic clause 
linkage and/or extensive pre- and post-nominal NP modification. In the 
Norwegian translation this hierarchisation is often broken up and replaced by 
paratactic clause linkage and less complex nominal (phrase) structures, and also 
Norwegian original texts of this genre seem to be more paratactically structured 
and informationally less complex. But does this say anything about the general 
adequacy of such discourse organisation strategies? The discourse purpose of 
texts of this genre usually is to convey complex and often hierarchically 
organised information or to argue for a specific view on a complex state of
affairs. At a first glance it might seem that the complexity of information-
oriented text is best accounted for by a discourse organisation strategy that 
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mirrors this complexity to some degree, e.g. by syntactic hierarchisation on 
clause and phrase level. Many of the relative clause examples indicate that 
relativisation in German can in fact be an elegant linguistic means to 
syntactically signal a hierarchical organisation of chunks of possibly complex
information. On the other hand, this discourse-structuring signal may also be 
misleading, i.e. not correlating to a corresponding organisation of some state of 
affairs. (9a.) above can be seen as an example where stylistic conventions 
characteristic of the genre (and possibly also individual preferences of the 
respective author), i.e. to use a nominal, impersonal style and to present as much
information as possible within a single sentence, not necessarily contribute to 
the comprehensibility of the text. The methodology used in this study, however, 
does not allow to systematically evaluate whether one of the discourse
organisation strategies really is superior to the other with respect to the 
comprehension and memory of this type of text by the reader. Here, clearly, 
psycholinguistic methodology is called for. 
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Abstract
Recent important developments within Discourse Representation Theory 
include a more elaborate formalisation and account of presuppositional 
phenomena, as well as the integration of unification as a mode of 
composition. Focusing on these issues, the following claims are made: (i) 
the varying compositional impact of some adverbials, ranging from 
merely constraining the properties of a predicate to radically altering 
them, is suitably modeled applying unification, and (ii) pragmatic 
mechanisms like bridging, presupposition verification and 
accommodation can apply word-internally for some lexical items. To 
substantiate these claims, the analysis will centre around the German 
causal preposition durch ('by', 'through', 'by means of'). 
1 A challenge to strict compositionality 
An adverbial can be said to be a free syntactic constituent which modifies a 
predicate semantically. However, some adverbials not only modify a predicate, 
but may even radically alter its properties. Prepositional adjuncts headed by the 
German causal-instrumental preposition durch ('by', 'through', 'by means of') 
belong to one such class of adverbials (cf. section 5 for further examples). One 
of the main functions of durch is to mark its complement as the causing event in 
a causal relation between two events, as exemplified below: 
(1)
(2)
Der Polizist wurde getötet durch einen Schuss aus der eigenen 
Dienstwaffe. 
'The policeman was killed by a shot from his own service weapon.' 
Der Polizist starb durch einen gezielten Schuss. 
'The policeman died through an accurate shot.' 
In (1), the causative predicate töten ('kill') is used, which implies the existence of 
a causing event without specifying it, i.e. it is manner-neutral. The semantics of 
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a phrase such as einen Polizisten töten ('to kill a policeman') can be specified as 
in (3), ignoring aspects which are not of immediate relevance here: 
Oe1e2[BECOME(dead(p))(e2)  CAUSE(e2)(e1)](3)
(4)
(5)
In prose: the set of events e1 such that there exists an event e2, which is a death
of p, and where e1 causes e2. The modifying durch-adjunct provides a 
specification of the event e1: the death of the policeman is caused by the event of 
a shot from his own service weapon. 
In (2), the inchoative predicate sterben ('die') is used. Inchoatives like 
sterben are not generally assumed to imply a causative relation. The semantics 
of sterben ('die') may be represented formally as in (4), i.e. without a CAUSE
predicate:
OyOe2[BECOME(dead(y))(e2)]
Still, in combination with the durch-adjunct, a semantics parallel to the one 
indicated for (1) is desirable: a shooting event is the cause of the policeman's
death. Additionally, an inchoative like sterben does not associate with an agent 
on its own. But sentence (2) clearly implies the presence of an agent, as the 
specification of the shooting event as being 'accurate', indicates. Thus, the
durch-phrase can be said to have altered the properties of the inchoative
predicate sterben.
Accordingly, the semantics of both (1) and (2) can be represented as 
indicated in (5), again leaving out information not relevant to the discussion 
here:
Ȝe1e2[BECOME(dead(p))(e2)  CAUSE(e2)(e1)  SHOOT(e1)]
However, since inchoatives are not assumed to imply causation, there must be 
two different sources for the abstract predicate CAUSE: with causatives it 
originates in the predicate itself, but with inchoatives, the preposition seems to
be the most plausible candidate for its introduction. But if durch in some cases 
should include a CAUSE of its own, principles of strict compositionality would 
seem to force us to assume an ambiguity between two durch prepositions since
no iteration of the CAUSE predicate is assumed after the composition of durch
with causatives: We do not get an interpretation involving indirect causation in a 
cause-to-cause-relation. Assuming ambiguity would, however, clearly be
somewhat counter-intuitive, given the parallel interpretation of (1) and (2).
Thus, other means of composition for durch-phrases and the predicates they 
modify, should be explored. 
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2 Alternative approaches 
There exist approaches which could be seen as avoiding the problems posed by 
the data in (1)-(2). In the following, I will comment briefly on two of these,
offering further arguments for the view to be taken here. 
A first alternative is to assume a principle of temporal coherence as e.g. 
Wunderlich (1997, p. 36) does. This way a CAUSE predicate can enter into 
semantic composition whenever there is a constellation where a process 
(immediately) precedes a resultant state, where the predicate BECOME occurs.
From this perspective, the CAUSE element occurs as a result of the combination 
of the BECOME predicate in the representation for inchoatives like sterben and 
the event of the shot, introduced by the durch-phrase. This means that durch
itself does not need to contain a CAUSE element for inchoatives and causatives to 
come out much the same when combined with durch.
In another alternative it is assumed, somewhat simplified, that every change 
involves a CAUSE at some level, under the assumption that "even if no specific 
causing entity or action is expressed, something must be responsible for the
change of state in the affected entity" (Härtl 2004: 899 ff.). Härtl, arguing for a 
division between a semantic and a conceptual level, claims that whenever a 
CHANGE predicate is present, a CAUSE predicate is introducable.
However, I think there are some facts concerning durch which render these 
approaches less attractive. In addition to the combinatorial possibilities of 
causal-instrumental durch briefly discussed in the previous section, the
preposition may also be combined with stative predicates, as in (6): 
(6) Auch der durch diese Haltung hohe Luftwiderstand kann auf
längeren Strecken ganz schön schlauchen. 
'The high air resistance due to this posture may put you through the 
mill over longer distances.' 
In cases like (6), one gets an interpretation where the state expressed in the 
lexical anchor hoch (Eng. high), is the resultant state of the eventuality
expressed in the internal argument of durch, in this case: Haltung (Eng.
posture).1
If the durch-phrase is left out, as illustrated in (7), the stative hoch should
not be interpreted as a resultant state as such – though this could be achieved by 
(intonationally) focussing hoch, introducing a set of alternatives which are
related to high through scales or negation. 
1 Haltung has both a stative and an eventive reading. It has an eventive, intergressive (Egg 
1995) reading in contexts where the position is upheld deliberately, as in (6). 
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(7)
(8)
der hohe Luftwiderstand
'the high air resistance'
In the light of the noun phrase in (7), it seems reasonable to claim that durch has 
a similar effect in the case of the stative hoch in (6) as with inchoatives. A 
CAUSE can be assumed to be present, and durch's internal argument expresses
the causing event in the causing relation. 
If one were to follow the above approaches, one would be left in a situation 
where one would have to do a lot of reinterpretation, in order to get a CAUSE
element introduced into semantic composition. But in (6) it is hard to see what 
could plausibly trigger the reinterpretation, apart from durch.
An intuitively more plausible analysis can be achieved if we allow durch to 
introduce the CAUSE element. This CAUSE element would be the driving force of
reinterpretation. If a CAUSE relation is present, one would expect a stative 
predicate to be reinterpreted as being a resultant state (Kratzer 2006). The 
reinterpretation of the stative predicate would thus follow automatically from the 
presence of the CAUSE element in durch, as in standard counterfactual analyses 
(Lewis 1973).
Another point in case for the plausibility of including a CAUSE in the 
semantics of durch is the reinterpretational effects durch has on its internal 
argument, which is the semantic correspondent of the preposition's syntactic 
complement. Normally, the internal argument of durch is an event noun. But 
durch can also have non-event-nouns as arguments, in which case these nouns 
will be reinterpreted as involving events (the relevant durch-phrase is printed in 
boldface):
Wer über das nötige finanzielle Langzeitpolster verfügt, kann durch 
die Wahl des Wohnortes und die Gestaltung der Wohnung den 
Risiken auszuweichen versuchen (oder durch Zweitwohnung, 
Ferien etc.). 
'Whoever has the necessary long-term financial cushion at hand can 
attempt to avoid the risk through the choice of a place of residence
or the set-up of the residence itself (or through a second house,
vacations, etc.).' 
In (8), the phrase durch Zweitwohnung ('through a second house') is interpreted 
e.g. as through the purchase of a second house, i.e. as an event which involves
the entitity second house. If durch includes a CAUSE, we will have a 
straightforward explanation of why this reinterpretation takes place, since CAUSE
is a relation between two events. 
In light of examples such as (6) and the reinterpretational effects of durch in 
general, it seems reasonable to assume a CAUSE predicate to be included in the 
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semantics of durch. The question I will turn to in the next section, is how this 
quality of durch can be retained for all its causal and instrumental uses, i.e. how 
one can deal in a compositional manner with the fact that durch includes a 
CAUSE predicate which is not always needed or wanted, as with causatives.
3 A unificational analysis
To deal with this challenge, the semantics of durch will be analysed by means of 
unification in Discourse Representation Theory (Bende-Farkas & Kamp 2001), 
applying principles of the presuppositional analysis of Kamp (2001) and Sæbø's
(to appear) analysis of by. Building on work by van der Sandt (1992), Kamp
assumes that semantic information in a sentence is processed bottom-up via a
storage algorithm. Semantic information represented preliminarily in the store 
part enters a main content part as it is bound, verified or accommodated, for 
which Kamp uses the general term justification. The general representational 
format of Kamp (2001) for a semantic node in a tree structure is shown in (9): 
(9) CONTENT,
STORE
ConditionBinding,ConstraintVariable,
  
A semantic node representation consists of a pair of a content and a store 
element. The content is always a Discourse Representation Structure (DRS). The 
store is a set of one or more elements, each being a triple of a variable, a set 
consisting of one or more constraints (a DRS) and a binding condition. Binding 
conditions determine which variables can enter a binding relation, and 
constraints contain semantic information which restrain the possible bindings
further.2 In addition to the binding mechanism, a principle which unifies
variables and constraints when possible, is assumed. 
This machinery allows a unified analysis of the above uses of durch where 
the preposition indeed includes a CAUSE of its own. When combined with a 
causative predicate, the implicit CAUSE of durch is not added to the content part 
since there is a CAUSE present in the predicate. However, the combination of 
durch with an inchoative leads to the projection of the CAUSE element in the
content part. The actual formalisation is illustrated briefly below. Durch may be 
represented as in (10): 
2 It might e.g. be the specification of gender features which are crucial for the correct binding
of pronouns. 
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(10)
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Durch has no content of its own - its content part is empty -, but it includes two 
event variables and a temporal variable in the store. The two event variables are 
further specified as entering a CAUSE relation. The binding conditions Ȝ1 and Ȝ2
indicate that the variables need to be bound. When the complement of the 
preposition is added, as in durch einen Schuss, the event expressed therein 
binds e1 and the information in the noun is added as a further constraint on the
causing event: SHOT(e1) (cf. Chung & Ladusaw 2004, where the term restriction
is used). When a durch phrase is combined with a causative predicate which has 
a completely parallel store part, the variables of durch and their constraints will
eventually be unified with or be bound by the variables of the causative 
predicate. The representation of töten is given in (11):3
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BECOME(dead(y))(e4)
PATIENT(y)(e4)
The causing event e1 of durch will first bind the event in the complement of 
durch, before being unified with the causing event of the predicate (e3), whereas 
the caused event e2 will bind the caused event of the predicate (e4).4
Additionally, the constraints of the predicate and the preposition are merged and 
- where applicable - unified. After binding and unification have occured, the 
actual contribution of a durch phrase, as compared to the information provided 
by the predicate alone, is restricted to the specification of the causing event 
given by the constraint SHOT(e1). Turning next to the inchoative predicate, its
store part includes only one event (e5), which will be bound by the caused event 
e2 of durch:
3 Under the assumption of a Kratzer (1996) style analysis, no agent is part of the semantics of 
the predicate itself. The agent is contained in the specifier position of a functional projection
termed VOICE, which is situated above the VP, but below any temporal or aspectual
projections.
4 The binding condition indef indicates that these variables can, but need not enter a binding 
relation.
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(12) BECOME(dead(y))(e5)
PATIENT(y)(e5)
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In this case, the variable of the causing event of durch will be added to the
content, since there is no event for it to be unified with. Furthermore, the CAUSE
relation of which the bound event variable of the inchoative predicate will be a 
part, will also enter the content, along with the aforementioned constraint 
derived from the internal argument of the preposition.
4 Sentence- and word-internal pragmatics 
This treatment of durch amounts to analysing its implicit CAUSE element as a 
sentence-internal presupposition. A durch phrase can be said to assert the event 
included therein and presuppose that this event is a cause of some other event. 
The common basis for generally assumed mechanisms for presuppositional
behaviour and the compositional unification-based analysis of durch is as 
follows: When combined with causatives, durch seems to lack a meaning of its 
own. This is due to the unification of the CAUSE of durch with the CAUSE of the 
predicate, which is parallel to presupposition verification. In combination with 
inchoatives, however, durch does seem to make a greater contribution, where a 
CAUSE predicate is introduced by the causal preposition itself. Here, a parallel to
context accommodation can be observed. 
Importantly, a pragmatic account of the combinatorial potential of durch
can capture some further properties of the preposition which have previously 
been ignored or not correctly identified. Two additional pragmatic mechanisms
involved are bridging and acceptability. In example (6) from section 2, here 
repeated for convenience as (13), bridging (in the wider sense of Bittner (2001), 
cf. also Clark (1977)) can be argued to take place. What is seen as bridging here, 
is the fact that the CAUSE associated with the preposition forces a reinterpretation
of the state described in the predicate hoch ('high') as being a caused resultant
state:5
Auch der durch diese Haltung hohe Luftwiderstand kann auf 
längeren Strecken ganz schön schlauchen. 
'The high air resistance due to this posture may put you through the 
mill over longer distances.' 
5 This is standardly described as coercion in the semantic literature on aktionsart. Bittner
(2001) chooses to describe this as bridging. 
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In (14)-(15), it can be seen that claims made in the literature that durch generally 
cannot be combined with manner-specific causatives (Härtl 2001) are not 
correct:
??Er wurde durch einen Schuss erschossen. 
'He was shot dead with a shot.' 
(14)
(15)
(16)
Er wurde durch einen Genickschuss erschossen.
'He was shot dead with a shot to his neck.'
The well-formedness of such combinations should not be explained by reference 
to the semantics of durch. A more general account of the distribution in (14) and 
(15) is achieved by assuming that composition is restrained by a general 
pragmatic mechanism of acceptability as described by van der Sandt (1992: 367 
ff.). The verb erschießen is a causative predicate, where the causing event is 
specified as being a shooting event. Thus, erschießen can be said to be a
manner-specific causative, as opposed to the manner-neutral töten. Modifying a
predicate such as erschießen ('shoot dead') by an adjunct like durch einen Schuss
('with a shot') is uninformative and thus unacceptable. The adjunct contains no 
information which is not included in the predicate. However, a specification 
such as durch einen Genickschuss ('with a shot to the neck') renders the adjunct 
more specific than the shooting event described in the predicate, adding to the
content. A shot to the neck describes not only a shooting event, but also specifies 
the direction of the shot. Thus, the distribution of durch phrases in combination
with manner-specific causatives does not have to be accounted for by reference
to the semantics of durch itself, but can be seen as fully determined by 
acceptability restrictions. 
The application of pragmatic mechanisms in explaining the compositional
behaviour of durch has additional benefits as compared to an analysis based on 
unification alone. This is the case in examples involving indirect causation,
where it is plausible to assume that two causes occur:
Der Kommandant ließ die Gefangenen durch eine Sprengung töten. 
'The commandant had the prisoners killed by means of an 
explosion.'
In (16), two causative predicates are used: lassen ('let'), which can be compared
to the causative uses of have in English, and töten ('kill'). Two interpretational 
variants are available for (16). They both have in common that the commander
is the agent of some event, which causes someone else to kill the prisoners. In 
the first variant, which is the most plausible one, it is additionally assumed that 
the explosion was the event that killed the prisoners. As in the above cases, the 
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CAUSE-presupposition of the durch-phrase would be verified by the CAUSE of 
töten. The other, more marginal interpretational variant of (16), is one where the 
explosion is not part of the killing event, but rather modifies the causing event of
which the commander is the agent, expressed in the lassen predicate, i.e. the 
commandant somehow uses the explosion to make someone else kill the
prisoners, in whatever way. In this case, the CAUSE-presupposition of durch will 
be verified by the CAUSE of lassen.
A case like (16) would however be potentially troublesome if unification is 
applied. It is preferrable if unification is allowed to occur whenever it can, 
limited by general constraints on unification, such as e.g. a demand on non-
conflicting features. Thus, in the formalisation described above, as in any other
unificational framework, the two CAUSE predicates and the CAUSE of durch
would be unified unless some (ad hoc) principles are defined to avoid 
unification.6 This would run against the actual interpretation of (16). 
It has been argued here that the kind of unification which is a plausible basis 
for the analysis of durch can be seen as presupposition justification. This view 
also allows a restriction of the processes which determine unification in a non-ad 
hoc way (though still not very clearly defined). Van der Sandt (1992) argues that
resolution does not always have to occur. It is certainly the preferred operation 
over accommodation, but accommodation might under certain conditions occur 
when resolution is possible. What these conditions are, is not an easy matter to 
settle, but in the case of (16), it might be argued that there is a simpler
expression without lassen which is available for direct causation, and that
unifying the two CAUSEs of the predicates and resolving the presupposed CAUSE
of durch with these would imply a lack of belief in the informativity of sentence 
(16) on the hearer's side. 
It should be emphasised that in the above examples, all pragmatic 
mechanisms assumed to account for the compositional behaviour of durch apply 
purely sentence-internally. What is more, the presupposition resolution which 
has been argued for here, occurs at a word-internal level, involving a 
decomposition of the semantics of lexical items by means of the predicates
CAUSE and BECOME. Thus, the above approach can be said to truly involve
lexical pragmatics (Blutner 2004), where not only the pragmatic aspects of some 
lexical items are discussed, but lexical composition itself is viewed as being 
pragmatic in nature. 
It might be questioned whether this is really a kind of presupposition. At 
this point, I have nothing much to say in my defence, this part of the article 
indeed being work in progress. It is however, not straightforward to establish 
this relation, since many of the normally applied tests for presuppositions are not 
6 Alternatively, applying default unification (Bouma 2006) might be seen as a way of 
avoiding this problem.
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applicable in the case of durch.7 The pragmatic mechanisms which are argued to 
be relevant here, apply at the word-level, whereas most presuppositional 
phenomena which have been treated in the literature belong to the sentence-
level. They can only be evaluated at the top-most CP-level and often only apply
intersententially. But the resolution of the CAUSE-presupposition of durch can be 
argued to rather happen at VP-level, before the topmost eventuality is 
existentially closed. Thus tests involving e.g. embeddedness do not make much
sense in the case of word-internal pragmatics. Connected to this, since the 
presupposition justification of durch applies at a word-internal level, effects 
involving global, local or intermediate accommodation (Beaver & Zeevat, to 
appear) are not expected either (but see the two possible modification in
example (16) above). 
One test which does seem to be more or less straightforwardly applicable,
though, is the negation test, which involves a non-entailing context, in which a 
presupposition should still be true: 
(17) Er starb nicht durch einen gezielten Schuss. 
'He did not die through an accurate shot.'
Now, it doesn't make sense to consider the truth of CAUSE alone, but it can be 
observed that the CAUSE of durch does seem to survive negation. The most
obvious interpretation of (17) is one where the person in question dies, but
where the cause of his death is not an accurate shot, i.e. the negation has narrow 
scope over the durch-adjunct. Importantly, (17) is interpreted as claiming that 
there was a cause for the person's death, but that the reason was not an accurate 
shot. Thus, the presuppositional part of the durch-phrase, consisting of the 
CAUSE-predicate, can be said to survive negation. 
It is possible to get a sentential negation reading of nicht in (17), but this is a 
more unlikely reading. The reason for this could be that it does not make sense 
to add a causal adjunct like by a shot if one wants to express that a person did 
not die (cf. Solstad, in preparation). 
Since presuppositions in general are assumed to be verified also 
intersententially, it might be an additional argument for analysing the CAUSE part
of the semantics of durch as being a presupposition if it could also be justified 
sentence-externally. There is at least one type of occurence where a claim can be
made that this is the case: 
7 See Beaver (2001: 18-20) and Geurts (1999: 6-10) for some general comments on the 
problem of testing for presuppositions and delimiting them from other semantic or pragmatic
phenomena.
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(18)
(19)
Sie hat Geld verloren. Es geschah durch Unaufmerksamkeit.
'Sie lost some money. It happened due to lack of attention.'
In the second sentence in (18) containing the durch phrase, the abstract event 
predicate geschehen ('happen') is used, which asserts that some event took place. 
What durch modifies semantically however, is the predicate verlieren ('lose') in 
the first sentence. Thus, in the case of (18), part of the presuppositional 
information in the store of durch is bound by an event variable in the preceding 
sentence.8
5 A wider perspective
An approach like the one sketched above has applications beyond the analysis of 
durch. First, unification as a mode of composition has been applied in an 
analysis of the semantics of by in English (Sæbø, to appear) using a somewhat 
different version of the DRT formalism sketched in section 3. Second, there are 
causal prepositions in other languages which show a behaviour similar to durch.
In English, through can also be combined with both causative and inchoative
predicates. More interestingly, given the close relationship between English 
through and German durch, a language more remotely related to German such 
as Bulgarian also has a preposition, ot ('from'), which combines with causatives
and inchoatives: 
a. Toj be ubit ot tri kurshuma.
 He was killed from three bullets
'He was killed with three shots.'
b. Toj zagina ot tri kurshuma.
 He died from three bullets
'He died from three shots.'
Third, there are other types of adverbial modification, where the above analysis 
can be applied plausibly, as illustrated in (20):9
8 It may be added that it is possible to see the presupposition of durch as purely sentence-
internally verified if it is assumed that geschehen ('happen') and the event anaphor es ('it') are 
identified with information in the preceding sentence, such that it is available for word-
internal modification in the second sentence. This conflicts, however, with the general
assumption that event variables are bound before the level of CP is reached, i.e. before any 
preceding context is considered.
9 Thanks are due to Christopher Habel for pointing my attention to this example.
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(20) a. Kjell Johan ging in das  Haus hinein.10
DIR+IN  DIR+IN
'Kjell Johan went into the house.'
b. Kjell Johan ging in das Haus. 
'Kjell went into the house.'
c. Kjell Johan ging hinein.
 'Kayjay went inside.'
In (20a) the adverbials in das Haus ('into the house') and hinein ('inside', in
addition to viewpoint information) specify a single path of movement. They are 
not interpreted as describing two paths which are combined. There is a double
specification of an in movement (i.e. into as opposed to out of), once in the
preposition in and once in the hinein element. In addition, directionality is 
specified twice, both in the combination of the preposition with accusative case,
and in the hinein element. As can be seen from (20b-c), either of the adverbials 
in (20a) can occur without the other. 
In the framework presented here, the hinein element would be assumed to 
carry the presupposition that there is an object into which movement takes place. 
In (20a) this presupposition is sentence-internally verified, whereas it will have
to be verified in a wider context or accommodated in (20c). The information on 
directionality and inwards movement of the two adverbials is unified whenever 
they both occur, as in (20a). 
In sum, these data suggest that the presuppositional analyses of Kamp
(2001) and van der Sandt (1992) in combination with unification-based 
composition can be suitably applied in analysing lexical items other than e.g.
particles and factive verbs. 
6 Conclusion
In this paper, it was argued that an analysis applying strict compositionality is 
not always a viable option. The varying compositional impact of German
adverbials headed by the causal-instrumental preposition durch was argued to be
better rendered in a unificational framework. It was further argued that 
pragmatic mechanisms are important in describing the combinatorial distribution
of some lexical items, and that what seems to be unification may be argued to be 
rather word-internal presupposition justification.
10 Until now, I've honoured Kjell Johan by keeping his name out of the violent examples.
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1 Plot1
The object of our investigation is expressing necessary conditions in natural 
language, particularly in a certain kind of conditional sentences, the so-called 
Anankastic Conditionals (ACs)2, a topic brought into the linguistic discussion by 
the seminal papers Sæbø (1986) and Sæbø (2001). A typical AC is the following 
sentence, Sæbø’s standard example: 
(1)
                                                
If you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train. 
Sæbø analyses the sentence by means of the modal theory in Kratzer (1981), 
according to which a modal has two contextual parameters, a modal base f(w)
and an ordering source g(w). The modal base contains relevant facts and the 
ordering source contains an ideal like wishes, moral laws and the like. Normally, 
the antecedent of a necessity-conditional is added to the modal base. Sæbø’s 
new proposal for the analysis of the AC is that the antecedent without the 
information ‘you want’, called inner antecedent, is added to the ordering source.
Sæbø’s analysis had remained almost unnoticed in the literature for more 
than a decade. But recently, quite a number of semanticists have discussed his 
theory. Every alternative account contains one or other material modification of 
Sæbø’s theory. 
Our proposal will be this. The inner antecedent is not added to the ordering 
source. It rather is the antecedent of a Lewisonian necessity-conditional. 
Equivalently, it can be added to a circumstantial modal base that contains all the 
facts compatible with the antecedent. Furthermore, the construction is analyzed 
as a conditional speech act: the sentence expresses an assertion in a context in 
which you want to go to Harlem. 
1 This paper was originally written as a reaction to Sæbø (2001). In the meantime, it has 
undergone various changes. We wish to thank Orin Percus, Sigrid Beck and Wolfgang Klein 
for inspiring discussion of the topic. It is obvious that we owe crucial insights to the authors 
quoted in this study; a warm thanks to them. 
2 The term is due to von Wright (1963). 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we will have a closer 
look at the data, section 3 will be a review of the literature on ACs and in section
4 we will present a counterfactual account. 
2 What is an anankastic conditional? 
In this section we say what ACs are and that it is easy to confuse them with
causative purpose constructions, which have a different meaning. The relevant 
observations are due to (Bech, 1955/57: 102 ff.), and it is Sæbø’s merit to have 
rescued them from oblivion. In fact, Sæbø’s example (1) is a transposition of the
following sentence by Bech: 
(2)
(3)
(4)
Wenn Müller mit Schmidt verhandeln will/soll, muss er nach 
Hamburg fahren. 
‘If Müller wants/is to negotiate with Schmidt he has to go to 
Hamburg’
Here is a list of different variants of the AC in (1). 
a. You have to take the A train if you want to go to Harlem.
b. If you don’t take the A train you can’t go to Harlem. 
c. To go to Harlem you have to take the A train. 
Sæbø assumes that these sentences are truth conditionally equivalent and 
express the idea that taking the A train is a necessary condition for getting to 
Harlem. This is the most natural interpretation though not the only one.
Sentences like (3a) are not restricted to the anankastic interpretation. Compare
the following pair from (Hare, 1971): 
a. If you want sugar in your soup, you should ask the waiter. 
b. If you want sugar in your soup, you should get tested for 
 diabetes. 
Whereas (4a) shows all the symptoms of being an AC, (4b) would sound weird 
on this reading. Rather, it is a normal must-conditional saying that in view of the 
medical facts, in any situation in which you want sugar in your soup and respect
the speaker’s advice, you get tested for diabetes.
An important observation due to Bech and highlighted by Sæbø is the fact
that um/to-clauses are ambiguous when they occur together with a modal: they 
either restrict the modal and thereby produce an AC, or they simply express a 
goal. Bech calls the first use of um/to DETERMINATIVE, the second 
INDETERMINATIVE. When the um/to-clause restricts the modal, it provides the 
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range of worlds over which the quantifier expressed by must/muss quantifies. 
Thus, (2), which we repeat below in (5a), is a paraphrase of (5b) on its
anankastic reading: 
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
a. Wenn Müller mit Schmidt verhandeln will/soll, muss er nach 
 Hamburg fahren.
‘If Müller wants/is to negotiate with Schmidt he has to go to 
 Hamburg’
b. Müller muss nach Hamburg fahren, um mit Schmidt zu 
 verhandeln. 
‘Müller has to go to Hamburg to negotiate with Schmidt’
Indeed, the sentences in (5) seem to express the same meaning, namely, that the
complement of must is a necessary condition for the truth of the proposition 
‘Müller negotiates with Schmidt’.
Under the INDETERMINATIVE interpretation, the to/um-clause expresses a 
goal. (5b) then means something like: ‘Müller has to go to Hamburg because he 
wants/is obliged to negotiate with Schmidt’. The purpose interpretation has 
nothing to do with the overt modal muss/must. Indeed, we can omit the modal
and still obtain a purpose reading: 
Müller is going to Hamburg to negotiate with Schmidt.
This can be paraphrased as: ‘Müller goes to Hamburg with the aim of 
negotiating with Schmidt’. Here the to-clause expresses a causa finalis. If we 
adopt Lewis’s (1973a) analysis of causation, we can paraphrase (6) roughly as:3
‘Müller is going to Hamburg, and he wants to negotiate with 
Schmidt, and if he didn’t want to negotiate with Schmidt, he would 
not be going to Hamburg’ 
In sentences without modals, only the causative reading exists, but sentences 
with overt modals + um/to-clauses are ambiguous, and the anankastic reading is 
easily overlooked. 
ACs have a ‘contraposed’ paraphrase: 
Wenn Müller nicht nach Hamburg fährt, kann er nicht mit Schmidt
verhandeln.
‘If Müller doesn’t go to Hamburg he can’t negotiate with Schmidt’ 
3 This is not quite correct. The paraphrase gives us what Lewis calls causal dependence. 
Causation should be analysed as a chain of causal dependencies. 
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(9) Müller kann nicht mit Schmidt verhandeln, ohne nach Hamburg zu 
fahren.
‘Müller can’t negotiate with Schmidt without going to Hamburg’
According to Sæbø, (8) and (9) are equivalent to (5). We think that this is not
entirely correct; rather they are entailed by it. The semantics for anankastic 
must/have to should account for this meaning relation.
A note on the terminology is in order. Following common practice, we 
conceive of the if-clause of a conditional as the restriction of an overt or covert 
modal. The if-clause is called the antecedent of the conditional and the
proposition or property embedded under the modal is called the consequent of 
the conditional. In (8), the antecedent is “if Müller doesn’t go to Hamburg”, and 
the consequent is the infinitival “he negotiate with Schmidt”. The modal can
expresses the logical relation between the two. In the example given, the entire
construction is negated in addition. The negation is not part of the consequent. 
We extend the terminology to modals that are modified by um/to-clauses. For 
instance, (5)b is a conditional with the antecedent “to negotiate with Schmidt”
and the consequent ‘Müller to go to Hamburg’. The two are mediated by the 
anankastic modal must.
To summarize, an AC consists of a modal must/have to, which is either 
restricted by an if-clause containing an expression of intention or obligation or 
by a to-clause. This restriction is the antecedent of the conditional. The 
restriction expresses a goal of the subject. The entire construction expresses the
idea that the consequent has to be true if the goal is to be true. The construction 
has a can-variant. Then it means that the goal can be achieved by making the
consequent true. The construction must not be confused with normal purpose 
constructions that have a different meaning.
3 Different analyses of anankastic conditionals 
In this section we give an overview of some approaches to the analysis of ACs. 
Since Sæbø (1986) the goal has been to develop an adequate analysis for this
kind of conditionals within the theoretical framework of (Kratzer, 1981). Von 
Fintel and Iatridou (2005)4 and von Stechow et al. (2004) refuted Sæbø’s 
analysis by independently showing that it fails in face of inconsistent goals.
Their solutions are criticized in Huitink (2005), who discusses certain scenarios 
with consistent goals and considers them problematic for the former two 
accounts. By doing this Huitink brings up an important property of ACs – a
restricted notion of a necessary condition. Let us look at these analyses more
closely and see what lessons we can draw from them. 
4 This is the latest version of the paper. Earlier versions go back at least to 2004. 
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3.1 Sæbø’s analysis 
Sæbø was the first to identify ACs as problematic data for Kratzer (1981). 
According to Kratzer, the two contextual parameters for the interpretation of 
modals are a realistic modal base f and an ordering source g. For a given world 
w, f(w) and g(w) are defined as sets of propositions. f(w) is a set of facts in w, i.e. 
w  f(w), hence f(w) is a circumstantial modal base, and f(w) are the 
accessible worlds. g(w) contains goals, wishes, regulations that are used to order 
accessible worlds: 
(10)
(11)
(12)
Ordering relations: 
Let g be an ordering source and let u,v,w be worlds 
v <g(w) u  iff {p  g(w) : p(u)}  {p  g(w) : p(v)}, where  is 
proper inclusion.
The if-clause of indicative conditionals restricts the modal base, i.e. the 
proposition it expresses is added to f(w).
If we apply this semantics to the AC in (11), it is predicted true in w with 
respect to f and g iff the condition in (12) holds: 
If you want to go to Harlem you have to take the A train. 
(w’  f(w)) you want to go to Harlem in w’ & (w’’  f(w))
you go to Harlem in w’’& w’’ <g(w) w’) o you take the A train in 
w’
where f(w) contains relevant facts, e.g. train schedules, and g(w) is 
a set of your goals/wishes in w.
According to (12), the sentence is true iff in all accessible worlds in which you 
want to go to Harlem and in which as many of your goals are achieved as 
possible, you take the A train. This fails to capture the intuitive meaning of (11) 
as Sæbø correctly observes. This is so for the following reason. The relevant fact 
is that you get to Harlem only if you take the A train and not that you want to go 
to Harlem only if you take the A train. 
To make Kratzer’s analysis work for ACs, Sæbø suggests that it is the
ordering source that grows as a result of processing the if-clause, not the modal
base. Want in the if-clause indicates that the internal antecedent, i.e. the 
complement of want, is added to g(w) but not to f(w) as it would be in ordinary 
conditionals.
Sæbø’s revised semantics for conditionals consists of two clauses - the first 
one applies to normal conditionals, the second takes care of the ACs: 
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(13)
(14)
(Sæbø, 2001: 442): 
[[ (if D)(must) ]] f,g = [[ must ]] f+,g+ where if D expresses M then for any 
w,
(i) f+(w) = f(w)  v  M F(v) and g+(w) = g(w) 
where F is the general modal base (‘the facts’, ‘what is the 
 case’), or
(ii) f+(w) = f(w) and g+(w) = g(w)  v  M GD(v)
 where GD is the ordering source expressed in D (e.g., ‘what 
 you want’)
The idea behind the qualification (i) is that v  M F(v) is {M}, i.e. the singleton 
containing the external antecedent, and this set is added to the modal base f(w)
for non-ACs.5 The qualification (ii) for ACs is best understood by considering 
the standard example (1). GD is the information “you want”, i.e. GD(v) = {p | you
want p in v}. If the content of the wanting is closed under entailment, v  M
GD(v) is the set {p | that you go to Harlem  p}. This set of propositions is to be 
added to the ordering source g(w). 6 Recall Kratzers definition of must:
w  [[ must]] f,g(p) iff (j  f(w))(k  f(w))(l  f(w))(l g(w) k o
l  p)7
We see two problems with Sæbø’s analysis. Firstly the formulation conceals the 
fact that the interpretation for the anankastic case is not compositional. The
problematic feature is the parameter GD. For the example given, GD is the 
information ‘you want’. There is no systematic procedure to obtain this from the 
sentence ‘you want to go to Harlem’. Since we need a syntactic procedure
anyway, a more honest way of formulating the rule is the following: 
5 We understand that F(v) = {p | v  p}, i.e. the set of all facts in v. Therefore, v  M F(v) = 
{M} = {p |(v  M) p  F(v)}, i.e. M is the proposition that is a fact in every M-world.
6 Suppose M = that you want to go to Harlem and \ = that you go to Harlem. Then v  M
GD(v) = {p | (v) If you want to go to Harlem in v, then you want p in v}. In every M-world,
\ is the case. Hence \, the internal antecedent, belongs to this set. By closure under 
entailment, the consequences of \ are in the set, too.
7 We gave a somewhat simplified version of Kratzer, which makes it equivalent with Lewis’
semantics, i.e. with the formulation
 i  A ჱo C iff (j) j  A  (k  A)(l i k) l  [A o C],
where “o” stands for material implication.
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(15)
(16)
(17)
Sæbø restated: 
Consider a complex modal of the form [if D must].
Suppose D splits into E + J, where E expresses an ordering source, 
i.e. something like “You want”, “Kjell wishes”, etc. Then 
(i) [[ if D must]] f,g = [[ must]] f,g+ with g+(w) = g(w)  { [[J]] f,g}
for any w. 
Otherwise,
(ii) [[ if D must]] f,g = [[ must]] f+,g with f+(w) = f(w)  {[[D]] f,g}, for 
 any w.
The first case is the anankastic one. Clearly, the syntactic expression of the
ordering source must somehow be detected syntactically, and there is no 
procedure for doing this. Note that the only effect of (i) is that the internal 
antecedent J is added to the ordering source. The second part of the definition is 
more or less identical to the definition of Kratzer (1981). 
The second problem, in our opinion, is that Sæbø underestimates the
complexity of the ordering source and the role of the internal antecedent as a 
hypothetical fact. To show why, it is enough to construct a scenario where the 
goal expressed in the antecedent is in conflict with the real goals of the subject. 
In this case, the conditional comes out false under Sæbø’s analysis, which 
should not be the case. 
One such scenario for sentence (11) is discussed in von Fintel and Iatridou 
(2005, henceforth vF&I) under the title ‘The Hoboken Problem’: 
The Hoboken scenario 
a. You want to go to Hoboken. 
b. Harlem and Hoboken are conflicting goals, e.g. for time 
reasons you can’t visit both places on one day. 
c. The PATH train goes to Hoboken. 
d. The A train goes to Harlem. 
vF&I show that if (11) is uttered in a situation like (16) Sæbø’s analysis fails.
According to this analysis, the sentence is true iff in all the best worlds you take
the A train. The best worlds are the Harlem worlds and the Hoboken worlds. But 
it does not follow from the relevant facts that you take the A train if you go to
Hoboken. So you don’t take the A train in all the best worlds. There are some 
worlds in which you take the PATH train, viz. the Hoboken worlds. Therefore
the conditional is false, which is a wrong prediction. Von Stechow et al. (2004) 
brought up the same point independently by discussing the following sentence 
from Kratzer (1981: 315): 
If you want to become the mayor, you must go to the pub regularly. 
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(18)
(19)
The mayor scenario 
a. You want to become mayor.
b. You don’t want to go to the pub regularly. 
c. You will become the mayor only if you go to the pub 
 regularly. 
If we follow Sæbø and add the proposition ‘you become the mayor’ to g(w)
without any restriction of f(w), we get the same problem again. The sentence is
incorrectly predicted to be false, because there are g(w)-best worlds in which the 
consequent does not hold. To see this, call the wish expressed by (18a) m and 
that expressed by (18b) p. Suppose these are the only wishes of the subject. 
Therefore g(w) = {m,p}. Call the fact (18c) m l p. We first notice that the set 
{m,p,m l p} is inconsistent. It entails p and p. Therefore this set cannot be 
satisfied by any world. It follows that any optimal world satisfies the set {m, m 
l p } or {p, m l p }. But in a world of the second kind the consequent p is 
false, i.e. you don’t go to the pub regularly. 
3.2 von Stechow’s analysis 
In his 2003 lecture notes (von Stechow 2004), von Stechow proposes that the 
want in the antecedent is empty at LF. The antecedent is added to the 
circumstantial modal base. So it plays the role of a hypothetical fact. Since ACs 
have the form of indicative conditionals, the antecedent has to be consistent with 
the modal base. The analysis can cope with both the Hoboken problem and the
mayor problem. As Sæbø’s analysis, it is not compositional, because the 
contribution of want in the antecedent remains unclear. 
3.3 von Fintel and Iatridou’s analysis 
vF&I are guided by the intuition that the antecedent of an anankastic conditional
contributes a ‘designated goal’ to the semantics. Crucially, there should be a
mechanism that makes the proposition expressed by the complement of want or
by the to-clause ‘override’ any other goals in the ordering source. Following this 
idea they suggest that teleological modals are restricted by the designated goal 
argument. Their proposal is this: 
von Fintel and Iatridou (2005: 15): 
a. to p, ought to q is true in w relative to modal base f(w) and 
 ordering source g(w) iff all the g(w)-best worlds in f(w)
 where p is achieved are q-worlds.
b. to p, must q is true relative to modal base f(w) iff all the 
 worlds in f(w) where p is achieved are q-worlds.
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The goal expressed by the if-clause of ACs contributes the designated goal by 
filling the relevant argument slot, since it is contextually salient. 
If we consider the Harlem sentence, the designated goals analysis correctly
predicts that in all circumstantially accessible worlds, in which your goal of 
going to Harlem is achieved, you take the A train.
This analysis is successful in solving the problem with inconsistencies in the 
ordering source. In fact, the ordering source doesn’t play any role for the
analysis. However, the claim that the analysis is compositional is not justified. It 
works no better in this respect than von Stechow’s analysis. Want does not
contribute to the meaning of the sentence. At the end of their paper, von Fintel
and Iatridou speculate on how the external antecedent could be integrated into 
the truth conditions. One possibility considered is the introduction of a second 
silent epistemic modal, something like: [If you want to go to Harlem MUST [to 
go to Harlem, must you to take the A train]]. Or the if-clause expresses an 
additional modification of the circumstantial modal base. None of these 
proposals solves the compositionality problem, because want is ignored for the 
essential part of the truth conditions, viz. (19). 
We cannot see any difference between (19)a and von Stechow’s analysis,
except for wording. The designated goal is treated precisely as if it were the 
antecedent of a conditional with circumstantial modal base and teleological 
ordering source, i.e., it plays the role of a hypothetical fact. 
One of the advantages of vF&I’s proposal is that it distinguishes between 
must-conditionals and weaker ought-conditionals. The difference is that the
latter are evaluated with respect to the teleological ordering source, whereas for 
the former the ordering source can be empty. There is one particular feature in
the analysis that strikes us as being correct: the authors assume that the main 
clause of the anankastic conditional is elliptic: the restriction for the modal is 
determined by the context and perhaps the if-clause itself. We will stick to that
idea in the following. 
3.4 Huitink’s analysis 
Huitink (2005) is another attempt to solve the puzzle of ACs. Huitink argues that 
if there are several non-conflicting goals at stake and several ways to achieve the 
goal in the antecedent, the anankastic reading cannot obtain. So ACs should be 
false in such cases. However, they are predicted true under vF&I’s and von 
Stechow’s analyses. The scenario that should make the argument clear is the 
following:
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(20)
(21)
(22)
The Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario 
a. To go to Harlem, you can take the A train or the B train. 
b. You want to go to Harlem.
c. You want to kiss Ruud van Nistelrooy (Dutch soccer star). 
d. Ruud van Nistelrooy is on the A train. 
The designated goal analysis would predict that the Harlem sentence is true at 
least in its ought-version:
If you want to go to Harlem you ought to take the A train. 
What we get is that in the best Harlem worlds, i.e. the worlds in which you kiss
Ruud van Nistelrooy, you take the A train. So the sentence is true but it 
shouldn’t be, because taking the A train is not a necessary condition for getting 
to Harlem in the described scenario. 
Huitink follows Sæbø in assuming that the internal antecedent of the 
conditional is added to the ordering source. In view of potential inconsistencies, 
she has to make a crucial modification. She assumes that the antecedent alone 
constitutes the ordering source. This draws on the idea that the ordering source, 
in contrast to the modal base, must be explicitly stated. 
There are two possible problems with Huitink’s analysis. The first is that the 
internal antecedent has to be consistent with the modal base. Otherwise true ACs 
would be predicted false. The compatibility requirement does not follow from
the architecture of Kratzer’s semantics for modality. The ordering source 
typically contains propositions that are not compatible with the modal base. The 
second problem is how to answer the question about which relevant facts are in 
the ordering source. If this question is not answered, the theory is virtually 
empirically empty.
Problem 1. The internal antecedent has to be compatible with the ordering 
source.
Assume a situation w in which the proposition p = ‘the water in the pot doesn’t 
boil’ is true. Suppose the modal base includes this fact. Huitink (incorrectly)
predicts the following AC to be false in w:
If the water in the pot is to boil, its temperature ought to be 100° 
Celsius.
The worlds quantified over by the modal are all p-worlds. The goal p cannot
be added because it is inconsistent with the modal base. Therefore the truth 
conditions of the AC is the following statement, which is false: 
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(23) In every world where the water in the pot doesn’t boil, its 
temperature is 100° Celsius. 
It has to be explained why it is not possible for a goal to be in conflict with this 
very salient fact and the modal base in general. 
Problem 2. Which are the relevant facts in the modal base? 
Consider (21) again. There are many ways to go to Harlem. You can take the A 
train, you can take a taxi, you can ask someone to give you a ride, you can walk 
all the way through Manhattan, you can even pretend to be an emergency and 
call for the ambulance. In other words, the facts are that you will reach Harlem, 
by taking the A train, by walking through Manhattan and so on. If all of these
where equally relevant for the evaluation of the truth of (21), the AC would be
predicted false under Huitink’s analysis. So how do we know that of all these 
facts the only thing that matters is that you will reach Harlem if you take the A
train? We think the answer is that taking the A train is the easiest way to get to 
Harlem. The other ways mentioned are more remote possibilities. So we really 
need a theory that chooses the least remote possibility among several 
possibilities. We think that Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals does precisely this. 
Huitink’s conclusions are important in one more respect. She insists on the 
purely anankastic reading which is not available in scenarios like (20). But 
anankastic sentences are not always false in such scenarios. Quite often we 
actually have to deal with pseudo-anankastic readings in the sense that we 
restrict the domain in which necessary conditions hold. We will discuss this 
point in section 4.5. 
4 A “Counterfactual” analysis
4.1 Anankastic conditionals as Lewis-counterfactuals
The idea behind our proposal is simple. Let us assume that we are dealing with a 
different source of ordering in the case of ACs. We rank worlds on the basis of 
comparative similarity to the actual world, in the sense of (Lewis, 1973b). As 
with counterfactuals, we restrict accessible worlds to those that are closest to the 
actual world, i.e. make as many of its facts true as possible. To keep pace with 
the preceding discussion, we remain in Kratzer’s framework, where a 
counterfactual is formalized as a modality with an empty modal base and a 
totally realistic ordering source. f is an empty modal base if f(w) is the singleton 
containing the necessary proposition W for any world w, and g is totally realistic
if g(w) = {w} for any w. Formally, the truth conditions look exactly as the 
semantics that vF&I state for ought to in (19), which is repeated for 
convenience:
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(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
Anankastic necessity: 
to p, ought to/have to q is true in w with respect to modal base f(w)
and ordering source g(w) iff all the g(w)-best worlds in f(w) where 
p is true are q-worlds (iff all the g(w)-best worlds where p is true 
are q-worlds)
The g(w)-best p-worlds are the p-worlds that are as similar to w as they can be. 
This semantics is a reformulation of Lewis’ (1973b) semantics for the
counterfactual operator ჱo in Kratzer’s terms.8 The definition neglects the 
qualification for vacuous truth and assumes Stalnaker’s limit assumption. The 
truth conditions for the AC (3c) then read as follows: 
‘To go to Harlem you have to take the A train’ is true in w with
respect to g iff 
you take the A-train in every g(w)-best world where you go to 
Harlem.
Note that the problem discussed in Huitink (2005) does not arise under this 
account. Recall the scenario in (20). If there are two trains going to Harlem,
whatever your preferences are, the sentence is false in this situation. We are 
considering the next Harlem worlds. Not in all such worlds you take the A train, 
in some of them you take the B train. However, the following sentence comes
out true in the given scenario, which is a correct prediction: 
If you want to go to Harlem and kiss Ruud van Nistelroy, you have 
to take the A train. 
This analysis strikes us as attractive. We don’t need to invent a new semantics 
for ACs – we treat them as instances of counterfactuals. 
4.2 Ellipsis resolution: the implicit restriction of the anankastic modal 
As vF&I have observed, anankastic want-conditionals are elliptic. An explicit 
statement of the Harlem example was given above and is repeated here: 
If you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train to do that.
= If you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train to go to 
Harlem.
8 For a comparison between Kratzer’s and Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals, see (Lewis, 
1981).
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The truth conditions we have given in section 4.1 were intended for the main
clause that doesn’t contain want. One function of the if-clause is that it delivers 
the antecedent for the ellipsis. The LF of the sentence is something like this: 
(28) If you want to go to Harlem [you have [to go to Harlem] to take the 
A train]
We claim that it is the to-clause that functions as the restriction of have to, not 
the if-clause. The complex main clause alone expresses the following AC, and 
that is all we need:
(29) In all the worlds where the goal that you go to Harlem is achieved 
and which make as many of the facts true as possible, you take the 
A train. 
It seems to us that this is precisely what vF&I and Huitink have in mind. But we
have said more than they have, namely what the relevant facts in the modal base 
are. The relevant facts are those that are “cotenable with the antecedent”.9
As for the role of the if-clause, we do not think that it is a part of the AC 
proper. We assume that the if-clause in ACs figures as the antecedent of what 
has been called a conditional speech act in the literature. However, neither of the 
two kinds of such conditionals studied in the literature - RELEVANCE or FACTUAL
conditionals10 - seem to form a natural class under which ACs could fall
according to the standard tests known from the literature.11 Therefore, we have 
to leave the precise status of the construction open. 
We suggest that the function of the if-clause is to reaffirm that the context is 
appropriate for the following elliptic anankastic statement. It has to follow from 
the context that the antecedent is somebody’s goal or wish for an AC to be 
felicitous. For our purposes the following crude rule of use is sufficient. 
9 For the notion of cotenabilty, see (Lewis, 1973b: §2.6). F is cotenable with premise I in 
world w if either (1) F = W or (2) F holds throughout some I-permitting sphere around w. A 
counterfactual I Ƒo \ is true in world i iff there is an auxiliary premise F cotenable with I in 
world i such that I and F together logically imply \. F may be regarded as the circumstantial
modal base that is needed for the modal analysis of Huitink to work. Each counterfactual can 
be reformulated as a strict conditional along these lines, but we have a price to pay: the 
cotenable premise depends on the antecedent of the conditional. Different conditionals require
a different cotenable premise. For the same reason the circumstantial modal base cannot be 
provided by the context alone: it depends on the antecedent. If we assume that the modal base 
f(w) is just the smallest I-permitting sphere, we are back to the counterfactual analysis.
10 The terms factual/relevance conditionals are taken from Bhatt and Pancheva (2004).
Presumably, the terms go back to Iatridou (1991).
11 See Bhatt and Pancheva (2004: 37 ff.) 
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(30)
(31)
The appropriateness condition 
Let c be a context of use. Then [[ if D E]]c is only defined if c  [[ D ]]
If defined, [[ if D E]]c =[[E]] .
This trivial pragmatics makes it possible to account for the role of ‘you want’ in 
the construction. Consider example (1). D corresponds to the clause ‘if you want
to go to Harlem’. So the entire sentence can be used only in contexts where you 
want to go to Harlem. It follows that the “inner antecedent” expresses a goal of 
the subject of want. This explains the oddness of the following sentence: 
#If you don’t want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train to 
go to Harlem.
The if-antecedent tells us that the context of use implies the proposition that the 
addressee doesn’t want to go to Harlem. It would be impolite or pointless to 
utter the consequent, which contradicts the intention of the addressee. 
Returning to the first role of the if-clause, i.e. providing the antecedent for 
the ellipsis, it is instructive to note that there are other types of clauses that have 
this function. Consider the following example with a free relative clause 
containing want:
(32)
(33)
Wer schön sein will, muss leiden. 
‘Whoever wants to be beautiful has to suffer’ 
This sentence is clearly anankastic. Our analysis for anankastic conditionals 
immediately extends to it. We suggest that (32) contains an elided to-clause, and 
after ellipsis resolution corresponds to: 
Wer schön sein will, muss leiden, um schön zu sein.
‘Whoever wants to be beautiful has to suffer to be beautiful’
4.3 Comparing anankastic conditionals and would-conditionals
On hearing the term ‘counterfactual analysis’ one could think that every AC is 
expressible as a would-conditional. This, however, is not so, and this fact might
serve as an objection against our proposal. Recall, however, that the 
Stalnaker/Lewis counterfactual semantics covers both subjunctive and indicative
conditionals, though these seem to have quite different meanings. The difference 
in meaning is explained by the difference in the felicity conditions: the 
antecedent of an indicative conditional must be compatible with the common
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ground.12 Counterfactuals “carry some sort of presupposition that the antecedent 
is false” (Lewis, 1973b: 3), i.e., the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional must
be incompatible with the common ground. The ACs considered so far are 
indicative conditionals and are therefore used in contexts different from those of 
would-counterfactuals. A further distinction is that the restriction of have to is an 
infinitival. Infinitivals under modals are future oriented if they express a non-
stative Aktionsart, and to-infinitivals seem to be future oriented quite generally. 
In many respects, the logical properties of ACs are the same as those of 
Lewis’ counterfactuals. To improve readability, let us use Lewis’ notation for 
counterfactuals instead of Kratzer’s: 
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
I Ƒo\ is true in world w with respect to the ordering relation  iff 
\ holds in every -next I-world.
I ᄽo \ is true in world w with respect to the ordering relation  iff 
\ holds in some -next I-world.
Recall that the ordering relation  can be defined via an ordering source g. Let 
us denote the anankastic relation by means of the symbol żo. Our account
suggests that the two relations are the same. Indeed, neither of the two relations 
allows for strengthening of the antecedent, transitivity or contraposition. 
No strengthening of the antecedent 
(I żo\) භ ((I & F) żo\)
Consider a scenario in which it takes 3 and a half hours to get to Harlem.
Then the following argument does not hold: 
To be in Harlem before noon you have to leave at 8 a.m.
? To be in Harlem at 9 a.m. you have to leave at 8 a.m. 
Transitivity does not hold for żo either. We can show that by using Lewis’ 
examples.
Failure of transitivity 
((I żo\) & (\ żo F)) භ (I żo F)
For Otto to come to the party, Anna has to come.
For Anna to come to the party, Waldo has to come.
? For Otto to come to the party, Waldo has to come.
12 Here is a relevant quote from Stalnaker (1976) making the point clear: “It is appropriate to 
use an indicative statement or supposition only in a context which is compatible with the
antecedent.” Subjunctive conditionals, on the other hand, are argued to presuppose the falsity
of their antecedent.
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The argument is invalid for reasons similar to those given in (Lewis, 1973b:
33). Contraposition cannot hold either, as an adaptation of another example of 
Lewis shows: 
(38) Failure of contraposition
(I żo\) භ (\ żoI)
For Boris to come to the party, Olga has to come.
? For Olga not to come to the party, Boris must not come.
The invalidity of these arguments speaks in favour of the identification of the
two relations. 
However, trying to paraphrase Lewis’ standard example by an AC suggests 
that there is a real difference in truth conditions between the two constructions:
(39)
(40)
a. If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over. 
b. For kangaroos to have no tails, they have to topple over. 
Here both the antecedent and the consequent are states, and straining our 
intuitions somewhat, the second sentence may have a simultaneous 
interpretation, even a tenseless one. We have the feeling that the two mean
different things. The second sentence suggests that the habit of toppling over
might cause the state of having no tails. This is an absurd idea. Therefore (39b) 
appears either nonsensical or false. (39a) on the other hand is true. Our analysis 
cannot explain the difference. 
Let us summarize the discussion in this section. With respect to 
strengthening of the antecedent, transitivity and contraposition, the anankastic 
relation żo and the counterfactual relation Ƒo behave alike. An identification 
of the two relations could explain the behaviour. On the other hand, a plain 
modal account would have to say something about why these logical properties 
don’t hold. 
We observe, however, that would-conditionals cannot be paraphrased as 
ACs and we have to explain why this should be so. 
Differences in meaning might come from the different felicity conditions 
and the difference in temporal orientation.
So far we have been assuming that ACs are indicative conditionals and 
therefore subject to Stalnaker’s restriction. But it is not clear that indicativity is 
an essential restriction, for ACs can be put into the subjunctive: 
To go to Harlem, you would have to take the A train. 
The only important difference that might yield an explanation is the difference 
in temporal orientation. If the antecedent and the consequent of a would-
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conditional are both about the present, the antecedent will typically be true
before the consequent. For an AC, the typical temporal relation is exactly the
other way round. The internal antecedent, i.e. the to-clause, will be true after the 
consequent. This fact suffices to guarantee the difference in meaning in many 
cases.
This, however, cannot explain all weird examples. The kangaroo-example
cannot be blocked because the sentence expresses a sort of law and is therefore 
timeless. The same can be said for other laws: 
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
If the water is to boil, its temperature must be 100° Celsius. 
This is an AC. It would seem then that we need a further relation R that 
strengthens the counterfactual relation I Ƒo \. Let us therefore symbolize this 
strengthened relation in the following way: 
(I żo\): l ((I Ƒo\) & (\ R I))
The question is of course, what R could be. The first idea that comes to the mind
is that the \ R I means something like ‘\ is a means for achieving I’. But does 
this make sense? 
a. Um einen Führerschein zu haben, musst du 18 Jahre alt sein. 
‘To have a driving license, you must be 18 years old.’ 
b. Um Bundeskanzler zu sein, musst du Deutscher sein. 
‘To be the chancellor, you must be German.’ 
Being 18 years old is a precondition for having a driving license. The age alone 
is no means for getting into the possession of the license. A similar
consideration applies to (43b). So the notion “means for achieving” doesn’t
always make sense. The consequent of the AC is just a necessary condition for 
achieving the purpose expressed by the antecedent. It is no more than that. But
perhaps the anankastic relation should be defined in a stricter way. We have to
leave it as an open question here, what kind of strengthening is necessary for 
ACs, if any.
4.4 ”Contraposition” and existential conditionals 
Following Bech (1955/57), Sæbø considered a “contraposed” paraphrase to 
which we turn now: 
If you don’t take the A train, you can’t go to Harlem. 
167
von Stechow, Krasikova & Penka 
Recall that Lewis’ could-conditional is defined as the dual of the would-
conditional:
w  (I ᄽo\) iff w  (I Ƒo\)
i.e. (u  I)(v)[v w u & v  I & \], where w is comparative
similarity with respect to w 
Roughly: Simw(I)  \  
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
The formalization of (44) would therefore be the following: 
a. (you take the A train ᄽo you go to Harlem)
b. iff (you take the A train Ƒoyou go to Harlem)
Strictly speaking, (46a) is the dual of the contraposition of (3a), i.e. (46b). 
According to Bech and Sæbø, (44) means precisely the same as (3a). Under
our analysis it is only a consequence of the AC. The intuitively correct 
paraphrase of the truth conditions is this: 
There is no nearest world where you don’t take the A train but 
where you nevertheless go to Harlem. 
= The nearest non-A-train worlds are disjoint from the Harlem 
worlds
In Stalnaker/Lewis’ terms, the truth conditions should be this: 
Simw(Ow.you don’t takew the A train)  Ow.you gow to Harlem = 
In order to see that (48) is only a consequence of the anankastic must-
conditional, assume that the A-train worlds (A) intersect with the closest Harlem 
worlds (H) without including them. Furthermore, there are H-worlds closer to 
the real world than any of the H&A-worlds. This makes the can-conditional true
but falsifies the must-conditional (3). Since it is difficult to find an example of 
this kind, we leave it open whether our prediction is born out. 
4.5 Restricting the Modal Base? 
Expressing necessary conditions is a context-sensitive matter. One should speak 
of a necessary condition relativized to certain facts. The following sentence (by 
Wolfgang Klein, p.c.) illustrates this idea: 
If you want to go to Vladivostok you have to take the Chinese train. 
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Now assume the following scenario: there are two trains, the Russian train and 
the Chinese train. The Chinese one offers a much better service. For W. Klein, 
the conditional is true in this situation. But is it an AC? For Orin Percus, the 
conditional is false in the given scenario. He would have to use the modal
“should” for obtaining a true statement:
(50)
(51)
(52)
If you want to go to Vladivostok you should take the Chinese train. 
This is not an AC meaning “The only way to go to Vladivostok is to take the 
Chinese train”.
On the other hand, we obtain true anankastic conditionals if we make the 
condition „to have good service“ explicit in the antecedent: 
a. If you want to go to Vladivostok comfortably you have to 
take the Chinese train. 
b. To go to Vladivostok comfortably you have to take the 
 Chinese train.
It is an empirical question whether (49) means the same as (51a-b) in the given
scenario. If ACs were context dependent in this sense, one would have to restrict
the modal base, or strengthen the antecedent, by adding additional facts. In our 
example f(w) would contain information about your preferences, viz. that you 
travel by trains with the best service. In any case, should-conditionals are 
interpreted with respect to such a personal modal base. 
In general, the restriction of the modal base seems to be needed quite often,
and not only for should-conditionals. One can come up with scenarios where to-
infinitive constructions or can-conditionals have to be weakened in a similar
way.
Consider the following example in which the restriction is introduced 
explicitly:
To go to Harlem you have to take the A train, unless you have 
enough money for a taxi. 
The hypothetical fact introduced by the unless-clause „you don’t have enough 
money for a taxi“ restricts the modal base. It is not empty anymore but contains 
an additional antecedent. The sentence is true iff in all the next worlds, in which
you go to Harlem and don’t have enough money for a taxi, you take the A train. 
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5 Conclusion
The counterfactual analysis of ACs solves most puzzles we have encountered so 
far in connection with these constructions. We have criticized Sæbø’s 
innovation that the antecedent is added to the ordering source. We claim that it 
has to be added to the (Lewisonian) modal base, i.e. it is the antecedent of a
counterfactual. In this respect, our proposal is different from all other proposals 
in the literature. It could turn out that wishes don’t play any role at all in the
semantics of ACs. The puzzles seem to arise if one assumes that the ordering
source consists of wishes. For us, at least the primary ordering source is simply a
set of facts whose intersection is the singleton containing the world of the
context. Wishes play a pragmatic role. 
After ellipsis resolution, our analysis is entirely compositional. The role of 
the if-clause with want/be to is to introduce a felicity condition on the use of an 
AC. These modals do not contribute to the truth conditions of an AC. 
As we have mentioned above, our approach is not so different from vF&I’s 
or Huitink’s. If we make the underlying assumption that for an AC of the form
‘to M you ought \’, f(w) should be the smallest M-permitting sphere (cf. fn. 9) 
explicit and if the inner antecedent is added to f(w), the approaches become
equivalent.
Still, the role of the want in the if-clause of the AC in (1) remains somewhat
mysterious. Our proposal of analyzing the construction as a conditional speech 
act is certainly open to criticism, because it doesn’t meet the usual syntactic tests 
for these constructions. 
If the criticism put forward in the recent literature is warranted, Sæbø’s 
innovation is not tenable, but the increasing interest in the subject demonstrates
the fruitfulness of his proposal. 
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Abstract
This study divides the Norwegian progressive forms into two groups 
according to the Aktionsart they combine with. In one group the forms 
predominantly combine with atelic predicates. They yield an 
interpretation similar to that normally ascribed to English progressive 
atelic sentences. In the other group the forms combine with telic 
predicates. These forms refer to a period prior to the end point described 
by the main verb. In this paper the distributional restrictions are 
correlated with the differences in meaning between the two groups. The 
forms’ distribution and semantics are furthermore related to their low 
degree of grammaticalization. 
1 Introduction
In the present paper I report from a corpus study of the Norwegian pre-
grammaticalized progressive forms. The study reveals patterns and properties of 
these forms that are novel compared to well-studied aspectual systems, such as 
the system of English and the Romance languages.  
The forms and meanings of the Norwegian progressives are here presented 
with a small set of examples drawn from the corpus (see list of sources). The 
study shows that the progressives should be grouped into two subgroups, 
according to their combinatorial and semantic properties. The two groups of 
progressives are described in some detail. The Norwegian forms are furthermore 
contrasted with the English progressive. Similarities and differences in the role 
of the simple verb form of the two languages are elucidated, and related to the 
differences of the progressives in the two languages. Finally, the Norwegian 
progressives’ level of grammaticalization is discussed and connected to their 
distribution and meaning. In this paper I recapitulate only the main points from 
my corpus study. See Tonne (2001) for further details, and for a proposal for a 
formal semantic analysis. 
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2 Singling out the Norwegian Progressives 
The Norwegian Reference Grammar (Faarlund, Lie and Vannebo 1997) divides 
the Norwegian progressive forms into several types according to differences in
aspectual meaning. Here, I delimit the investigation to two of these groups. One 
group consists of a variety of forms often called "pseudocoordination" (e.g. 
Johannessen 1998) due to their apparent coordinated structure (with the 
conjunction og). They nevertheless have many syntactic properties that are 
typical of subordination. Pseudocoordinations are held to have a process 
meaning, they describe a situation as extended in time without any delimitation,
where the agent is in the midst of the described situation. There are some
conditions on the use of the pseudocoordinations, or at least a tendency in the 
way they are used. For example, the subject referent must be such that it can 
serve as the subject of posture verbs like ligge ('lie') and sitte ('sit'). Furthermore,
the forms are less frequent in formal than in colloquial contexts (Tonne 2001).
These tendencies of use are correlated with the forms' degree of 
grammaticalization, discussed in section 5.
Examples of pseudocoordination are given in the a-sentences in (1) and (2) 
below. The b-sentences show their simple verb counterparts, which have an 
ambiguous interpretation with regard to aspect, as reflected in the English 
translations:
(1)
(2)
a. Barna satt og leste. 
children-the sat and read 
'The children were reading.'
b. Barna leste.
 children-the read
 'The children read/were reading.' 
a. Ungene dreiv og samla sammen papir og 
kids-the DRIVE-PAST OG collected together paper and
treull ...
 wood-wool 
'The boys were gathering up the paper and string …'
b. Ungene samla sammen papir og treull ... 
kids-the collected together paper and wood-wool 
'The boys were gathering up/gathered up paper and string ...' 
(3) below is a further example from the corpus, showing the use of the
pesudocoordination as a background type of information, a typical use of an 
imperfective form:
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(3)
(4)
(5)
De tre satt og drakk kaffe da skjelvet fikk huset til 
the three sat and drank coffee when quake-the got house-the to 
å rase sammen.
INF-MARKER slid together 
'The three of them were drinking coffee when the quake made the
house fall down.'
The forms of the other group of progressives, that I here call the prospec group,
do not include the conjunction og. Examples of these forms are shown in (4) - 
(6) below:
a. Han holdt på å dø. 
he HPÅ die
 'He was dying.'
b. Han døde.
 'He died.'
a. Han var i ferd med å frakte materialene opp til balkongen ... 
he was IFMÅ carry materials-the up to balcony-the 
 'He was carrying / was about to carry the material up to the 
 balcony …'
b. Han fraktet materialene opp til balkongen ... 
'He carried the material up to the balcony ...'
(6) a. Disse var på vei til å bli blant byens verste forbrytere. 
These were PVTÅ become among town's worst criminals
'These were about to become some of the worst criminals in 
 town.' 
b. Disse ble blant byens verste forbrytere. 
These became some of the worst criminals in town. 
The main word of each periphrastic progressive form in this group is a word 
that, when used in other contexts, either describes continuity (the verb which 
means 'hold', see example (4) above), movement (the noun which means 
'journey', see example (5)) or path (the noun which means 'way', see example
(6)). They include prepositions (på ('on'), med ('with') and til ('to'), and an 
infinitival structure that carries the main lexical content of the sentence. The 
members of this group are held to have two types of imperfective meanings (see 
e.g. Faarlund et al. 1997), reflected in the translation of (5a) above. Either the 
interpretation appears to be similar to that of the pseudocoordination, i.e. the 
subject referent is in the midst of a situation, or the interpretation is that the 
subject referent is in progress towards a point of change of state that is described
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by the infinitival structure. In the latter case, they have what here will be called a 
prospective reading; that is, the subject referent "looks" ahead towards a certain
point. I claim, however, as will be seen in the discussion of the distributional
pattern, that this latter reading, the prospective reading, is the only reading for 
the prospec group. I hold that the important information carried by the forms is 
that there is an orientation towards the mentioned point. 
In the set of extracted occurrences of the progressives, I found a pattern: the 
pseudocoordinations, exemplified in (1)-(3) above, combine almost exclusively 
with atelic predicates. The atelic predicates are mostly activities, like those we 
see in the examples (1)-(3), but there are also combinations with various types of 
statives, like the one we see in (7): 
(7)
(8)
Jeg satt som sagt og var fascinert av det yrende vinduslivet 
I sat as said and was fascinated of the teeming window-life-the
'As I mentioned, I was observing with fascination the teeming life 
in my window'
The prospec forms, on the other hand, exemplified in (4)-(6) above, almost
exclusively combine with telic predicates, i.e. accomplishments and 
achievements. The prospec forms are not well-formed with statives: 
#Nicolas var i ferd med å sitte ved bordet. 
N. was IFMÅ sit by table-the 
The degree to which the mentioned distributional pattern holds is overwhelming;
more than 95% of the pseudo forms occur with atelic predicates, and more than 
95% of the prospec forms extracted are combinations with telic predicates.
Some so-called activities are ambiguous between an activity and 
accomplishment reading (e.g. modne ('ripen') and utvide ('expand')), and others 
still are ambiguous between activities and ingressives (i.e. a kind of change of 
state into an activity, therefore differing from activities, e.g. le ('laugh'), smile
('smile'), see also Santos 1996 and what she calls "acquisitions"). Interestingly,
these are the few cases of activities that are found to combine with the forms in 
the prospec group (see example (12) below).
My corpus confirms the widely held view about divergence in imperfective
meanings between the two groups of progressives in Norwegian. Importantly,
the new insight drawn from my corpus study, is that such a difference in 
meaning corresponds closely with the difference in distribution. The prospec 
forms need a point towards which they are oriented. I therefore claim that the 
prospec forms have one interpretation, i.e. the prospective interpretation, and do 
not have the option of a process interpretation. The understanding that the 
prospec forms in some cases may have either a process reading or a prospective 
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reading, I hold to be due to vagueness (with regard to the start of the event), not 
ambiguity. The difference I then take to lie within the same, prospective, 
meaning. This explains the impossibility of combining a prospec form with a
stative predicate: The lack of a point towards which it can be oriented makes the
result impossible to interpret. 
3 Contrasting the Norwegian Progressives 
In addition to the monolingual study described above, I have undertaken a 
Norwegian-English contrastive study, by way of investigating a parallel corpus. 
The study consists of Norwegian original texts compared with their English 
authentic translations, as well as English original texts compared with their 
Norwegian authentic translations. The goal set for the contrastive study was to 
gain a better understanding of the meaning and extension of the relatively 
unknown Norwegian forms by way of a contrast with a well studied aspectual 
form like the English progressive.
3.1 The Pseudo Group and the English Progressive 
The contrastive study shows that there is an overlap between pseudo-
coordination and the progressive in English. However, the Norwegian pseudo-
coordination is more often translated with an English progressive than the other 
way round. The progressive in English is used as translation of the Norwegian 
pseudocoordination in as much as 50% of the cases. (2), repeated here, is one 
example of such a translation pair: 
(2) Ungene dreiv og samla sammen papir og treull ... 
kids-the DRIVE-PAST OG collected together paper and wood-
wool
(2') The boys were gathering up the paper and string and cardboard 
boxes ...
The pseudocoordination is found as a translation of the progressive only in 11%
of the cases. In the vast amount of the cases where the English progressive is not 
translated by a Norwegian pseudocoordination, the translator has chosen a 
simple verb form in Norwegian. An example is seen in (9):
(9) all the streams of the forest were tinkling happily
(9') alle bekker klukket og lo 
all streams gurgled and laughed 
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The reason for not choosing pseudocoordination in the Norwegian translation 
may be related to the conditions on its use, mentioned above. The subject would 
be odd for a posture verb, in the imagined case where a pseudocoordination 
were forced as translation.
The study furthermore shows that many of the English progressives in the 
translation of the Norwegian texts stem from a simple verb form in the
Norwegian original, like we see in (10): 
(10) Kjerringa ... gikk langsomt hjemover med kørja på armen ... 
woman-the walked slowly home-wards with basket on arm-the
(10') Mrs. Pepperpot ... was walking slowly home with her basket on her
arm ...
A detailed study of the concordances of the English original texts with 
Norwegian translations shows that several of the pseudocoordinations stem from 
a locative or postural expression in the English original, like in (11): 
(11) Piglet was lying on his back, sleeping peacefully. 
(11') Nøff lå på ryggen og sov trygt.
N. lay on back-the and slept safely 
In general, one can observe how the specific meaning of the Norwegian pseudo-
coordination restricts the contexts in which it is used. When going from a 
progressive to the posture-sensitive pseudocoordination, information about 
posture and position, if not included in the English original, must be added. If it 
is difficult to deduce such posture information from the context, pseudo-
coordination is not chosen in the translation. The relatively specific posture or 
locative meaning of pseudocoordination restricts its distribution compared to the 
English progressive, but gives it a match in other types of locative constructions 
like we see in (11) above. The progressive in English, which has no restrictions 
with regard to information about location or posture, and no restriction 
connected to colloquial context, is therefore more frequent than the Norwegian
pseudocoordination.1
3.2 The Prospec Group and the English Progressive 
The difference in frequency between the Norwegian prospec forms and the 
English progressive is also rather great. In the corpus, there are a total of 2570 
1 The frequency of the English progressive found here in this study confirms the figures in 
Biber et al. (1999). 
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occurrences of the English progressive, whereas there is a total of 170 
occurrences of the Norwegian prospec forms. The restricted distribution of the 
prospec forms is due to their limited Aktionsart-combinatorial possibilities, as 
revealed in the monolingual study. The prospec forms never combine with 
statives, and usually do not combine with activities. The few activity 
combinations found describe a period prior to the start of the activity. (12) is an 
example from the (monolingual) corpus: 
(12)
(13)
Også jeg var i ferd med å danse. Jeg kjente den gamle lengselen i
also I was IFMÅ dance. I felt the old longing-the in 
meg.
me
'I was about to dance, too. I felt the old longing inside.'
For an activity verb like dance with a progressive in English, we therefore do 
not get a direct translation into a Norwegian sentence with a prospec form,
illustrated in (13): 
He was dancing. zHan var i ferd med å danse. 
The contrastive study shows a low degree of match between the English 
progressive and the Norwegian prospec forms. Like we saw with the pseudo 
group, the prospective forms find an English progressive match much more
often than the other way round. Only 2.2% of the English progressives in the 
corpus have a Norwegian prospective correspondence in the authentic 
translations. 30-40% of the Norwegian prospectives found in the corpus, on the
other hand, correspond to an English progressive. The incompatibility of the two 
expressions in (13) is part of the explanation of the modest match between the 
English progressive and the Norwegian prospec forms. The matches that are
found, involve accomplishments and achievements.
The English progressives that are combined with accomplishments (e.g. He
was eating an apple) get an interpretation where the subject referent is in the
midst of the accomplishment event. A Norwegian counterpart with a prospec
form gets a prospective interpretation. The orientation towards a point in such a 
prospective interpretation means that the described period is prior to the end 
point, i.e. most likely within the accomplishment event itself. The vagueness 
mentioned earlier with regard to the understanding of these prospective-
accomplishment combinations, refers to whether there is a possibility that the 
period described is prior also to the starting point of the accomplishment event. 
As mentioned, I believe that this question is a matter of vagueness, the important
thing being that the described period lies before the end point of the accomplish-
ment event. But since it is likely that such a period lies within the accomplish-
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ment event itself, we may say that the Norwegian prospec-accomplishment
means more or less the same as the English progressive- accomplishment:
(14)
(15)
(16)
He was eating an apple. |Han var i ferd med å spise et eple.
When the progressive in English is combined with an achievement (e.g. He was 
reaching the top), the interpretation of the English sentence is prospective, and a 
Norwegian prospec form suits perfectly as a translation:
He was reaching the top. = Han var i ferd med å nå toppen. 
In accordance with (15), I found in the parallel study that progressive 
achievements in English are often translated by a form from the prospec group,
as in the parallel example shown below: 
But now I daren't, because my conscience is killing me. 
(16') Men nå våger jeg ikke det, fordi samvittigheten min holder på å ta 
but now dare I not that because conscience-the mine HPÅ take 
  life-the of me
livet av meg.
3.3 Summing up the Contrastive Study 
In the contrastive study it is found that the progressive in English is far more
frequent than the Norwegian pseudo and prospec forms. Furthermore, the simple
verb form in Norwegian is often translated into the English progressive, and the
English progressive is often translated into a Norwegian simple verb form. For 
the English progressive to be translated into a Norwegian pseudocoordination, it 
must be an activity and include information about place or posture. When a 
pseudocoordination is used in Norwegian, it corresponds felicitously with the
English progressive. An English progressive achievement has the same 
interpretation (i.e. prospective) as the corresponding Norwegian prospec 
achievement. An English progressive accomplishment has approximately the 
same interpretation as the corresponding Norwegian prospec accomplishment.
Finally, an English progressive activity does not have the same interpretation as 
the corresponding Norwegian prospec activity.
This study of the correlation between the Norwegian forms and the English
progressive partly confirms and partly complements other contrastive 
investigations. Nordset (1996), for example, investigates the Norwegian 
translation equivalents of the English progressive. Some of the generalizations I 
find in my study are not recognized by Nordset (1996), however. She shows that 
54.9% of the "double-verb" constructions (i.e. all the progressive forms) are 
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combinations with activity predicates, 32.4% are combinations with 
accomplishments and 11.3% are combinations with achievements. The 
generalization is missed that the pseudocoordinations and the prospec forms are 
close to having a complementary distribution with regard to Aktionsart.
Since the simple verb form is more frequent in Norwegian than in English,
the roles played by the progressive forms are correspondingly different (viz. 
'grammaticalization of zero', Bybee 1994). In the following I look more into the
role of the simple verb form and how it interacts with the progressive forms.
4 The simple verb form and its interaction with the progressive 
In English the verbal suffix -ed in the simple verb form means past. Often, like 
with entered, it also has perfective meaning, but at other times, like with the 
verb lived, it does not, it rather has an imperfective meaning (see e.g. Boogaart 
1999). The simple verb form is used for both perfective and imperfective
meaning in Norwegian, too. But the simple verb in Norwegian can have an 
imperfective meaning even with non-stative verbs, for instance lese ('read').
Imperfectivity by way of pseudocoordination was expressed with this verb in the
Norwegian sentence (1a), and imperfectivity by way of a simple form was 
shown in (1b) (as one of its aspectual interpretations), and is also seen in the
small discourse in (17):
(17) Barna leste da jeg kom inn. 
children-the read when I came in
'The children read/were reading when I entered.'
When the context does not explicitly say otherwise, the first part of (17) conveys 
imperfective meaning. This contrasts with English. The children read has 
(unambiguous) perfective meaning, and needs an immediate context which
matches this reading, for example a direct object, or a subordinate sentence like 
when I entered in (17). Barna leste, in (17), may also have perfective meaning in 
Norwegian. Given the right context, (17) can mean that the children started to
read when I entered, i.e. have an ingressive type of meaning (recall the 
"acquisitions" mentioned earlier). Hence, the Norwegian sentence (17) with a 
simple verb form is ambiguous with regard to aspectuality.
Not only simple verb activities are ambiguous in Norwegian. Barna leste en
bok in (18) below is an accomplishment (i.e. telic) due to the direct object
(compare with (17)), but an interpretation similar to that of (17) is still possible: 
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(18) Barna leste en bok da jeg kom inn. 
children-the read a book when I came in 
'The children read/were reading a book when I entered.'
The English translation reflects the ambiguity of the Norwegian sentence (18); it 
may mean that the children were already reading a book when I entered, or it 
may mean that they started to read a book when I entered, depending on the 
context. In contrast, the English simple verb counterpart to (18) has only the 
latter, perfective, interpretation. 
We see that the lack of imperfectivity/progressive-marking in a sentence has
different implications in English and Norwegian. In different ways in the two 
languages, verb-grammatical marking interacts with other parts of the sentence, 
like the lexical semantics of the verb and the arguments. Depending on the
nature of this interaction, we get a final aspectuality interpretation of the 
sentence.
An important function of the progressive forms in Norwegian is to 
disambiguate aspectually ambiguous predicates, selecting the imperfective
reading. With the “extreme” Aktionsarten, the aspectuality is clear, that is, a
Norwegian simple verb achievement sentence is unambiguously perfective, and 
a Norwegian stative simple verb sentence is unambiguously imperfective.
However, around the telic/atelic borderline, i.e. the border between 
accomplishments and activities, the aspectuality is ambiguous. By invoking a 
progressive marker, the aspectual interpretation of such an utterance becomes
unambiguously imperfective.
A great part of previous work on these Norwegian forms is concerned with 
their grammaticalization status. The study of their degree of grammaticalization 
furthermore reveals additional information about their form and meaning. In the 
following I discuss some of the grammaticalization issues that are relevant for 
the Norwegian forms.
5 The Grammaticalization Status of the Norwegian Progressives 
In the literature, the Norwegian progressive forms are claimed to be pre-
grammaticalized. They are not pure function words, void of descriptive, lexical 
content. Yet, the form-bits are stripped of some of their normal descriptive 
meaning. A case in point is (1a) in the beginning of this paper. For (1a) to be
true, not only must the children be reading, but they must also be sitting. But the
verb satt is not the main content word in (1a), leste ('read') is. Andersson (1979) 
notes both similarities and differences between the pseudocoordination and 
auxiliary constructions, indicating the intermediate grammaticalization position 
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of the pseudocoordination.2 Similarly, Digranes (2000: 206) concludes in her 
study of the grammaticalization of the pseudocoordination in Norwegian that on 
a grammaticalization scale, it falls in the middle between the two extreme points 
(totally lexical and totally grammatical). Hence she considers it somewhat, but 
not fully, grammaticalized.
Even less of the original lexical meaning remains in the other Norwegian
progressives, the prospec forms, exemplified in (4)-(6). For these, the agent is 
not usually in a concrete sense on a journey, say, or physically holding 
something. Rather, the nouns ferd ('journey'), vei ('way', 'road') and the verb 
holde ('hold') are used in an abstract sense. They are also not fully 
grammaticalized; they are much less frequent than the English progressive, and 
they, too, overlap in meaning with the simple verb form.3
As mentioned, the relatively low frequency of each of the Norwegian 
progressive forms is connected to there being restrictions on their use and 
therefore also connected to their grammaticalization status. The posture verbs of 
the pseudocoordinations are not pure function words, and therefore their 
semantics restricts the usage. They are also less frequent in formal than 
colloquial contexts (although this distributional pattern is not found to be 
connected to any linguistic feature of the forms). Furthermore, as has been 
emphasized here, all the forms are almost complementary distributed according 
to Aktionsart.
The low degree of grammaticalization of the forms gives us new insight into
the various aspects of imperfectivity and progressive meaning. For, as one often 
finds with pre-grammaticalized forms (see Ebert 2000), the Norwegian forms
make up a set of several forms. The two groups split between them the pool of 
sentences to which they can combine. These combinatorial restrictions are 
correlated with differences in meaning between the two groups, namely a 
process meaning and a prospective meaning. It is possible to tease apart these
two progressive meaning facets due to the progressives’ difference in
combinatorial possibilities.
6 Conclusion
The corpus study discussed here has shown that there is a division of labor 
among the Norwegian progressive forms, in terms of what Aktionsart they 
combine with. The "pseudo group", consisting of various instantiations of
pseudocoordination, preferably combines with atelic predicates, mostly 
2 He studies the Swedish pseudocoordination, which is very similar to the Norwegian. 
3 For additional details about the grammaticalization status of the Norwegian progressives, 
and a related discussion of the comparison between the Norwegian pseudocoordination and 
the Spanish progressive, see Tonne (1999). 
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activities. On the other hand, the "prospec group", for example the i ferd med å-
construction, mostly combine with telic predicates. The combinatorial
restrictions of the forms are found to be connected to a difference in meaning. 
Atelic predicates do not have an inherent end point, but the telic predicates do. 
The pseudo group of progressive forms does not need an end point for their
interpretation, while the prospec progressives do.
The pseudo group consistently conveys a "process interpretation" (in the
midst of the main verb event) while the forms in the prospec group may be 
vague with regard to the start of the event. The common denominator for the 
interpretation of the prospec group is that they have a prospective interpretation 
with regard to a point, or culmination, of the main verb event.
The simple verb form in Norwegian is often aspectually ambiguous. An 
important effect of the progressive forms in Norwegian is that they disambiguate
aspectually ambiguous predicates in the imperfective direction.
To sum up, the pervasiveness of "ambiguous aspect" with the simple verb 
form, the progressives' division of labor correlated with different meaning facets 
are all shown here to be distinct properties of an aspectual system like the
Norwegian.
The reported study may throw new light on the phenomenology and theory 
of aspectuality as known primarily from studies of English. For example, the
study of the prospective achievements in Norwegian suggests no process 
reading, but rather a prospective interpretation with regard to the end, or 
culmination, of the main verb event. Such information may support and extend 
general theories of aspectuality, especially those concerned with the interaction 
between progressive forms and Aktionsarten.
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Abstract
In Classical Greek, complex determiner phrases may be formed in 
various ways. From a semantic point of view, the different formal 
patterns seem not to be associated with differences in meaning; in 
traditional grammars they are all claimed to be equally grammatical and 
equally definite. The distribution of the varieties of complex DP in 
discourse has not been studied in detail. In this paper I will discuss the 
combination of a noun with a modifying adjective. I will investigate the 
various patterns from semantic, pragmatic and, to a certain extent, 
syntactic points of view. I conclude that the possible configurations are 
semantically equivalent, but sensitive to information structure, both 
within the clause and in the larger context. 
1 Definiteness in Classical Greek 
The definite determiner of Classical Greek developed from the well-known 
Indo-European demonstrative pronoun *so-/to-. This process of semantic and 
pragmatic function change has been documented for many other languages, e.g. 
German and the Romance languages (Lyons 1999). In Classical Greek, this 
development took place between the writing down of the Homeric epics, the 
Iliad and the Odyssey (ca. 700 BCE) and the beginning of the Classical period 
(500-300 BCE). There are some indications of an emerging definite determiner 
already in Homer, but it is only in the prose literature of the fifth and fourth 
centuries that we may observe the full extension of the system. 
The definite determiner attaches to its NP as a proclitic and agrees with it in 
number and case. Clitics of different types, such as sentence particles, may 
intervene between the determiner and its noun complement. In the case of a 
complex NP, there are several possible ways of attaching the determiner (1a-e): 
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(1)
(2)
a. ho agathos anêr (Determiner-Adjective-Noun = DAN) 
 ‘The good man’
b. ho anêr ho agathos (DNDA) 
c. anêr ho agathos (NDA) 
d. agathos ho anêr (ADN) 
e. ho anêr agathos (DNA) 
The patterns documented in (1) are divided by traditional school grammar into 
two main groups. In (1a-c), the adjective is said to stand in an attributive relation 
to the noun, while in (1d-e), it is said to be used predicatively.1 In the following 
discussion we will be concerned with the first three patterns, and more
specifically with (1c). It should be noted at the outset that while (1c) may give 
the impression of being more intimately related to (1a), the only difference 
being whether the noun precedes or follows the determiner-adjective complex,
the expected variant of (1b), *ho agathos ho anêr (DADN) is not found in 
Classical Greek texts.
2 Pragmatic roles and information structure 
Since we are interested in the possible differences in pragmatic function 
between the various configurations of the complex DP in Greek, we must
outline a model of information structure. We claim, following Kruijff-
Korbayová and Steedman (2003), that information structure is best understood 
by assuming that it consists of two interacting parameters, viz. theme-rheme (or 
topic-comment) and focus-presupposition. The parameters interact in the 
following manner (Kruijff-Korbayová and Steedman 2003: 251): 
[Theme   ][Rheme   ] 
 [[Focus] [Presupposition][Focus] [Presupposition ]]
According to (2), both theme and rheme may contain focussed elements.
Because of a more general principle of informativity, the rheme must contain a 
focussed element. When the theme contains a focus as well, the result is a 
contrastive theme (cf. also Büring 2003). When the focus is co-extensive with 
the rheme, we have ‘broad’ or ‘informational’ focus. When the focus domain is 
smaller than the rheme domain, we have ‘narrow’ focus. 
Following Rooth’s (1992) alternative semantics account of focus 
interpretation, we derive the meaning nuances associated with focus expressions 
1 The term ‘predicatively’ as used within Classical Philology includes both primary and 
secondary predication: ho anêr agathos ‘the man is good’, a complete sentence, vs. ho anêr 
agathos ‘the man, if/since/when he is good…’, a sentence fragment requiring a finite verb. 
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(‘counter-assertive focus’, ‘exhaustive listing focus’, etc.) from the interaction of 
the focus expression with the larger context.2
The definition of theme and rheme is a more tricky business. It seems clear 
that in order to function as theme, a linguistic expression must refer to a specific, 
already established discourse referent (cf. Karttunen 1976 for discourse
referents). Whether it must also refer uniquely to this referent, is not quite clear
(cf. Dyvik 1979 on the referential properties of NPs in Old Norse and Modern 
Norwegian and Kiss 2002: 11 on specific indefinite topics in Hungarian). In 
general, specific indefinites may not replace definite NPs or anaphoric pronouns, 
cf. ‘I saw a dog yesterday. It/the dog/*a dog tried to bite me.’
Below, we will approach the main question of the paper by a somewhat 
circuitous route. First, we will take a look at the use of the definite article with
proper names in an attempt to separate the pragmatic use of the determiner from 
its semantic core meaning. After that, we will return to the question of the
semantics and pragmatics of complex DPs. 
3 The definite determiner with proper names 
A clear example of a pragmatic use of the definite determiner in Classical Greek
is its use with proper names.3 If proper names are taken to refer to unique
individuals, they must by definition always be definite from a semantic point of 
view. Hence, the determiner would seem to be superfluous. In a context which 
involves several people who have the same name, the semantic interpretation of 
the definite determiner as denoting a uniquely identifiable referent, would 
predict that it should in fact be disallowed. Consequently, the function of the
determiner with proper names cannot be to identify a referent for the name to the
exclusion of other possible candidates. Alternatively, we may take the 
determiner to indicate that the person referred to with the name is already 
established as a discourse referent. The meaning of the name ho Kuros would
then be something along the lines of ‘the aforementioned Kyros’.
This does not seem, however, to be the case generally, cf. example (3):4
2 We believe this to be basically right, although languages may grammaticalize focus variants 
in various ways, cf. e.g. É Kiss (1998). 
3 In contrast to the usage in Modern Greek, where the determiner is obligatory with proper
names (Lyons 1999:121, Holton et al. 2002:278), such names often occur without a 
determiner in Classical Greek texts. Cf. also the paper by Janne Bondi Johannessen in this 
volume.
4 In the Greek examples the following abbreviations are used: The cases are nominative (N), 
accusative (A), genitive (G) and dative (D); the numbers are singular (SG) and plural (PL); 
the tenses are present (PR), imperfect (IM), aorist (AO) and future (FUT). Relative pronouns 
are glossed as REL, infinitives as INF and, finally, particles as PART. I have glossed 
participles with English participle forms, although they do not match in every detail. For
proper names, I only note the case, not the number, which is in all cases singular. 
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Dareiou kai Parusatidos gignontai paides duo, presbuteros men 
Dar-G and Par-G become-PR3PL children-NPL two, older-NSG PART
Artaxerxes, neôteres de Kuros. … epei de eteleutêse Dareios kai 
Art-N younger-NSG PART Kur-N…when PART die-AO3SG Dar-N and
katestê eis tên basileian Artaxerxes…
establish-AO3SG to the kingdom Art-N
‘Darius and Parysatis had two sons born to them, of whom the elder 
was Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus. … When Darius had died 
and Artaxerxes had become established as a king...’ (Xenophon, 
Anabasis I.1.1-3, trans. Brownson/Dillery) 
(3)
(4)
(5)
The first sentence introduces the king of Persia, Darius, his queen and their two 
sons. In the temporal clause which follows shortly after the names of the king 
and his eldest son are not provided with a definite determiner even though the
first sentence clearly establishes them as discourse referents. Now compare the 
following example, from the same context: 
Tissaphernes diaballei ton Kuron pros ton adelphon hôs 
Tis-N attack-PR3SG the Kur-N to the brother-ASG that
epibouleuei autôi
plot-PR3SG him-DSG
‘Tissaphernes falsely accused Kyros to his brother of plotting
against him.’ (Xenophon, Anabasis I.1.3, trans. Brownson/Dillery)
Here the name Cyrus occurs with the definite determiner, while Tissaphernes,
who was introduced as the end of the preceding paragraph, does not. Does the 
determiner then indicate some kind of contrast, e.g. between Cyrus and his
brother? The following example contains a pair of contrastive topics which 
show this not to be the case: 
ho men oun presbuteros parôn etugkhane. Kuron
the PART PART elder-NSG being-present-NSG happen-IM3SG. Kur-ASG
de metapempetai apo tês arkhês hês auton satrapên
PART summon-PR3SG from the province REL-G him satrap 
epoiêse.
make-AO3SG
‘The elder, as it chanced, was with him already; but Cyrus he 
summoned from the province over which he had made him satrap.’ 
(Xenophon, Anabasis I.1.2, trans. Brownson/Dillery) 
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Here there is an explicit contrast between Artaxerxes, the elder brother, and 
Cyrus. As we have seen, Cyrus has already been established as a discourse
referent, but neither this fact nor the contrast is apparently enough to make the 
determiner obligatory. 
The determiner frequently, though not universally, occurs with proper
names when there is a shift of grammatical subject: 
en Milêtôi de Tissaphernes proaisthomenos ta auta tauta
in Mil-DSG PART Tis-NSG finding-out-before-NSG the same those
bouleuomenous apostênai pros Kuron, tous men autôn apekteine, 
plan-APL desert-INF to Kur-N, some PART of-them kill-AO3SG,
tous d’ exebalen. 
some PART expel-AO3SG
Ho de Kuros hupolabôn tous pheugontas sullexas strateuma 
the PART Kur-N protecting-NSG the fleeing-APL collecting-NSG army
epoliorkei Milêton…
besiege-IM3SG Mil-ASG
‘The people of Miletus also were planning to do the very same 
thing, namely, to go over to Cyrus, but Tissaphernes, finding out 
about it in time, put some of them to death and banished others. 
Cyrus thereupon took the exiles under his protection, collected an 
army, and laid siege to Miletus…’ (Xenophon, Anabasis I.1.7, 
trans. Brownson/Dillery)
(6)
(7)
In this example, the transition from Tissaphernes to Cyrus as grammatical 
subject/sentence topic is accompanied by the occurrence of the determiner on 
the new subject. This is, however, not always the case, and the name which
receives the determiner is frequently not the grammatical subject. In example (4) 
given above, Cyrus is the direct object of the verb diaballein ‘falsely accuse’, 
and the object stays in postverbal position. Accordingly, it is difficult to construe
it as the theme, which usually comes first in the sentence. The same goes for the 
following example: 
Parusatis men dê hê meter hupêrkhe tôi Kurôi…
Par-N PART PART the mother-NSG support-IM3SG the Kur-D
‘Parysatis, his mother, supported Cyrus’ (Xenophon, Anabasis
I.1.4, my translation) 
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Here Cyrus’s mother, Parysatis, is the subject, while Cyrus again occurs
postverbally. Interestingly, Brownson/Dillery in their translation make Cyrus the
topic as well as the subject: ‘He had …the support of Parysatis, his mother…’ 
Hence we may perhaps take the function of the determiner here to be to indicate 
the discourse topic: Cyrus’ plans to revolt against his brother are the subject of
the paragraph which example (7) is taken from, and Cyrus is the subject of the 
sentences which precede and follow the example sentence. The main 
participants in this story are the brothers Artaxerxes and Cyrus. Perhaps the
determiner is used with his name to indicate that while Parysatis is the
grammatical subject of the sentence, Cyrus is the underlying theme. 
Consequently, the main point of example (7) is not that Parysatis supported her 
son Cyrus, but that he received the support of his mother.
As we have seen, it is difficult to draw general conclusions about the
function of the definite determiner with proper names. We might follow Dyvik’s 
(1979) lead and assume that for proper names in Classical Greek, non-use of the
determiner is the unmarked option, in contrast to Modern Greek. It may also be 
that the determiner indicates the discourse topic. Is it possible to identify a
comparable effect with complex DPs? More specifically, does the difference 
between the two patterns DNDA and NDA boil down to a difference with regard 
to informational status in the discourse? I will return to this problem in section 7 
below.
4 The scope of the definite determiner 
In complex DPs in English, the determiner has scope over the entire NP. This is 
clearly seen in examples like ‘the black cat’, ‘the tiny, old woman’, etc. From a 
semantic point of view, the noun and the adjective are put together first, and 
then the determiner is applied to the NP ‘black cat’ as a whole. Alternative 
orders of composition produce ungrammatical results as ‘a cat the black’, ‘the 
cat black’, etc. 
As shown above, there exist several possible orders for complex DPs in 
Greek. The one resembling the English pattern most closely is the order 
Determiner-Adjective-Noun (DAN). Because of the superficial similarity of
these patterns in the two languages, we tend to interpret the Greek DP as 
equivalent to the English one in its semantics as well as in linearity. That is, we
quietly assume that the determiner in Greek projects definiteness over the entire 
NP.
This assumption is problematic for two reasons. The first concerns the 
possibility of marking definiteness explicitly for the whole NP. As we have seen
in example (1), postnominal attributive adjectives must be marked for 
definiteness separately from their nouns: ho anêr ho agathos ‘the good man’.
This fact seems to indicate that the scope of the determiner goes no further than 
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to the noun and has to be extended by the introduction of another determiner.
This is in fact the case for every additional postnominal adjective: the
determiner must be repeated for each one. Secondly, if the pattern NDA anêr ho 
agathos is interpreted as equivalent to its English translation ‘the good man’, 
then the determiner must project its definiteness upwards from the adjective to 
scope over the noun as well.5
5 Semantics of the definite determiner with complex NPs 
The following discussion of the various patterns of complex DPs consisting of a 
noun and a modifying adjective will concern the configurations (1a-c) as 
exemplified above. My explanation is couched in terms of a compositional
semantics for the complex DPs and on general considerations of economy in the 
marking of dependencies within the DP. 
In an intensional semantics, adjectives are taken to denote functions which 
map properties onto referents which have the relevant properties. Thus ‘red’ 
denotes a function which, when applied to an argument, gives as its value a 
referent which has the property ‘red’, as e.g. ‘red car’. (With an intersective 
adjective like ‘red’, we could use an extensional semantics without running into
trouble. The above formulation would then be equivalent to saying that ‘red car’ 
denotes the intersection of the sets denoted by ‘red’ and ‘car’.) 
The definite determiner, on the other hand, denotes a function which maps 
its argument onto the singleton set containing the only referent which has the 
relevant property. In the case of a complex property like ‘red car’, ‘the red car’ 
denotes the intersection of ‘red’ and ‘car’ only if it contains exactly one 
member.
Let us try on the basis of these definitions of the semantics of the parts to 
analyse the composition of the various orders of the complex DP in Greek. We
will begin with the configuration which resembles English most closely, viz. 
DAN ho agathos anêr ‘the good man’. We start by applying the function 
agathos to its argument anêr. This gives us the common NP ‘good man’ which 
as mentioned above denotes a function. We let this function be the argument of 
the definite determiner ho (formally nominative masculine singular). As in our 
English example ‘the red car’, we end up with the DP ‘the good man’. For a 
proposition containing this phrase to be true, it is at least necessary that there is 
only one referent which is both a man and good in the relevant model.
If we move on to the configuration DNDA, we first apply the adjective to 
the determiner. For ‘the good man’ this means that we apply ‘good’ to ‘the’. An 
expression such as ‘the good’ is ambiguous in Greek. On the one hand, it may 
5 I will not attempt a syntactic explanation for this here, but cf. the discussion of this pattern in
section 7 below. 
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mean that the property denoted by the adjective picks out a set which has only 
one member. On the other, the adjective may be taken as a null head modifier as 
noted by Devine and Stephens (2000: 228ff.). In this sense, the adjective picks 
out a contextually given referent which has the property in question. The 
adjective introduces a variable which is bound by any referent which satisfies 
the conditions inherent in the semantics of the adjective. In our case, the binding 
takes place at the next stage of composition, namely, when the function ‘the 
good (one)’ is applied to the argument ‘man’. We now have ‘man the good 
(one)’. The function picks out the intersection between the set denoted by 
‘good’, a contextually given referent and the set denoted by ‘man’ on the
condition that this set is a singleton set. At this point, we have actually derived 
the semantics of the configuration NDA as well. The meaning of NDA anêr ho 
agathos is thus shown to be identical to the meaning of DAN ho agathos anêr.
They both denote the single referent which is both a man and good. In this 
situation it seems superfluous to apply the determiner to ‘the good man’ once 
more.
We have derived the attested orders for the combination of an attributive
adjective and a noun. We will not pursue the discussion of why the historical 
development of a definite determiner led to exactly these configurations. This is 
a complicated question, which deserves a more detailed account than we are 
able to give at this point. 
6 Syntax or pragmatics 
We have determined that the semantics of the various attested orders within the 
DP does not allow us to distinguish between them in a principled way. The 
question remains whether the reason for the variety is to be found in syntax or 
pragmatics. We will discuss pragmatics first and then evaluate the consequences 
for the syntax. 
Dik (1997) discusses the placement of modifying adjectives in relation to 
their nouns. She explains the various attested patterns in terms of focus. Dik 
concludes that an adjective appears after the noun when the adjective is not 
‘contrastive or otherwise the most salient element in a noun phrase’ (1997: 76).
When it is contrastive, it will appear before the noun. While she does not 
provide a formal analysis of the Greek noun phrase, her conclusion is
compatible with a movement analysis along the lines of Devine and Stephens 
(2000). Her concluding statement may be reformulated as a claim that adjectives
are base-generated in postnominal position. When focused, the adjective must
move to a phrase internal focus position. The same applies to nouns: focused 
nouns move to the same phrase internal focus position. This last movement
operation would, however, be string vacuous since the noun precedes the
adjective in the first place and doesn’t move beyond the DP. 
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Examples from Greek show that the complex DP configuration NDA
frequently must be given a definite reading. If we combine this fact with the 
semantic analysis above which showed that the first determiner in the 
configuration is superfluous from a semantic point of view, it is tempting to 
hypothesize that it plays a pragmatic role. This role may be identical to the role 
which the definite determiner plays with proper names; in other words, the first
determiner in the DNDA complex indicates the role of the DP as a whole in 
discourse structure. 
If this is the case, then why isn’t an extra determiner inserted in front of the 
noun in the DAN configuration? One reason may be that the ‘pragmatic’
determiner is always placed at the left edge of the DP as a whole. Since the DP 
does already have a determiner at its left edge, there is no need for a second one. 
Alternatively, we might appeal to a morpho-phonological rule which deletes one 
of two identical determiners.6
7 The pragmatic function of (D)NDA 
So far our examination of complex DPs has shown that the first determiner in
the DNDA configuration does not contribute to the semantics of its phrase. 
Rather its role is to indicate the status of the DP in discourse structure. It is not 
possible to give explicit expression to this distinction with DPs of type DAN. In
this section we will discuss the discourse structural role of (D)NDA and give 
some examples of its use.7
Devine and Stephens cite the following example from Herodotus in order to 
illustrate his use of split constituents, but it is interesting as an example of NDA
order as well: 
(8) epiphaneos de toutou genomenou autika hoi Aigyptioi 
visible-GSG PART he-GSG becoming-GSG at-once the Egyptian-NPL
heimata te ephoreon ta kallista kai êsan 
clothes-APL and put-on-IM3PL the most-beautiful-APL and be-IM3PL
en thaliêisi
in celebration-DPL
‘When he appeared to them, the Egyptians immediately put on the 
6 Searches in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG) database confirm that the writers of the
classical period actively avoided sequences consisting of two identical determiners within the
same phrase. The reasons for this avoidance are surely complex, but euphony and syntactical 
transparency probably played a part. 
7 The examples in this section are taken from Devine and Stephens (2000:238) and Brunel 
(1964:81).
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most beautiful clothes and celebrated.’ (Herodotus, Histories III.27,
my translation) 
hêdion gar an kômôdias tês phaulotatês ê tôn houtô tekhnikôs
rather PART PART comedy-GSG the lowest-GSG than the so skilfully 
pepoiêmenôn akousaien
made-GPL listen-AO3PL
‘For they would rather listen to the lowest comedy than to these 
things which have been skilfully made.’ (Isocrates, Against
Nicocles, section 44, my translation) 
(9)
(10)
(11)
The NDA phrases in these examples both belong to the rheme part of the 
sentence. In (7) the interesting phrase is heimata…ta kallista ‘the most beautiful
clothes’. The theme is the Egyptians, while the (first part of the) rheme consists 
of the information that they put on their finest clothes after the god Apis had
shown himself to them. Neither part of the DP seems to be contrastively 
focused: the point is neither that the Egyptians put on clothes to the exclusion of 
other things, nor that they put on their finest clothes as opposed to their 
everyday clothes. In example (8) the speaker contrasts low comedy not with 
other varieties of comedy, but with the most elegant poetry.
The following example is instructive as well: 
pôs pote hê akratos dikaiosunê pros adikian tên 
how ever the pure-NSG justice-NSG against injustice-ASG the
akraton ekhei 
pure-ASG have-PR3SG
‘…how the pure justice might be related to pure injustice…’ (Plato, 
Republic VIII 545a, my translation) 
Again we see that the NDA phrase belongs to the rheme. The intersective 
adjective akrastos is not contrastive, being repeated with both nouns. 
Examples (11) and (12) do in fact illustrate a textual pattern in which
D(A)N and NDA alternate. In these examples, the D(A)N phrase comes first, 
followed by the NDA phrase: 
Kurou apotemnetai hê kephalê kai kheir hê dexia
Kur-GSG cut-off-PR3SG the head-NSG and hand-NSG the right-NSG
‘The head of Cyrus and his right hand were cut off.’ (Xenophon, 
Anabasis I.10.1, transl. Brownson/Dillery) 
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Oikêsete de tas autas oikias kai khôran tên 
inhabit-FUT2PL PART the same-APL houses-APL and land-ASG the
autên ergasesthe kai gunaiksi tais autais
same-ASG work-FUT2PL and woman-DPL the same-DPL
sunoikêsete
live-together-FUT2PL
‘You will inhabit the same houses and work the same fields and 
live together with the same women.’ (Xenophon, Cyropaedia
IV.4.10, my translation) 
(12)
Example (11) is parallel to (9) in that the modifying adjectives are repeated with 
the following phrases. In example (10), on the other hand, the adjective dexia
‘right’ is genuinely new information, though perhaps not focused: the important
point is not that it was Cyrus’s right hand that was cut off, but rather that there 
was a cutting off of head and hand. 
These examples, then, seem on the one hand to confirm Dik’s hypothesis 
that the placement of modifying adjectives is related to their informational
status. On the other hand, the parallelism between the DAN and NDA 
configurations strengthens the suspicion that they both are equally definite. 
8 Conclusions
In this short survey of the various configurations of determiner phrases 
containing modifying adjectives in Greek, we have established that there is no 
semantic difference between the patterns. Their distribution in discourse does, 
however, show that they are sensitive to information structure. The patterns 
DAN and NDA are used together to distinguish focused adjectives from 
presupposed ones in the rheme of sentences. While DAN phrases may function 
both as theme and rheme, NDA phrases must be expanded to DNDA to occur as 
theme.
We have adduced evidence from the use of the definite determiner with 
proper names to show that the definite determiner may indicate the discourse
topic, whether this occurs as a presupposed part of the rheme or as the theme. 
Detailed investigations are needed to illuminate more clearly the relation 
between pragmatics and syntax in the Classical Greek determiner phrase, but we 
hope this contribution may point the way to interesting subjects for 
investigations.
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Abstract
The generation perspective taken by optimality theoretic syntax has a lot in common
with the insights gained in natural language generation. This paper explores how
insights about NP generation (e.g. Reiter & Dale (2000), van Deemter (2004)) can
be made fruitful for explaining the semantics and pragmatics of sentences with
more than one plural NP by exploiting optimality theoretic pragmatics, as well
as the list construction in discourse grammar. Though this is an exploration only
(anaphora is completely neglected and no attempt is made at covering the lexicon), I
would claim to show here: 1. the naturalness of the cumulative readings, 2. how the
different quantiﬁcational schemata arise, 3. how exhaustivity implicatures arise, 4.
how differential implicatures arise, 5. how to disambiguate double plural sentences.
1 How to specify relations
A normal natural language generation task is to specify a relation, given as a set
of sequences of objects, as computed e.g. by a relational database.1 One of the
subtasks here is to construct singular referential expressions. It is customary in NL
generation to have preferences for the kind of NP employed. This is an example
statement of the preferences, meant to be correct for Dutch and extended from
Reiter & Dale (2000).
(1) ﬁrst and second person pronouns > reﬂexives >
3rd person pronoun > deictic pronouns > anaphoric
deﬁnites and short names > full demonstrative NPs
> full descriptions and full names > indeﬁnites >
generics
∗In partial fulﬁllment of a promise I made to Kjell-Johan to specify all my prejudices about topics.
1It is certainly no accident that the pioneering PHLIQA project in the 1970’s, an NL interface with a relational
database, was the context for the work reported in Scha (1981) and Scha (1983).
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The interpretation of the hierarchy is that if the triggering condition for one kind
of NP is met, it should be employed in preference over the NPs in the lower parts
of the hierarchy. The triggering conditions are the conditions under which the NP
can be used and the whole scheme can be captured by saying that a certain type
of NP must be used if it can be used unless there is a more preferred type that can
also be used. First and second person pronouns can be used if the intended referent
is the speaker or the hearer, reﬂexives can be used if they have a c-commanding
antecedent in the same clause, 3rd person pronouns if the referent is given and
highly activated. Deictical NPs are made possible by being present in the visual
ﬁeld, short deﬁnites and short names by the referent being activated (or for short
deﬁnites employing a relational noun, if a relation to a highly activated referent
is expressed). Long deﬁnites are allowed by the possibility of a deﬁnition using
common ground knowledge, and indeﬁnites are the last resort if everything else
fails.
Singular quantiﬁers are missing from the scheme (and do not belong there
since they are not referring even in the extended sense given to that concept in
discourse semantics). But they will be discussed later on in this paper.
The scheme can be explained in optimality theory (a fuller treatment is given
in Zeevat (2000)) by assuming a set of expressive constraints that force the ex-
pression of certain features, like reﬂexive, person, identiﬁable etc. The constraints
can be left unordered since it seems that apart from 1st/2nd person not implying
reﬂexive, the higher triggering conditions all entail the lower ones.2 Such con-
straints also give rise to implicatures associated with the choice of elements from
the lower part of the hierarchy: the hearer is given to understand that e.g. the choice
of “a woman” implies that various features are missing like reﬂexive, ﬁrst person,
identiﬁability by a property or by a function, contextual salience or visibility in
the perceptual ﬁeld of the conversation partners. Notice that these features are
deﬁnable in terms of the common ground between the speaker and the hearer.
Grice notes that A in saying (2)
(2) I saw Smith in town with a woman.
implicates that the woman is not Smith’s wife, but there is a far larger class of
women she is implicated not to belong to (basically no woman in the common
ground of speaker and hearer or functionally related to those) and the explana-
tion for these implicatures – including Grice’s implicature – are the expressive
constraints the speaker is supposed to follow.
The hierarchy does not substantially change for plural reference:
2This suggests that Panini’s elsewhere principle also explains what is going on here. The most speciﬁc rule for
referring needs to be followed and this is e.g. using the third person pronoun if the object is activated as well as
discourse old and identiﬁable.
200
Strategies for Specifying Relations
(3) ﬁrst and second person pronouns > reﬂexives >
reciprocals > 3rd person pronouns > deictic pro-
nouns > anaphoric deﬁnites and short names >
full demonstrative NPs > full descriptions and full
names > cardinal and estimating indeﬁnites > bare
plurals and covering plural deﬁnites
These hierarchies can be used for specifying a relation R. For simplicity, I am here
assuming that the relation is given by its extension, i.e. as a set of n-ary sequences
of objects, with the objects coming from domains Ai with i ≤ n. The projections
πi(R) are deﬁned as πi(R) = {ai :< a1, . . . ,ai, . . . ,an >∈ R}. I also assume that
there is a given Natural Language sentential scheme ζα1, . . .αn that expresses that
x1, . . . ,xn stand in the relation R iff α1 . . .αn are replaced by names for x1, . . . ,xn
respectively.
Under these assumptions, one can deﬁne a simple and natural strategy for
specifying the given relation. Using the hierarchy, a referring expression is se-
lected for each projection πi and ﬁlled in for αi in ζα1, . . .αn. This will be the
default strategy in the rest of the paper. It applies both to the singular and to the
plural.
For singular relations (where all projections have cardinality 1) and quite a
substantial class of plural relations, this is a successful strategy. E.g. for a single
plural projection in an otherwise singular relation, this gives an optimal speci-
ﬁcation, i.e. one where the hearer is maximally informed given the possibilities
provided by the common ground between speaker and hearer. In case deﬁnites
can be used everywhere and can in fact be used by the hearer to determine the
referent, the hearer can reconstruct the input relation.
A single plural projection does no harm to this property and the cases where
the projection is a single collection (rather than the set of the elements collected
in it) also do not lead to speciﬁcations that are less informative than is possible.
But if there are two properly plural projections, information may be lost under
the simple strategy: the information about how the members of the projections are
related. This does not mean that the strategy is not used. It still is and then
gives rise to intended so-called cumulative readings, but their use seems to be
either a ﬁnal resort: the common ground does not allow full speciﬁcation or a full
speciﬁcation is not the goal of the conversation. For the other cases, there are
alternative strategies: the distributive strategy and the list strategy.
The simple strategy operates properly for homogeneous relations:
A relation R⊆ A1× . . .×An is homogeneous iff R = B1× . . .×Bn with
Bi ⊆ Ai for i < n.
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Purely singular sentences specify homogeneous relations and all monadic rela-
tions are homogeneous. Any polyadic relation with a single plural projection is
still homogeneous. It is clear that homogeneous relations can be effectively spec-
iﬁed by generating the singular or plural NP appropriate for each of their projec-
tions.
For non-homogeneous relations there is the distributive and the list strategy.
In the distributive strategy, the relation is split into a set of relations
Ra = {< a,a2, . . . ,an >: a ∈ π1(R)}
and it works only if all the other projections of these relations are uniform in one
of the senses described below. If this condition is not met, the list strategy is the
only one that will lead to a proper speciﬁcation.
The best case is identity uniformity.
(4) ∀a,b ∈ π1 πi(Ra) = πi(Rb)
ex. Every boy kissed the two girls.
The next best case is (deﬁnable) functional uniformity.
(5) there is a functional relation F with a name α such
that ∀a ∈ π1πi(Ra) = F(a)
ex. Every boy kissed his nieces.
The next best uniformity is kind and number/estimation uniformity.
(6) there is a kind K and a number/estimate N with
names α and θ such that ∀a ∈ π1 ∀i ≤ n πi(Ra) has
N members of kind K.
ex. Every boy kissed three aunts.
Every boy kissed many girls.
The weakest form of uniformity is kind uniformity:
(7) there is a kind or set K with name α such that ∀a ∈
π1 ∀i≤ n all members of πi(Ra) are of kind K.
ex. Every boy kissed girls.
In essence, in ﬁnding the NP for the non-distributing projections πi(R), the hier-
archy of NPs still applies. One is looking for the highest NP in the hierarchy such
that the NP meets the triggering condition for each object πi(Ra) for all a in the
distributing projection. The nature of the uniformity determines how far this can
go: identity uniformity gives no restriction, functional uniformity can be marked
by 3rd person pronouns bound by a, deﬁnite and possessive markers, kind and
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number uniformity leads to NPs like “many chicken”, “some books” and “three
cakes”, while kind uniformity is exclusively expressed by bare plurals and cover-
ing deﬁnites.
The distributing projection itself may follow the default strategy, though ex-
plicit quantiﬁers (“every boy”) are also possible.
The distributive strategy presupposes uniformities in the relation: each pro-
jection needs to be uniform at the very least for kind. The hierarchy of NPs
gives also here the correct implicatures: if a bare plural is used, one can infer
that the uniformity in that projection does not go up to identity, functional relation
or count/estimate.
The list strategy ﬁnally cuts up the ﬁrst projection into a partition and divides
the relation over that partition. The cells of the partition determine subrelations
which should be presented in turn. All strategies are in principle possible for
presenting the subrelations, but it is sensible to go for efﬁciency here, by selecting
the partition in such a way that the default strategy or the distributional strategy
applies. The following list illustrates the list strategy for a given relation LIKE ⊆
GIRLS×DANCES on which the ﬁrst projection is split into two singletons and the
partition results into two homogeneous relations which are speciﬁed by the names
of the girls and the dances.
(8) Clara likes waltzing.
Maaike likes belly dancing.
The list strategy gives rise to the discourse relation “list” which allows recursive
uses. It comes with a special implicature: that the partition is a partition, i.e. that
the different cells are exclusive (the kind of differential implicatures that also arise
with the discourse relation “contrast”) and that their union gives the whole pro-
jection (a special exhaustivity implicature going with the list discourse relation).
Unlike the default and the distributive strategies, the list strategy always leads to
the most informative speciﬁcation and – where deﬁnites can be used all around –
allows the full reconstruction of the relation by the hearer.
2 A Theory of Interpretation: OT Pragmatics
In other work (Zeevat 2001) I defended the following theory of interpretation
given by four OT constraints. It is called a pragmatics and not a semantics be-
cause while it is a theory of how to determine the change that a given utterance
makes to the common ground (conversational implicature, context change poten-
tial or update semantics – in this case also allowing “downdates” –) and thereby
also a natural account of the truth conditions of sentences, it is not determined by
the syntactic structure of the utterances alone, but also by contextual factors and
pragmatic principles.
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The theory consists of a system of four defeasible constraints given here:
(9) FAITH > CONSISTENT > *NEW > RELE-
VANCE
FAITH is the principle that an interpretation is good if one could have expressed
that interpretation in the same way oneself, if one were the speaker. Utterances
that are imperfect do not remain uninterpreted: one goes for the interpretation for
which there are fewest violations of this principle. If one would have a full OT
syntax and phonology, the principle would be ﬁnding an interpretation for which
the utterance is as optimal as possible, i.e. the interpretation should be such that
there is no alternative interpretation for which the utterance is more optimal given
the OT syntax and phonology. Requiring full optimality is too strong: FAITH
should not give up with pronounciation or syntactic mistakes. It should also not
give up for utterances that make use of non-conventional means.
CONSISTENT discards interpretations which are inconsistent with the con-
text or are implausible given the context, provided of course there are others avail-
able that are more plausible and consistent. If the language can mark inconsistency
with the context (e.g. by adversative marking) or implausibility given the context
(e.g. by mirative marking), FAITH as the stronger constraint would switch this
process off, by instead preferring inconsistent or implausible interpretations.
*NEW is the general preference for the old, expected, familiar and activated
and the prohibition to add anything to the interpretation without good cause. Good
cause is exclusively given by the needs of FAITH, CONSISTENT or *NEW
itself. It prefers presupposition resolution over presupposition accommodation,
partial presupposition resolution over full accommodation, highly activated an-
tecedents for pronouns over less activated ones, old referents over new referents if
both are possible.
RELEVANCE is the principle that any question that is activated in the con-
text and that seems to be addressed by the utterance is in fact answered by the
utterance. It prefers interpretations where the questions are answered over those
where they are not. There is an interaction here with the strategic considerations
of section 1. Wherever decisions are conditioned on relevance, the RELEVANCE
principle guarantees that the hearer will faithfully reconstruct those decisions.
3 The meaning of plurals
The following two examples of double plurals as well as the readings attributed to
them are taken from Scha (1981). I will show how these readings follow from the
possible strategies and pragmatics.
(10) a. The lines cross the circles.
b. 200 ﬁrms bought 300 computers.
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They give rise to many readings. The ﬁrst example identiﬁes contextually given
sets LINE of lines and CIRCLE of circles. Assuming those, the readings are as in
(11).
(11) a. cross(LINE,CIRCLE)
b. ∀x ∈ LINE ∀y ∈CIRCLE cross(x,y)
c. ∀x ∈ LINE ∃y ∈CIRCLE cross(x,y)
d. ∀x ∈ LINE ∃y ∈CIRCLE cross(x,y)∧
∀y ∈CIRCLE ∃x ∈ LINE cross(x,y)
e. ∃x ∈ LINE ∃y ∈CIRCLE cross(x,y)
f. ∀y ∈CIRCLE ∃x ∈ LINE cross(x,y)
Here (11a) is the (implausible) collective reading (compare: The boys lifted the
pianos).
The second example has 18 readings based on the following ambiguities:
(12) collective or not per coordinate
precise/at least per cardinal
scope
cumulative or not
The point of the pragmatic system is that it gives combinations of a reading with
a pragmatic proﬁle which can be matched to the discourse situation as perceived
by the interpreter.
If the speaker is taken to specify the crossing relation (restricted to the lines
and the circles) or the buying relation (restricted to ﬁrms and computers) by means
of the default strategy, in addition to the cumulative reading (= the double exis-
tential reading if we assume both deﬁnites in (11a) are covering deﬁnites) one
gets an implicature that the relation is homogeneous (the condition under which
the default strategy is a strategy for speciﬁcation). This then gives the double uni-
versal reading based on covering deﬁnites (14 ) to (11a) (and in principle also to
(11b)).
(13) ∃X ⊆ LINE ∃Y ⊆ CIRCLE ∀x ∈ X ∀y ∈
Y cross(x,y)
If the business of the speaker is speciﬁcation, this also gives exhaustivity im-
plicatures: no more ﬁrms bought computers, no more computers were bought by
ﬁrms. This gives precisely 200 and precisely 300 as a meaning of the cardinals.
The double universal reading does not make sense for the relation of buying re-
stricted to ﬁrms and computers (ﬁrms buy their own computers), so the assumption
of the default strategy for specifying the relation in (11b) leads to the cumulative
205
Henk Zeevat
reading with the exhaustivity implicatures, where the question which ﬁrm bought
what computer is left open. For (11a) speciﬁcation also brings the implicature
that all and not only some of the lines and circles are involved. Otherwise, the
hearer would not be able to reconstruct the relation. So (11b) is the result. The
existential readings (11c) , (11d) and (11e) result from not assuming full spec-
iﬁcation.
The full result for (10b) is (14).
(14) ∃X ⊆ FIRM ∃Y ⊆COMPUTER (#X = 200∧
#Y = 300∧ ∀x ∈ X ∃y ∈ Y buy(x,y)∧ ∀y ∈ Y ∃x ∈
X buy(x,y)∧
∀z∈FIRM ∀v∈COMPUTER (buy(z,v)→ z∈X∧
v ∈ Y ))
But with a different predicate homogeneity is quite plausible, as in (15).
(15) 3 boys saw 5 girls.
∃X ⊆ BOY ∃Y ⊆ GIRL (#X = 3∧#Y = 5∧
∀x ∈ X ∀y ∈ Y see(x,y)∧
∀z ∈ BOY ∀v ∈ GIRL (see(z,v)→ z ∈ X ∧ v ∈ Y ))
The other plausible reading is the distributive one with exhaustivity implicatures.
(16) ∃X ⊆ FIRM (#X = 200 ∧ ∀x ∈ X ∃Y ⊆
COMPUTER
(#Y = 300∧ ∀y ∈Y buy(x,y)∧ ∀z ∈COMPUTER
(buy(x,z)→ z ∈ Y ) ∧
∀v ∈ FIRM ∃w ∈ COMPUTER (buy(v,w) → v ∈
X)))
The other readings can arise by assuming that full speciﬁcation is not sought by
the speaker. E.g. in the last case one may be interested in how many ﬁrms bought
a substantial number of computers with substantial being pragmatically deﬁned as
minimally 300. This removes both exhaustivity implicatures. Or (11b) can be
part of a list where groups of ﬁrms are listed according to the number of computers
they bought. The exhaustivity of 300 is then maintained but the exhaustivity of
200 is now with respect to buying 300 computers and not with respect to buying
computers.3
Notice that there is a considerable distance here from compositional seman-
tics. The “logical forms” that were given describe the input relation under the
3The exactly 200 reading would still be what one gets. In the case described by (16) one gets an even stricter
reading for the “quantiﬁer” 200.
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assumption that the speaker is trying to do something speciﬁc with it (specify it,
count it, etc.), given her knowledge of the input relation and the common ground
with the hearer. The semantic/pragmatic contraints on the relations derive from
the strategy that the speaker is apparently following in order to achieve her aim. It
is in principle an accident, if there exists a compositional recipee for deriving the
logical form, though it may be argued that the existence of such a recipee could
be a factor in making communication easier.
The strongest argument for the picture of interpretation sketched in this and
the previous section is the optionality of the grammatical marking involved. Dis-
tributivity can be forced by determiners like “every”, “each” and “no” or by ﬂoat-
ing markers like “each”, but it is not necessary to do so. Likewise collective inter-
pretations can be marked by “together” and “all” rules out covering interpretations
of deﬁnites and bare plurals (even of cardinal NPs). But often it is not necessary
to use a marker. This points to a system of defaults that one can mark against. The
optionality of the markers does not make proper sense under a compositional ap-
proach4 since it seems counterproductive to leave the interpreter in the dark with
respect to which of the many readings applies and it is equally hard to see why the
markers would be recruited from other material if the interpreter is anyway free to
insert covert operators as she sees ﬁt during interpretation.
The system of defaults is given to some extent by the pragmatic system. REL-
EVANCE forces the construction of goals and questions the current sentence must
contribute to, given the goals and questions already in the common ground and
so is responsible for mostly assuming that the speaker is trying to specify a fully
known relation in an effective way, thus giving homogeneous interpretations when
the default strategy is already assumed. The constraints *DISTRIBUTIVE and
*SPLIT make the default strategy in effect the default strategy, but also weaker
interpretations when the relation is not fully known or when full speciﬁcation is
not the best way to contribute to the conversation. CONSISTENT is important to
rule out implausible homogeneous readings (as in our second example) or implau-
sible collective interpretations (as in our ﬁrst example). *NEW does not seem to
play any role.
How did a system of this kind get in place? The fossils seem to be still around,
in the form of bare nouns and ﬂoating quantiﬁers. Starting from the assumption
that it all starts with nouns and verbs, initially noun+verb and noun+verb+noun
were highly ambiguous, with the nouns being everything: kind names, pronouns,
existential and universal quantiﬁers, deﬁnites and indeﬁnites. Recruitment of
demonstratives in an adnominal position makes it possible to disambiguate def-
inites. Adverbs can take on the role of distribution/collection/existential markers.
Finally these can coalesce with nouns into NP determiners. A separate develop-
4Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle 1993) seems to have no advantages in this respect.
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ment of cardinals and estimators from adjectives makes it possible to disambiguate
towards indeﬁniteness.
The new recruitments have pushed some of the original uses of bare nouns
away towards the more unclear uses: where there is no identiﬁcation of the referent
or group of referents, no counting is possible and there is no distribution.
4 Exhaustivity Implicatures
The strategies I discuss in the ﬁrst section also give a theory of scalar and other
implicatures. Anybody who has been thinking about problems in natural language
generation knows the effect: choices need to be made in generation, the fact that a
certain choice is made indicates that the speaker assumes something.
Our strategy counts where counting is possible and classiﬁes only where that
is impossible or irrelevant. If counting takes place, it indicates that (functional)
identiﬁcation is impossible. Splitting the most prominent projection indicates that
the most prominent elements of the split form a partition of the most prominent
projection and that the remaining relations are uniform. These are exhaustivity
implicatures. Counting gives the special exhaustivity implicatures that used to be
called scalar implicatures.
They are computed as a side effect of the hearer checking FAITH in her joint
context with the speaker. For this she needs to put herself in the hearer’s shoes.
As a good Gricean she needs to discover the speaker’s intentions on the basis of
the utterance.
Many other Gricean implicatures can be reduced to similar strategies. E.g.
the (natural) strategy of telling a story in the order of the events is responsible
for moving up reference times. The strategic obligation in complex assertions
of marking whether a subordinate clause holds or does not hold according to the
speaker (an obligation that cannot always be carried out as in: My husband be-
lieves I am cheating on him but he does not know it) forces the choice of “when”
or “because” instead of “if” when the complement is true and a choice of the
irrealis when it is false and forms the basis of clausal implicatures.
5 Relations are Topics are Questions
Many (van Kuppevelt 1995, Umbach 2001, Krifka 1992, Zeevat 1994) have as-
sumed that topics are questions. If topics are wh-questions ?x1, . . . ,xnϕ then they
are relations or at least closely related to relations. The view that they are rela-
tions is Scha’s (1983), but the views of Hamblin (1973) or Karttunen (1977) or
Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) are not far removed. The point here is that for a
satisfactory treatment of the relation between questions and reduced answers, one
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needs to get hold of the relation somehow and all accounts should allow for that.
If one takes a conversational turn in order to settle a topic, one needs to specify
a relation. This is what is done all the time, but often the speciﬁcation problems
are rather trivial. Sometimes the relation is on a high level, e.g. in giving the ar-
guments against a theory or in listing the possible causes of John not being there.
Good Griceans standing in the speaker’s shoes see the task the speaker is trying
to carry out: telling them what happened last night at the party, explaining why
so little progress has been made with the paper, giving the list of the shopping,
explaining where one should go to when visiting Du¨sseldorf. If they grasp the
speaker’s intention, they grasp which relation she is trying to specify and how she
is trying to do it. I am here playing out Grice (1957) against the later Grice who
believed in literal meaning as a basis for computing the conversational contribu-
tion. FAITH is all but it produces all possible conversational contributions and
not a core from which the contribution has to be computed.
References
van Deemter, K. (2004), ‘Towards a probabilistic version of bidirectional ot syntax
and semantics’, Journal of Semantics 21(3), 407–421.
Grice, H. (1957), ‘Meaning’, The Philosophical Review 66(3), 377–388.
Groenendijk, J. & Stokhof, M. (1984), Studies on the Semantics of Questions and
the Pragmatics of Answers, PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam.
Hamblin, C. (1973), ‘Questions in montague english’, Studies in Language
pp. 41–53.
Kamp, H. & Reyle, U. (1993), From Discourse to Logic, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Karttunen, L. (1977), ‘Syntax and semantics of questions’, Linguistics and Phi-
losophy 1, 3–44.
Krifka, M. (1992), ‘Presupposition and focus in dynamic interpretation’, Journal
of Semantics 10.
van Kuppevelt, J. (1995), ‘Discourse structure, topicality and questioning’, Jour-
nal of linguistics 31, 109–147.
Reiter, E. & Dale, R. (2000), Building Natural-Language Generation Systems,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Scha, R. (1981), Distributive, collective and cumulative quantiﬁcation, in J. Groe-
nendijk, T. Janssen & M. Stokhof, eds, ‘Formal Methods in the Study of
Language’, AMC, Amsterdam, pp. 483–512.
Scha, R. (1983), Foundations for Question Answering, PhD thesis, University of
Groningen.
209
Henk Zeevat
Umbach, C. (2001), Contrast and contrastive topic, in I.-K. Korbayova´ &
M. Steedman, eds, ‘Proceedings of the ESSLLI 2001 Workshop on Infor-
mation Structure, Discourse Structure and Discourse Semantics’, Helsinki.
Zeevat, H. (1994), Applying an exhaustivity operator in update semantics, in
H. Kamp, ed., ‘Ellipsis, Tense and Questions’, ILLC, Amsterdam.
Zeevat, H. (2000), Semantics in optimality theory, in H. de Hoop & P. Hendriks,
eds, ‘Optimality Theoretic Semantics’, OTS, Utrecht.
Zeevat, H. (2001), ‘The asymmetry of optimality theoretic syntax and semantics’,
Journal of Semantics 17(3), 243–262.
210
KNOWLEDGE AND DESIRE, 
FROM A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE 
THOMAS EDE ZIMMERMANN 
UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT 
T.E.Zimmermann@lingua.uni-frankfurt.de  
Abstract
The German modal verb wollen (§ want) easily embeds reports of 
interrogative knowledge (know whether), but is reluctant to take 
propositional knowledge reports (know that) as complements. The 
difference is accounted for in terms of presupposition projection and a 
bridge principle relating desire reports and knowledge. The overall 
setting is a presuppositional extension of Groenendijk & Stokhof’s 
(1982; 1984) partition semantics, as proposed by Sæbø (2005). 
1 A Puzzle 
The first snow has fallen. The roads are icy. Gaby has left about an hour ago. 
Under normal circumstances she would have arrived at her office half an hour 
ago, but with the weather it is to be expected she is late. She promised to ring 
Heinz on her arrival. She hasn’t so far and Heinz is beginning to get worried. He 
wants Gaby to have arrived safely and he also wants to know that she has. 
Heinz’s state of mind can be summed up by two German sentences: 
(1)
(2)
Heinz will wissen, ob Gaby im Büro ist. 
Heinz wants to-know whether Gaby in-the office is 
'Heinz wants to know whether Gaby is in her office.' 
Heinz will, dass Gaby im Büro ist. 
Heinz wants that Gaby in-the office is. 
'Heinz wants Gaby to be in her office.' 
What Heinz wants, then, is to be in a situation in which not only Gaby is safe 
but in which he also knows that she is safe. It would thus seem that his state of 
mind may be summed up by one German sentence: 
Thomas Ede Zimmermann 
(3)
(4)
Heinz will wissen, dass Gaby im Büro ist. 
Heinz wants to-know that Gaby in-the office is. 
'Heinz wants to know that Gaby is in her office.'
However, (3) does not express a consequence of (1) and (2), and it is not an 
appropriate way to describe the situation either. To the extent that (3) is 
appropriate at all, it has an entirely different meaning, due to an ersatz
interpretation of will as meaning something close to claim. In the present note, I 
will ignore the latter phenomenon altogether1 and pretend that (3) is simply ill-
formed, be it for syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic reasons. And I will seek a
semantic explanation.
When it comes to marking an expression inappropriate, two kinds of 
semantic explanation spring to mind. First, the expression might fail to express
any content. This happens if its (semantic) presuppositions are jointly 
unsatisfiable, e.g. because some selectional constraint is violated. Alternatively, 
the content of the expression might be useless in one way or other. This happens 
if it is obviously redundant or, in the case of a sentence, clearly contradictory.
Although the latter account of oddity in terms of information value may be a 
far cry from a full explanation – after all, we do speak redundantly once in a 
while, and we may use obvious contradictions, albeit not in a literal way – if the 
case can be made that an ill-formed expression would have had a neurotic
content, this might give a clue for why it is ruled out on syntactic grounds. 
2 A Failed Attempt 
2.1 Semantic Analysis 
In the case at hand, a rather straightforward account in terms of 
contradictoriness suggests itself. It rests on the observation that the truth of (4) 
may be concluded from a report like (2): 
Heinz weiß nicht, ob Gaby im Büro ist. 
Heinz knows not whether Gaby in the office is 
'Heinz does not know whether Gaby is in her office.'
If the inference from (2) to (4) follows a general pattern, one would expect it to 
also apply to (3), leading to: 
1 The ersatz reading appears to occur whenever the literal reading would be inappropriate. In
particular, it takes over with complements in the present perfect, as in Er will sie getroffen 
haben, which translates as He claims to have met her.
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(5)
(6)
Heinz weiß nicht, ob er weiß, dass Gaby im Büro ist. 
Heinz knows not whether he knows that Gaby in-the office is 
'Heinz does not know whether he knows that Gaby is in the office.'
This conclusion, however, may be construed as contradicting certain 
fundamental principles of knowledge, viz. what is known as Strong
Introspection in epistemic logic. Hence if indeed (3) implies the contradictory
report (5), this fact may be part of an explanation of why such a report is felt
inappropriate.
In order to make the above reasoning precise – and then reject it – I will cast 
it in a surface-oriented (and thus somewhat superficial) semantic framework. To
capture the interaction between knowledge as a propositional and as an 
interrogative attitude, i.e. between wissen dass [know that] and wissen ob [know
whether], I will rely on a partition semantics of questions that treats an ob-
complement as a bi-partition of Logical Space (LS).2 In such a framework, the 
difference between dass- and ob-complements comes out as follows: 
dass  S a  {i  LS S i  1}
(7) ob  S a  {i  LS S i  S a}
A quick word on notation in case it is not obvious. I am using ‘a’, ‘i’, and ‘j’ as 
variables ranging over members of LS (whatever they may turn out to be). If E is 
an expression, ‘ E ’ denotes its intension, i.e. a function assigning to any point in 
LS E’s extension at that point; sub-scripts are used for the arguments of 
intensions. In the case of sentences, which belong to category S and are denoted
by the variable ‘S’ (this abuse of notation is of course customary), the extension 
is one of the truth values 0 (false) and 1 (true). Hence the intension of a sentence 
is a characteristic function of a subset of LS, the proposition it expresses. Thus 
according to (6), the extension of a clause of the form ‘dass S’ is the proposition 
expressed by the sentence S. And according to (7), the extension of ‘ob S’ is that 
proposition if it is true, and its complement otherwise. In particular, the 
extensions of both dass- and ob-clauses are propositions, and their intensions are 
propositional concepts,3 i.e. functions from LS to its power set (of propositions). 
Under this semantic assumption they may be subsumed under one category 
and be given a uniform treatment as complements to verbs like wissen:Scomp
2 Cf. Groenendijk & Stokhof (1982, 1984); for the present purposes the restricted version of
Lewis (1982) suffices. In the present setup the partitions come out as the ranges of the 
intensions of interrogative clauses.
3 The concept and the term derive from Stalnaker (1978), where they are employed for
entirely different (pragmatic) purposes, though. 
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(8) wissen a (Q)(x)  1 iff Epix (a)  Qa
– where a  LS , Q is any propositional concept, and x is an arbitrary subject. (8)
rests on the assumption that the epistemic perspective of any subject x at any
given point a in Logical Space can be modelled by a non-empty set 
comprising the possibilities i
Epix(a)
 LS  that are not excluded by x’s knowledge at a.4
According to (8), the verb wissen expresses a relation holding between 
individuals x and propositional concepts Q just in case the proposition Q
determined by Q at the actual point a is true of all i in x’s epistemic
perspective, . In case Q is derived by (6), Q  is the proposition expressed
by the embedded sentence; if Q is derived by (7), Q  is either the proposition 
expressed by the complement – or its complement, depending on which of the
two is true of a.
a
Epix(a) a
a
In a similar vein, the extension of will can be specified in terms of bouletic 
perspectives  that contain all and only thoseBoux (a) i  LS  at which everything is 
the case that x wants at point a. I will skip the obvious treatment of that-clause
embeddings as in (2) and only formulate the clause for will as a (subject) control 
verb of category , where the proposition corresponding to Q  in (8) is 
obtained by saturating the open proposition expressed by its complement (of 
category ) with the attitude subject: 
Vcont a
VPinf
(9) will a (P)(x)  1 iff Boux (a) {i  LS Pi(x)  1}
The internal compositionality of the most deeply embedded clause in (1)–(5) is 
of no concern here; we will refer to the proposition it expresses as ‘g’, as shown 
in (10). (11) gives the straightforward interpretation of the name Heinz of 
category , where D is the set of individuals.NPprop
(10) Gaby im Büro ist a  1 iff a  g
Heinz a  h  ( D)(11)
Apart from these assumptions about the contribution of the relevant lexical
material, we also need some rules of construal taking care of meaning 
composition. These are quite straightforward, the relevant semantic 
combinations being varieties of functional application: 
(12) NPprop  VP a  VP a ( NPprop a )
V fact  Scomp a  V fact a ( Scomp )(13)
4 Cf. Hintikka (1962, 1969). The usual disclaimers about de se complications apply. 
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(14) Vcont  VPinf a  Vcont a ( VPinf )
It is readily verified that the above assumptions lead to the following predictions 
concerning the interpretation of (3): 
(15) })({)(iff1)3( giEpiLSiaBou hha  
2.2 Logical Analysis
Without further ado, (15) does not guarantee that (3) expresses a contradiction.
What is still needed are (i) assumptions about the interaction between the 
intensions of wissen and will, as well as (ii) some basic principles of epistemic 
logic. Without (i), the inference from (3) to (5) would not be available; without
(ii), (5) could not be shown to be contradictory. Both (i) and (ii) can be attacked 
more conveniently by introducing some notational conventions, thereby 
transposing the present discussion into ‘Heinzentric’ epistemic and bouletic
logic. For any proposition p  LS , let ‘Kp’ and ‘Wp’ denote the following 
propositions, respectively: 
(16) {i  LS Epih (i)  p}
{i  LS Bouh (i)  p}(17)
Moreover, following established practice of modal logic, we may construe
Boolean connectives as operations on propositions: p : LS \ p ; pq  : p q;
etc. With this notation the truth condition given in (15) may be expressed by a 
term denoting the proposition expressed by (3): 
(18) WKg
The notation can also be used to formulate the general principles of epistemic
logic. As a case in point consider the principle that what is known is true. In 
terms of the present framework this means that any point i in Logical Space and 
any individual x would have to satisfy: 
(19) i  Epix(i)
Given our notation, (the Heinzentric version of) principle (19) can be 
reformulated as the Reflexivity axiom of epistemic logic:5
5 The term alludes the fact that (19) expresses that the epistemic accessibility relation
{(i, j)  LS2 j  Epih (i)}  is reflexive. The (well-known) equivalence, or correspondence,
between (19) and (A0) holds if the latter is understood as a second-order condition to the 
effect that the proposition it denotes coincides with LS, for any p  LS . See van Benthem 
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(A0) Kp o p
Two further axioms expressible in this modal language are valid solely due to 
our coarse-grained account (8) of epistemic perspectives: 
(A1) (KpKq) oK( pq)
(A2) Kp oK(pq)
Clearly, these axioms do not suffice to derive the desired inference. We still 
need to make the connection between (2) and (4), and between (3) and (5) – 
which can naturally be achieved by way of a Bridge axiom spanning the gap 
between epistemic and bouletic modality:
(B) Wp o (KpKp)
Given the above semantic analysis, (B) expresses that a lack of knowledge 
whether p follows from the desire of wanting p to hold. As a case in point,
assuming that nicht reverses truth values, it is easy to verify that (3) and (5) 
express the propositions (20) [= (18)] and (21), respectively: 
(20) WKg
KKgKKg(21)
Hence (B) adequately captures the pattern behind the inference aimed at. It 
remains to be shown that the proposition (21) expressed by (5) is indeed 
contradictory, i.e. the empty set. To this end one needs to introduce principles 
concerning the iteration of epistemic operators. The most obvious – and widely 
accepted – ones turn out to do the trick: 
(A3) Kp o KKp
(A4) Kp oKKp
(A3) says that whatever is known (by Heinz) is known to be known; according 
to (A4), whatever is not known is known to be not known. Together, (A3) and 
(A4) guarantee that the relational structure of Heinz’s epistemic perspective is 
(1984) for the general setup. (19) and (A0) cover only one direction of the factivity of wissen,
to which I will come in Section 3.2. 
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particularly simple and transparent;6 and they also guarantee the desired 
contradiction. To see this, one should first note that, by (contraposing) Positive 
Introspection (A3), (21) implies (22), which in turn implies the contradiction 
(23), by (contraposed) Negative Introspection (A4): 
(22) KgKKg
(23) KgKg
Since (3) expresses (20), which – given (B) – implies (21), which has just turned
out to be contradictory, (3) itself is contradictory. As remarked earlier, this 
deficiency may be argued to be part of an explanation of why (3) is infelicitous.
However, this cannot be right. For the principles we have used to rule out 
(3) by deriving a contradiction from (20), may also be employed to rule out (1) 
by deriving a contradiction from one of its consequences, viz.: 
(24) K(KgKg)K(KgKg)
Given (B), (24) follows from (25), which is the proposition expressed by (1), as 
the reader may care to verify: 
(25) W(KgKg)
Now two applications of the Disjunctive Weakening axiom (A2) to the left
conjunct of (24) yield (26), which again can be seen to imply (27), by two 
applications of the Positive Introspection axiom (A3): 
(26) KKgKKgK(KgKg)
KgKgK(KgKg)(27)
However, (27) is the same proposition as (28), from which the contradiction (29) 
follows, by the Conjunctive Distribution Axiom (A1): 
(28) KgKgK(KgKg)
KgKg (KgKg)(29)
6 More precisely, (A3) and (A4) jointly correspond to the condition that the relation defined in
the previous footnote is transitive and Euclidian and can thus be modelled by a ‘split 
partition’ of Logical Space; cf. Zimmermann (1999: 269). 
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It would thus seem that the reasoning used to rule out (3) as contradictory also 
rules out (1), which is not only consistent but a perfectly adequate report of the
situation at hand. So either there is something wrong with the semantic
background assumptions or one of the above principles is not correct. I will
argue for the former. 
3 Amendments
3.1 Time
Let us take a closer look at the above reductiones of the propositions (20) and 
(25) expressed by (3) and (1), respectively, and at the principles underlying that 
reasoning. In both cases the initial step was made by invoking the Bridge axiom 
(B), which ought to reflect the intuition that German will (or English want for 
that matter) cannot report a desire that the subject knows to be satisfied or 
unsatisfiable. Whatever the precise basis of this intuition, I think it is not entirely 
misguided. Nor, I contend, is there anything wrong with attributing full positive
and negative introspective powers to Heinz. In fact, by introspection, Heinz is
fully aware of his own ignorance as to Gaby’s whereabouts. This, however, 
flatly contradicts what (20) and (25) seem to imply according to (B), viz. that
Heinz is unaware of his own ignorance. However, the contradiction ought to be 
seen as revealing a certain sloppiness in our application of (B), and not a reason 
for rejecting the bridge principle altogether. For Heinz’s introspection and his 
desire concern different objects: whereas he knows that he is presently unaware 
of Gaby’s whereabouts, he wants his knowledge to increase soon. And while he
is fully informed about his present state of knowledge, his clairvoyant powers 
are somewhat limited, even if restricted to matters of his own epistemic
perspective. In particular, he does not know whether he will ever find out about 
Gaby’s whereabouts, and so he does not know whether what he wants to be the
case, will be: that, at some future time, he will know that g is true, or at least 
whether g is true. Once the future directedness of desire is taken into account, 
the conflict with introspection ought to vanish.
So let us add a temporal dimension to the framework introduced in the 
previous section by dissecting the points of Logical Space into coordinates:
LS  W u T , where W is the set of possible worlds and T consists of (absolute) 
times that are ordered by the relation  of temporal precedence and its converse 
, which we take to be weak (= reflexive) linear orderings. We can now capture 
the future orientation of will by replacing the meaning assignment (9) with: 
(30) will a (P)(x)  1 iff Boux (a)  {(w,t)  LS Pi (x)  1, for some t't t}
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According to (30), a proposition to which the subject stands in the will relation
need not be true in his or her bouletic alternatives; it suffices if it eventually 
becomes true at some point in the future. Of course, it may be true, because the 
proposition may hold unbeknownst to the subject. Given this correction, instead 
of (20) and (25), the tenseless propositions expressed by (3) and (1) must now 
be replaced by: 
(31) WFKg
WF(KgKg)(32)
– where F is a weakened version of the Priorian future operator: 
(33) Fp   {(w, t)  LS (w, t ')  p,  for some t 't t}
The weakening lies in the fact that the underlying relation of temporal
precedence is reflexive. Hence one of the general principles F satisfies is 
Reflexivity: 7
(A5) p o Fp
I can see no reason why (31) or (32) should be contradictory. In particular, the 
Bridge axiom (B) no longer creates havoc: in relation with the above two 
propositions, it only leads to conclusions concerning Heinz’s ignorance about 
his own future epistemic states, as the reader is invited to verify.8 But then, once 
the conflict between the interpretation of (1) and the above principles of 
knowledge and desire has been resolved, (3) no longer comes out as 
contradictory either. Hence more ought to be done to arrive at a semantic 
explanation of what is wrong with (3). 
3.2 Presupposition
According to (A0), which has not been brought into action so far (as the reader 
may have noticed), knowledge implies truth. Hence (A0) only partially accounts 
for the well-known factivity of wissen. This is in line with a lot of previous work 
in epistemic logic, but also in partition semantics, where the presuppositional
7 Cf. Prior (1967), Chapter VII, for the irreflexive variant of F. The implicational directions of
(A0) and (A5) are reversed, because K is universal and F existential; by duality, (A5) also
corresponding to reflexivity. 
8 (31), or (32), may still be contradictory for independent reasons. To establish their 
consistency, the logical and metaphysical principles regarding time, knowledge, and desire 
would have to be made explicit – which is clearly too ambitious a task to be attacked in this
short note.
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nature of factivity is frequently treated as a quantité négligeable. However, Kjell
Johan Sæbø (2005) recently argued that a full treatment of factivity within 
partition semantics could be employed to give a simple explanation of why 
know, but not believe, may embed interrogatives. I will now argue that it can
also help explaining the oddness of (3). 
In order to account for the factivity of wissen we must trade the above 
classical framework for one that allows for partial intensions. To keep notational
changes and extravagances to a minimum, I will only add presuppositions as 
side-conditions to those meaning assignments from Section 2.1 that directly 
affect the problem under scrutiny, beginning with a replacement of (8) by: 
(34) wissen a (Q)(x)  1 iff Epix (a)  Qa  // a  Qa
In (34), the presupposition is given immediately to the right of the double-slash. 
Hence (34) abbreviates: 
(35)
wissen a (Q)(x)  
1 iff Epix (a)  Qa  and a  Qa ;
0  iff Epix (a)  Qa  and a  Qa;
undefined otherwise.
­
®
°
¯
°
The presupposition in (34) makes sure that the extension of wissen only yields a 
truth value (given a subject) if the complement clause expresses a true 
proposition. In case this complement is a dass-clause, the proposition denoted is 
its intension; hence (34) does impose factivity. If, on the other hand, the 
complement is of the form ob S, the presupposition will only create a truth value 
gap if the intension of S is undefined for the index a under consideration;
otherwise, according to (7),9 the complement denotes a proposition that is true at 
a: the ob-clause denotes the true of two alternatives, and that the true of the two
is true is a truism! In other words, the presupposition imposed by (34) is always 
satisfied if Q happens to be the denotation of an ob-clause (as long as the 
presuppositions of the latter are satisfied). There is thus an asymmetry in the 
presupposition behaviour of dass-clause embedding wissen and its ob-clause
embedding use: the former, but not the latter, is a presupposition trigger. This 
asymmetry will help to settle the puzzle about (3); for it will carry over to 
embeddings of wissen under will.
What remains to be done is to adapt the interpretational clause (30) for will
to the case where the embedded material carries a presupposition. I will assume 
9 Unless specified otherwise, the classical conditions from Section 2.1 are understood as only 
carrying the presupposition that all the terms occurring in them have a denotation. Hence (7) 
only presupposes that S has a truth value at point a.
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that in such a case the presupposition must be part of the subject’s knowledge.10
However, we must take care of the implicit future shift observed in the previous 
sub-section: since the desired state of affairs need not already obtain, its 
presuppositions need not be known to hold at the time the report is about either. 
We thus arrive at the following presupposition scheme: 
(36) }'somefor},1,0{)(),{()( // )30( )',( ttxPLStwaEpi twx t
For simplicity, let us continue to assume (10), whereby the clause Gaby im Büro 
ist is presupposition-less. Then, given (36), the proposition expressed by (3) – 
i.e. the set of indices at which its extension is (defined and) 1 – turns out to be: 
(37) WFKgKFg
Since (37) derives from the (amended) classical analysis (31) by intersecting it 
with the presupposition triggered by will, this result is neither surprising nor 
exciting. But it is sufficient to obtain the desired contradiction. For (37) is at 
odds with (B), which we may directly apply to its left conjunct, leading us from 
(37) to: 
(38) KFKgKFg
By the temporal Reflexivity axiom (A5), (38) may be rewritten as (39), to which 
the contrapositive of Disjunctive Weakening (A2) can be applied, yielding (40): 
(39) K(KgFKg)KFg
KKgKFg(40)
By Positive Introspection (A3), again taken contrapositively, we can get rid of 
one of the Ks in the left conjunct of (40); given (A5), we may thus conclude 
(41) from (40): 
(41) K(gFg)KFg
But (41) is clearly inconsistent, in view of the disjunction principle (A2). We 
thus conclude that (3) is incoherent in that the proposition it expresses is 
necessarily inconsistent. The reader is invited to verify this result in a direct
way, without taking the detour via logical notation. 
10 In that respect (36) is stronger than the usual assumption (made about English want) that
the presupposition need only be true according to the subject; cf. Karttunen (1974). I do not 
have anything to say about this matter, except that (36) is useful when it comes to explaining 
the oddness of (3) as a case of necessary presupposition failure.
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The above reasoning started out with the factive presupposition triggered by 
wissen and filtered by will. It will thus not carry over to (1) where, as we have 
seen, the embedded infinitival is presupposition-less. Thus Sæbø’s asymmetry 
between propositional and interrogative knowledge saves us from paradox. 
4 The View from English 
A superficial comparison between the samples obtained by googling will wissen
dass and wants to know that indicates that English speakers appear to be a lot 
more comfortable than their German counterparts with directly reporting desires 
for propositional knowledge.11 If the above analysis is correct, then this 
difference between German will and English want as regards the embeddability
of epistemic reports must be explained in terms of presupposition management,
i.e. triggering and/or projection. I will have to leave this to future research.
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